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ABSTRACT 
The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) pursued a vision to bring racial harmony to a 
nation divided. CORE—regionally known as the Chicago Committee of Racial 
Equality—began in the spring of 1942 in Chicago through the work of James Farmer, 
George Houser, Bernice Fisher, Homer Jack, James Robinson, and Joe Guinn. This group 
of young idealists directed its attention to social action and according to August Meier 
and Elliott Rudwick applied Gandhian techniques of nonviolent direct action to the 
resolution of racial conflict in the United States.
1
 THE CORE WAY: THE CONGRESS 
OF RACIAL EQUALITY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT—1942-1968 
reexamines CORE, its members, philosophies, and transitions. 
Chapter one, A New Reflection: Revisiting the Voices of CORE‟s Past—The Birth of 
CORE 1942, looks at the formation of the organization in 1942 and the development of 
its foundational principles and ideas. Chapter two, Reconciling the Journey of 
Reconciliation: The Revealing of the Congress of Racial Equality—1947, looks at the 
Journey of Reconciliation and how CORE put into practice nonviolent direct action—one 
of its main ideological principles. Chapter three, Until the Cup That We Drink from Is the 
Very Same: The 1961 CORE Freedom Ride, builds upon chapter two with a look at the 
Freedom Ride of 1961. It chronicles the overwhelming commitment of the organization 
to racial integration and harmony. Chapter four, We‟re Sick and Tired of Being Sick and 
Tired: The Transitional CORE Years—1960-1966, begins to highlight the fracturing of 
CORE and its transition away from some of its traditional initiative, campaigns, but more 
                                                          
1
 August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, “How CORE Began,” Social Science Quarterly, 
(March 1969), 789-799. 
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importantly foundational principles. Finally, chapter five, The Opening of Pandora‟s 
Box: CORE at a Crossroads, examines the shift away from the original goals of CORE 
and the creation of a new direction.  
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THE CORE OF IT: THE JOURNEY OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY 
  I must admit I have lived an extremely privileged life. The idea of struggling or 
going without has never crossed my mind and until this day, I can honestly say that type 
of mentality does not exist for me. My parents endowed me with luxuries and necessities 
and instilled the confidence in me to understand I can do anything I set my mind on. I 
went to the best of schools and was exposed to all types of cultures. I never truly 
understood the concept of limitations due to ethnicity until I began to study history—
especially American history. Now, I may come across as somewhat spoiled, naïve, even 
arrogant, but it is because of this comfortable life, I believe I appreciate the never-ending 
efforts of CORE in their initial years. Understanding these men and women and their 
actions are a doorway for me to understand that my comfortable life came at a cost from 
this previous generation. I can still recall asking my parents about their childhood, 
teenage and young adulthood years, where segregation in schools and neighborhoods was 
the norm. My father being an open book expressed to me the deplorable reality of my 
great-grandfather being addressed as boy in Halls, Tennessee by white residents or my 
mother living on the all black Harriet street in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The idea of second-
class citizenship was a reality for my parents and grandparent‟s generation, while for me 
it is an historical construct to explore and teach.  
These personal stories of struggle, discrimination and limitation intrigued me and 
left the budding historian in me wanting to know more. It is not enough to make brief 
mention of these individuals and their actions; but it is crucial that each new generation—
especially the young African-American generation—realize the past is relevant today.  
Only a few decades separate this generation from the Jack Spratt Coffeehouse and 
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Stoners restaurant discriminatory policies. These events are a reflection of the struggles 
not only for African-Americans but also for our nation in its quest for the democratic 
dream of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Congress of Racial Equality 
played a fundamental part in this pursuit. Its goals, desires, actions, philosophies, and 
difficulties contributed to the society that exists today. Now, I am not arguing today‟s 
society is fully equal, but without the nonviolent direct action campaigns of CORE during 
the Civil Rights Movement, the plausibility of having Barrack Obama as the president of 
the United States is rather small. The concept of CORE was innovative in 1942. They 
pursued alternative tactics to the problem of inequality in the United States and attacked 
this inequality at its core. CORE envisioned an American society that rejected racial 
inequality and worked toward a nation in harmony. For CORE members having unity, 
love, and peace internationally was pointless if these same elements did not exist 
internally in the United States. Jack Spratt Coffeehouse and Stoner‟s restaurant was the 
start of CORE, but its nonviolent direct action platform grew and spread across this 
country and penetrated into every aspect of American life. CORE brought about 
substantive change in this nation. In order to understand the movement, one must 
appreciate the people and organizations involved in the movement. They reflect both 
internally and externally the tumultuous period in which our nation battled between racial 
segregation and racial harmony.  
CORE was a part of that battle during the movement. It began as an organization 
committed to racial integration and racial harmony. As James Robinson, a CORE 
member stated, “this country will achieve integration, and CORE‟s nonviolent direct 
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action will make the process less [acidic].”
2
 Yet, as time passed, the organization lost that 
commitment and redirected itself in a new direction. This dissertation takes a look at the 
journey of CORE from an organization committed to racial equality to one committed to 
a strong Black Nationalism platform. The once united organization with its platform of 
nonviolent direct action was gone and in its place was a new CORE order. The goal of 
this dissertation is to understand the reasons why this change took place. Was it the white 
paternalistic leadership, the new urban black members, or frustration over the lack of true 
equality existing in this country?  Through exhaustive use of the CORE Archives from 
the State Historical Society of Madison, Wisconsin, the August Meier papers from the 
Schomburg Center at the New York Library, and a plethora of books, articles, and 
documentaries I have presented how CORE transitioned from the goal of racial 
integration to Black Nationalism.  
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 Interview with James Robinson in August Meier Papers at Schomburg Center, New 
York Public Library. 
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A NEW REFLECTION: REVISTING THE VOICES OF CORE‟S PAST 
CHAPTER ONE: THE BIRTH OF CORE: 1942 
 
My mother, Barbara Ann Frierson Johnson, was just a year old when her father 
moved the family from Tuscaloosa, Alabama to Ypsilanti, Michigan in 1940. My 
grandfather wanted a better life for his wife and five daughters. He envisioned the North 
as a place of opportunity and prosperity. Ypsilanti was a better place for my grandfather 
and his family. He was able to work and provide for his family. He even built their home 
on the famous Harriet Street.
3
 This place was much better than the Jim Crow south he 
moved his family out of, or was it.  My grandfather easily recognized Jim Crow in the 
South. He knew his place as a black man in Alabama and acted accordingly. Moving 
North was a chance for change, but in reality, my grandfather faced segregation and 
racism. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) grew out of this environment of 
segregation and racism.  
        The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) existed long before a group of young 
radicals in Chicago decided to form an interracial organization devoted to destroying 
racial inequality. The seeds of the organization rest in the pacifist principles of the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), a progressive organization that surfaced after World 
War I.  Members of the FOR believed that the beneficial measures of peace and non-
violence solved the problems facing humanity. These men and women opposed war and 
inequality. Within this initial FOR vision is where CORE developed. The FOR became 
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 Harriet Street was the first glimpse of segregation for my grandfather in the North. 
Harriet Street housed all the black families that lived in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The house 
he built still stands today in an integrated neighborhood. 
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the architectural blueprint for future CORE chapters. One must look at the origin and 
vision of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in order to understand CORE.  
 “We are at one in Christ and can never be at war,”
4
 stated English Quaker Henry 
Hodgkin and German Lutheran Friedrich Sigmund-Schulze, who were determined to 
ignite a worldwide pursuit to end war. Their pledge encouraged 130 Christians globally, 
of all denominations, to come together in 1914 in Cambridge, England, to denounce war. 
Out of this gathering, the Fellowship of Reconciliation established an international 
religious antiwar movement. Five basic principles united members of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation: 
1. That love as revealed and interpreted in the life and death of Jesus Christ 
involves more than we have yet seen, that is the only power by which evil can 
be overcome and the only sufficient basis of human society. 
 
2.  That, in order to establish a world-order based on Love, it is incumbent upon 
those who believe in this principle to accept it fully, both for themselves and 
in relation to others and to take the risks involved in doing so in a world which 
does not yet accept it. 
 
3. That therefore, as Christians, we are forbidden to wage war, and that our 
loyalty to our country, to humanity, to the Church Universal, and to Jesus 
Christ our Lord and Master, calls us instead to a life-service for the 
enthronement of Love in personal, commercial, and national life. 
 
4.  That the Power, Wisdom, and Love of God stretch far beyond the limits of 
our present experience, and that He is ever waiting to break forth into human 
life in new and larger ways. 
 
5. That since God manifests Himself in the world through men and women, we 
offer ourselves to His redemptive purpose to be used by Him in whatever way 
He may reveal to us.
5
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 Quote from Henry Hodgkin and Friedrich Sigmund-Schulze. Fellowship of 
Reconciliation Papers. Library of Political and Economic Science HUB Archives. 
London, England. 
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The members of the FOR were pacifists who wanted to change mentalities on a global 
level. They were committed to the absolutist form of pacifism, which states that “all 
forms of violence, war, and killing [are] unconditionally wrong.”
6
 These men and 
women, ranged in age, culture, and nationality, but together they envisioned a world 
that solved its problems through dialogue and not military action. They were all 
pacifists who proclaimed and labeled themselves conscientious objectors to all wars. 
The Fellowship of Reconciliation began an American chapter in Garden City, Long 
Island, in 1915. This chapter engaged in “waging peace” in the pursuit of ending all 
wars and spreading its political and religious ideology of pacifism. “The Fellowship,” 
according to Calvin Craig Miller author of  No Easy Answers: Bayard Rustin and the 
Civil Rights Movement, “did not believe achieving peace was a passive process, gained 
only by avoiding war.”
7
 Rather, these men and women centered their rhetoric on the 
idea of Christian love and peace. “To know in one‟s inmost being,” John D‟Emilio 
lamented, “the unity of all men in God; to express love at every moment and in every 
relationship, to be channels of this quiet and unobtrusive, persistent force which is 
always there… this is the meaning of pacifism.”
8
 One main purpose of the Fellowship 
was to create an environment in which people embraced this notion of Christian love 
                                                          
6
  Maire A. Dugan, “Nonviolence and Nonviolent Direct Action.” Beyond Intractability. 
Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of 
Colorado, Boulder. (Posted: September 2003) 
7
  Calvin Craig Miller, No Easy Answers:  Bayard Rustin and the Civil Rights Movement, 
(Morgan Reynolds: Greensboro, North Carolina, 2005) 47. 
8
    John D‟Emilio, Lost Prophet: The Life and times of Bayard Rustin, (The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago: 2003) 43. 
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and peace. “A.J. Muste, the chief executive of the American chapter eloquently 
summarized the platform of FOR: “If I can‟t love Hitler, I can‟t love at all.”
9
 This was 
the embodiment of the organization, which encouraged people to hate the sin, but love 
the sinner. “Either we ought to resign from the world,” Muste noted, “… or else we 
must resolutely carry our political task to the end.”
10
  
One of the FOR‟s major “political tasks” was the resolute support of 
conscientious objectors. During World War II, three major figures within the 
Fellowship, as well as future CORE co-founders, were George Houser, James Farmer, 
and Bayard Rustin, all of whom confronted the  power of the government to draft  them 
into the war. For resisting the legal authority of the government to draft men into the 
Army, George Houser was among the first to be sentenced to a year and a day in 1940.  
 Bayard Rustin‟s battle for conscientious objection proved more complicated than 
Houser„s resistance and imprisonment. By 1943, when he received his order from the 
draft board to report for a physical examination, Rustin felt that religious objection to 
the war was not the only legitimate option to oppose the war. Whether religious or non-
religious, Rustin believed that an individual had the right to exercise his freedom of 
conscience. Rustin argued to the draft board: 
I cannot voluntarily submit to an order stemming from the selective service act. 
War is wrong, Conscription is a concomitant of modern war…. Conscription for 
war is inconsistent with freedom of conscience, which is not merely the right to 
believe but to act on the degree of truth that one receives,…. I regret that I must 
break the law of the State. I am prepared for whatever may follow.
11
 
                                                          
9
   Miller, No Easy Answers, 47. 
10
  John D„Emilio, Lost Prophet, 43. 
11
 Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rustin: Troubles I‟ve Seen, (New York: NY: Harper Collins: 
1997) 98. 
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At protest rallies across the nation, Rustin echoed the above sentiment to young 
men. This action sealed his fate with the United States draft board. Rustin was arrested 
for his vocalized objection to the war, and on February 17, 1944, he was found guilty of 
resisting the Selective Service System. Rustin was sentenced to three years in federal 
prison, a harsher sentence than Houser, due in part to his urging of other men to burn 
their draft cards. Rustin spent a total of twenty-seven months in the Federal Correctional 
Institution in Ashland, Kentucky; upon his release in August 1945 he appeared 
emotionally and physically drained, but still devoted to conscientious objection, 
pacifism, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.
12
  
     James Farmer chose to submit a DSS Form 47, the form to apply for 
conscientious objector status. Farmer‟s experience was indicative of the average 
conscientious objector and pacifist. From a religious and humanitarian standpoint, 
people of different cultures and nationalities had a process in place to avoid the 
destructive nature of violence and wars. Farmer relied on this process. In his letter to the 
draft board, he wrote that for two reasons, fighting in any war was not an option for 
him. One, Farmer argued, was  his “unalterable opposition to war” because war was an 
action of mass murder; and, two, “there was simply no way [he] could, in conscience, 
enter the United States‟ racially segregated armed forces to fight for freedom, liberty, 
and equality on other parts of the globe.”
13
  Farmer, like Houser and Rustin, was willing 
to go to jail to uphold the principles of conscientious objection, but the draft board 
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 John D‟Emilio, Lost Prophet, Picture 9 page four. 
13
 James Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart, (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University 
Press,1985) 81. 
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deferred him labeling him a “minister of the gospel.”
14
 Houser, Rustin, and Farmer were 
conscientious objectors and devout pacifists on a “personal moral” journey, a journey 
that prevented them from “violating the principles of Christian fellowship.”
15
 Engrained 
in the actions of the Fellowship was the literal belief that “I am my brother‟s keeper.”      
 Waging peace, while a commendable goal, was a difficult struggle. To ensure the 
success of the FOR platform, Muste and other Fellowship members adopted the 
Gandhian principle of non-violent direct action or Satyagraha. Muste, a devout follower 
of Gandhi, noted that “pacifism with Gandhi [was] not a tool you pick up or lay down, 
use today but not tomorrow…. It was a way of life.”
16
  Pacifists like Muste wanted 
people to understand not only that war damaged governments, but also that it decimated 
the essence of humanity.  
 The Gandhian technique of Satyagraha became the political vehicle through 
which the FOR sought to achieve its pacifist and egalitarian ideals. Literally meaning 
“truth force,” Satyagraha was part of a process for achieving love, peace, and the 
destruction of war. As Richard Gregg, an American Quaker, argued in the “The Power 
of Nonviolence,” the use of non-violent resistance became a “moral jujitsu” in which an 
opponent “loses” his moral balance” because violence as a legitimate response is 
eliminated.  
  Nonviolent direct action became a moral principle in which, fellowship members‟ 
endured violent action in the hopes of converting their opponents. “Conversion 
                                                          
14
 Farmer, Lay Bare, 82.  
15
 D‟Emilio, Lost Prophet, 40. 
16
  Miller, No Easy Answers, 49. 
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[removed],” Bo Wirmark noted in Nonviolent Methods and the American Civil Rights 
Movement that, “the opponent‟s reason for resisting, rather than his ability to resist. It 
[made] him accept a more favorable image of the campaigner and regard his aim as 
legitimate.”
17
  While the hope of using nonviolent direct action was to change the 
mentality of the opponent, it was not the main objective. Quite often, persuading the 
opponent to accept the “new image of the nonviolent actor, an image which 
[discouraged] the use of violence against him/her…”
18
 was the goal of the Fellowship‟s 
nonviolent direct action. The FOR and CORE wanted to eliminate social injustice in the 
face of violence. These men and women worked toward stripping agency away from 
violence with peaceful nonviolent tactics. The FOR and CORE, unlike their 
counterparts, gave greater agency to their own cause in not resorting to violence. 
The FOR believed that, “Gandhi‟s philosophy, nonviolence—not just non-injury but 
positive goodwill toward the evildoer—was the indispensable cornerstone of ethical 
action. Nonviolence was not just a means to other ends, it was itself the highest end, and 
all other goals were subordinate to it. There was no desirable political goal that would 
not be compromised and distorted were violence used to attain it. Gandhi counseled his 
followers that if they perfected their means, desirable ends would inevitably follow.” 
19
 
 
                                                          
17
  Bo Wirmark, “Nonviolent Methods and the American Civil Rights Movement 1955-
1965,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 11, no. 2 (1974): 115. http://www.jstor.org 
(accessed October 13, 2006). 
18
 Wirmark, “Nonviolent Methods,” 115. 
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 M. K. Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments with Truth (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1948) and M. K. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa (Triplicane, Madras: 
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This belief solidified the Fellowship‟s Christian pacifist ideologies and its moral 
commitment to work for revolutionary change through nonviolent means. 
 The FOR wanted to rid the world of war through peaceful action. Gandhi and his 
philosophy of Satyagraha was a means to that end. This new social struggle for the 
Fellowship manifested into social actions. The Harlem Ashram was one of these 
actions. This interracial living experiment established in 1940 by Jay Holmes Smith, a 
Methodist minister who spent close to a decade in India studying Satyagraha, created an 
environment that “developed spiritual discipline and cultivated an ascetic Gandhian 
sensibility.
20
  While its residents noted numerous flaws, from the dingy dirty rooms to 
the awful food, the community living there fostered an environment that applied the 
principles of Satyagraha to the pacifist and civil rights movements developing in the 
United States. Smith created a place where pacifists enhanced their intellectual 
understanding of Gandhian principles of nonviolent direct action. These peace radicals 
read influential works, such as Thoreau‟s essay on civil disobedience; The Power of 
Violence, by Richard Gregg; The Conquest of Violence, by Bartolemeo de Ligt; and the 
most influential War Without Violence, by Krishnalal Shridharani. These works, 
especially Shirdharani‟s War Without Violence became, as Rustin noted, “our gospel, 
our bible.”
21
 Reverend Glen Smilley, a FOR staff member, recalled that, “a small 
number of people in New York , including A.J. Muste, A. Philip Randolph, and John 
Haynes, met to discuss [Shirdharani‟s] book and its possible application to the racial 
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  Anderson, Troubles, 70. 
21
 Anderson, Troubles, 69. 
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conditions in the United States.”
22
 These men contemplated how to take these 
philosophical ideologies and apply them to an action plan. The discussions in the 
Harlem Ashram had lasting effects not only on the future of the Fellowship, but also on 
race conditions in the United States. As Smiley noted, “It was a tiny pebble thrown into 
a pond, but its resulting ripples and waves were to have an extraordinary influence upon 
the future of civil rights activism in America.”
23
  
 The Harlem Ashram was a mecca for people to discuss principles and establish 
new organizations like the Committee for Non-Violent Direct Action and the Free India 
Committee. These two organizations revealed the Fellowship‟s devotion to not only its 
antiwar platform, but also its growing commitment to the struggle for black equality in 
the United States. Since the Fellowship of Reconciliation had committed itself in the 
1930‟s to conscientious objection, pacifism, the Gandhian technique of Satyagraha, 
global peace, and racial equity, one might wonder why there was a need to establish the 
Congress of Racial Equality in 1942. The intent of the Fellowship was to focus on 
correcting social and global issues that morally corrupted the world. In order to achieve 
the goals A.J. Muste believed there was a need for a revolutionary approach to the 
struggle.  A.J. Muste envisioned an organization that adopted a more aggressive 
platform that would transform society. As Muste stated, “in a world built on violence, 
one must be a revolutionary before one can be a pacifist… a non-revolutionary pacifist 
is a contradiction in terms, a monstrosity.”
24
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 Anderson, Troubles, 69. 
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 Anderson, Troubles, 70. 
24
  D„Emilio, Lost Prophet, 40. 
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As the 1940‟s began, Muste focused on achieving social justice at home, through a 
massive nonviolent movement, as well as an, resistance to war.  
 The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was the product.  Abraham Johannes 
Muste expressed his beliefs and leadership during World War II. He vehemently wanted 
to expand the agenda of the Fellowship of Reconciliation to confront racial problems in 
the United States. Muste wanted to establish a more aggressive organization, in which the 
“…only valid objective [was] the transformation of society, not the building of a shelter 
for its saints.”
25
 By 1941, Muste wanted to create a revolutionary movement that 
encompassed more than resistance to war, but contributed to establishing an interracial 
and equal society in the United States. The road to this revolutionary agenda was not an 
easy one.  
While Muste envisioned a revolutionary movement that went beyond the scope of 
global war, the majority of the National Council of the Fellowship of Reconciliation was 
immensely cautious and advocated against such a drastic change in philosophy and 
direction. “On social activism,” as D‟Emilio noted, “they [the national council] were 
conservative. They did agree that they would not participate in war, and that was the only 
cement.”
26
 The suggestion of a racial revolution at home made the comfortable lives of 
these middle class Americans far more complex. Muste wanted The National Council of 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation to adhere fully to its convictions. As Muste declared, 
“Either we ought to resign from the world… or else we must resolutely carry our political 
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  D‟Emilio, Lost Prophet,40. 
26
 D‟Emilio, Lost Prophet,43. 
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task to its end.”
27
 Muste implored the members of the council to take action against the 
internal injustices in the United States. These men and women wanted to avoid conflict 
and maintain a sense of peace and tranquility, but as Gregory Vlastos, a theologian stated, 
“He who preaches love in a society based upon injustice can purchase immunity from 
conflict only at the price of hypocrisy.”
28
 In not pursuing this new direction, the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation was condoning the oppression of the African American race 
in the United States.  As D‟Emilio noted, “the Christian pacifists of the FOR sought to 
end war, [while members of the race relation cells] wished to eliminate injustice.”
29
 
 Muste began the process of expanding the Fellowship of Reconciliation by 
establishing “race relation cells.” These activists that had the same fervor for combating 
racial inequality as Muste. These young men and women had a “lean and hungry look,” 
needed to create change in the country.
 30
   
James Farmer was one of the first activists to work with these cells.  Farmer 
understood from an early age the evils of racial segregation and discrimination. Growing 
up in Mississippi, Farmer endured racial slurs, and he witnessed the humiliation of his 
father at the hands of white southerners. He questioned why a segment of white society 
reduced blacks to second-class citizenship in the United States. Muste wanted a 
revolution, and Farmer gave him the pathway to achieve that goal. In April 1942 Farmer, 
along with George Houser, Bernice Fisher, Homer Jack, James Robinson, and Joe Guinn, 
took steps to establish the Chicago Committee of Racial Equality under the auspices of 
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FOR.
31
 They proposed to the Fellowship of Reconciliation a nationwide “distinctive and 
radical”
32
 interracial movement that embraced Gandhian principles of nonviolence, and 
that would employ these principles in the struggle to end racial segregation, 
discrimination, and inequality. Farmer envisioned this organization going beyond an anti-
war grouping. “Peace,” Farmer recalled later, “was number one for [Muste], whereas for 
me the priority was racial equality.”
33
 Farmer proposed an organization engaged in 
“nonviolent direct action protests and sit-ins, if necessary, to combat racial segregation 
and discrimination.”
34
  He wanted a “movement comprised of a pacifist nucleus: black, 
white, Jewish and Gentile, all mobilized into a Gandhian approach to integration.”
35
 The 
goals were monumental: “Not to make housing in ghettos more tolerable, but to destroy 
residential segregation; not to make Jim Crow facilities the equal to others, but to abolish 
Jim Crow; not to make racial discrimination more bearable, but to wipe it out”
36
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 These men and one woman wanted to establish a course of action that, according to 
Darlene Clark Hine, made “America live up to the ideals of equality and justice.”
37
 
Farmer reflected the same sentiment; in his memoir Lay Bare the Heart, he wrote, 
 As we swept by the pregnant earth of Ohio farms on that spring day in 1942, there 
was already talk about our giving birth that year to a revolution in race relations 
with a technique new to America that would change the face of this nation. The 
Blessed Community and the Family of Christ are rent asunder by the evil practice 
of apartheid in America, which will not end until the decent and the religious 
people of the land will it so. God willing, segregation will end when the good 
people withdraw their  cooperation from it and stop, willingly or unwillingly, 
giving it their support. What I am proposing is that the FOR, because of its 
thorough-going commitment to nonviolence and brotherhood, take the lead in 
setting up a vehicle through which no cooperation with evil can be forged into a 
national movement.
38
  
 
 
These six members of the FOR race relations peace team set into motion an 
uncompromising agenda that displayed their deep-rooted beliefs in integration and 
pacifism. They reflected a new generation of pacifists that no longer drew their 
inspiration from Henry Hodgkin and Friedrich Sigmund Schulze—which later was a 
point of contention between A.J. Muste and CORE founders—but rather used “Gandhian 
nonviolence to [attack] racism in the United States.”
39
 George Houser echoed this new 
challenge in the FOR pacifism, writing in 1945:  
Since two-thirds of all the peoples of the world are colored, if racial democracy is 
not realized there is not much hope of creating permanently much of any other 
kind of democracy in the world. And racial democracy must consist in 
unequivocal recognition of equality among human beings regardless of race, 
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color, religion, national origin, or ancestry, in our social relations, government, 
industry, labor, law, and education. People do not have to be all of the same color, 
religion, height, or weight, or with long, round, or square heads in order that their 
personalities may be considered of equal human worth and dignity.
40
  
 
Pacifism remained the preached message of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, but a new 
national movement was emerging out of the FOR, one that advocated fighting 
nonviolently for real democracy and racial equality.  
 CORE envisioned a transformed United States where men and women of diverse 
cultures came together to establish harmony in a nation clearly divided along social, 
political, cultural, and racial lines. The current lack of harmony affected not only the 
people of the nation, but the nation itself. In order for America to be true to its ideals, it 
first had to recognize its weaknesses and eliminate them. The Congress of Racial 
Equality argued divisions within the country, like the lack of “organic unity of the human 
family,”
41
 was a destructive weakness in the United States. The American people needed 
to acknowledge that the reality of the African American‟s economic, political and social 
experience in the United States tarnished the American creed of human equality. 
42
 
CORE desired to uphold this American creed, which Gunnar Myrdal had described in An 
American Dilemma as: 
These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the 
fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, 
justice, and fair opportunity ….these tenets were written into the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill of  Rights and into the 
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constitutions of the several states. The ideals of the  American Creed have thus 
become the highest law of the land.
43
 
 
CORE wanted everyone in this country to have equal access to the “highest law of the 
land. 
  “African Americans,” according to the historian John D‟Emilio, “had been 
resisting racial oppression, [and fighting for the American creed], for generations.”
4445
  
CORE, though, explored new territory with its mindset of nonviolent direct action. 
CORE took the movement to the streets and provided a national voice for nonviolent 
resistance.  The nonviolent resistance of CORE became a way of life, not just a formal 
policy, for men and women in this country to forge human relationships based upon 
equality.
46
 
 CORE became the focal point of the nonviolent direct action society in 1942 with 
the subsidizing support of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, but the question remained, 
how do you take an ideology and make it a reality? What was the viability of protests, sit-
ins, stand-ins, and jail-ins? What was going to ensure this organization‟s success in 
achieving its goal of racial harmony? Passion was not lacking, but to provide momentum 
for CORE in 1942, there had to be an action plan. The action plan devised by CORE 
defined the relationship between CORE and the philosophy of nonviolence. James 
Farmer and his comrades characterized nonviolence as a “powerful social force that 
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highlighted three major points: (1) the power of active good will and no retaliation; (2) 
the power of public opinion against an injustice; (3) the power of refusing to be a party to 
injustice, as illustrated by the boycott and strike.”
47
 
 CORE took these three points and created a platform to change the social 
constructs in the United States. CORE‟s belief was that nonviolent action could resolve 
the racial problems of the country. CORE‟s founders and new members embraced the 
notion that a “spirit of good will, [respect] and understanding contributed to ending 
discrimination and [fostering] an integrated society where each member [was] judged 
solely on the basis of his individual worth.”
48
  
 In order for CORE‟s nonviolent direct action plan to work, the organization 
needed a one hundred percent commitment to the Gandhian principle of Satyagraha. 
Martin Luther King Jr., wrote of this commitment in Stride Toward Freedom. King 
noted, 
Bomb our homes and threaten our children; send your hooded perpetrators of 
violence into our communities and drag us out on some wayside road, beating us 
and leaving us half dead, and we will still love you. But we will soon wear you 
down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our  freedom we will so appeal to 
your heart and conscience that we will win you in the process.
49
  
 
 The “race relations” team of James Farmer, Bernice Fisher, Jimmy Robinson, Joe 
Guinn, Homer Jack, Bob Chino and Hugo Victoreen wasted no time in challenging racial 
segregation through non-violent direct action. As Farmer noted in Lay Bare the Heart, 
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“May 1942, we began what I believe to be the first organized civil rights sit-in in 
American history.”
50
  Chicago CORE launched its first campaign to eliminate 
discriminatory practices at Jack Spratt Coffee House. In an earlier visit, Farmer and 
Robinson, a white graduate student at the University of Chicago, faced blatant 
discrimination. Farmer recalled the manager‟s reaction to him and Robinson coming into 
the restaurant. “You‟ll have to get out of here,” the owner said, “We can‟t serve you 
here.” Farmer, bewildered by the comment, responded simply, “Why can‟t you?” Not 
waiting for an answer, Robinson pointed out to the restaurant manager that he was in 
violation of state law. Robinson stated, “I suppose you realize that there is a civil rights 
law in this state forbidding this kind of practice. Now, if you don‟t serve us, I promise 
that you‟re going to pay the stiffest penalty that the law allows.”
51
   
While Robinson‟s words were more aggressive than the traditional Gandhian 
method, they were effective. The manager responded by taking both his and Farmer‟s 
order. The discrimination did not end with this exchange of words. The manager tried to 
overcharge Farmer for a cup of coffee and two donuts. Claiming the donuts were a dollar 
a piece, Farmer replied, “that is rather steep for donuts, don‟t you think?” Robinson 
interceded and said, “I‟ve gotten donuts here at two for a nickel and that‟s the price we‟re 
going to pay.”
52
 After Jim Robinson paid one dollar for both the coffees and two donuts, 
he and Farmer left the Jack Spratt coffeehouse.  
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This experience ignited the spark for CORE‟s first action plan to end the 
discriminatory practices in public facilities. Within forty-eight hours Farmer, Robinson, 
Joe Guinn, a black youth in the community, Winnie Christie, Farmer‟s first wife, Bernice 
Fisher, one of the initial founders and members of CORE, and a handful of white students 
returned to Jack Spratt Coffeehouse to start a non-violent direct action protest.  
 Robinson and Fisher trained these men and women in Gandhian nonviolent direct 
action. Their structured action plan included four major components. The first component 
was: 
1. Preparation: Knowing the types of discrimination facing your group  
a. Refusal of service 
b. Being seated reluctantly and in an obscure place 
c. Being forcibly ejected 
d. Discrimination in food—irregular food—garbage sandwiches 
and or small portions 
e. Overcharging 
2. Secondly, CORE instituted ways to counter act this discrimination 
a. Stage a small sit-down. Ask for the manager or someone 
responsible for the policy 
b. Sometimes one may request another seat, although this is not 
advisable if establishing a court case. 
c. Stand your ground, accept violence if necessary and do not 
retort nor respond violently. 
d. Ask to see the manager or someone responsible. If establishing 
a court case, take a sample of the food. 
e. Call attention to the fact of overcharging, but pay your bill, as 
refusal might prejudice your position. 
3. Thirdly, CORE encouraged follow up through negotiation. 
a. Whenever service is refused or is very poor, there should be a 
follow-up. Careful planning is helpful before anything is done. 
The first step is negotiation which must be carried on by 
personal contact, by a designated committee, which should be 
interracial. 
b. When repeated negotiations fail, more direct action can be 
taken, such as passing out leaflets, picketing, talking to patrons, 
sit-down strikes, etc. 
c. Always ask what possible approach to an understanding has 
not yet been tried. 
22 
 
d. If all efforts at negotiation and arbitration have no effect in 
changing the policy of the restaurant, it may be necessary to 
appeal to the law, but this should be done only when all other 
efforts have failed. 
4. Finally, CORE offered helpful hints for a positive outcome. 
a. Be confident, and assume that you will have trouble being 
served. 
b. Dress neatly and appropriately 
c. Tip your waitress 
d. Always pay your bill 
e. Be observant at all times. Watch particularly the reactions of 
customers and capitalize on sympathetic responses. 
f. If no difficulty is encountered, you may express                                     
appreciation for courteous service to the cashier.
53
 
 
   Robinson and Fisher stressed the need for everyone to be peaceful and orderly, 
never loud or verbally abusive. Unruly behavior was unacceptable; rather a calm friendly 
disposition was the attitude they wanted the protesters to exhibit. As Farmer recalled:  
We were to take available seats at the counter, with each white sitting beside at 
least one black. If there were not enough counter seats, then also use one booth, 
with at least one black and one white sitting there. Whites were either to decline 
to order until all had been served, or to order and pass the food to a black friend 
beside them. If we were served, each person was to leave an appropriate tip and 
give enough money to Jimmy Robinson to cover the bill. He would pay the bill 
for all of us and give us an accounting afterward. In the event we were not served, 
we would sit there for the approximately three and a half hours till closing.
54
  
 
Following this briefing, the group entered Jack Spratt Coffeehouse and took seats at the 
counter. Standing motionless and with his arms folded, the manager did not greet or serve 
the group.  Bernice responded first, “May we have some service please?
55
  Reluctantly, 
the manager signaled the server to take everyone‟s order. Without any climatic incidents, 
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the diners finished their meals. It was, as Farmer noted rather “anticlimactic.”  The 
manager and his staff had complied with the Illinois law, which Robinson mentioned in 
his and Farmer‟s visit. The men and women left their payments on the counter where all 
their checks were stacked and left the coffeehouse. The Jack Spratt Coffeehouse was not 
going to put up a fight, or so Farmer and his comrades thought. But, Farmer recalled: 
Scarcely had the door closed behind the rest of us than it opened again, violently 
this time. The manager ran onto the sidewalk, hurling our money into the street, 
screaming, „take your money and get out! We don‟t want it!‟ Dollar bills fluttered 
and coins rolled. One person started to pick it up, but I said, No. Don‟t touch it; 
leave it there so he can‟t possibly say that we left without paying our bill.
56
 
 
The actions of the manager set in motion Chicago CORE‟s nonviolent direct action plan 
to break Jim Crow practices on the South side of Chicago. The group focused its action 
on three basic steps, (1) investigation—to understand the facts, (2) negotiation—to 
engage in face-to-face discussion to solve the problem, and (3) direct action—if 
discussion proved unsuccessful.  
 The non-violent direct action campaign against Jack Spratt started with a phone 
call to set up a negotiation session to discuss the discriminatory practices of the 
coffeehouse.  When Farmer identified himself, the manager hung up. In response, Farmer 
drafted a letter asking for a meeting to discuss the situation. He requested that the 
manager respond by phone or letter within ten days. When the manager did not respond 
by the deadline, Farmer, Jimmy, and Bernice decided to send two female students—one 
white—one black—to Jack Spratt to open up dialogue with the manager.  Farmer thought 
the manager “would be more receptive and civil to women.”
57
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 When the women arrived, they met a woman, identified later as the owner, who 
agreed to discuss the situation. The woman, who indicated that she was only following 
the policy “dictated by the requirements of business,” said that she feared losing her 
white patrons if she served blacks at her establishment.
 58
 The CORE team replied that 
her business was close enough to the university to offset any potential losses. When the 
woman disagreed, the CORE representatives asked permission to query the present 
customers to ascertain whether they would object to Jack Spratt Coffeehouse serving 
blacks. The woman refused. Determined to prove their point, the CORE team requested 
that a bookkeeper or CPA look over the books after one month of the coffeehouse serving 
all patrons. If there was a loss, the CORE team said they would pay the deficit for that 
month and end the direct action campaign at Jack Spratt.  The woman swiftly turned 
down the offer and walked away, thus ending the negotiation. 
 The night of May 12, 1942, Chicago CORE decided to carry out a large-scale sit-
in at Jack Spratt Coffeehouse on May 15, 1942. White and black men and women 
planned to occupy all available seats in the coffeehouse. Meeting at 4:30, they began 
what Farmer believed was “the first organized civil rights sit-in in American history.”
59
 
Consisting of twenty-eight persons, the group entered Jack Spratt in pairs of two, three, 
and four, with each party having one black woman or man. Filling every available 
counter and booth, the parties waited for a server to serve them. The staff looked to the 
owner, who had cut off negotiation, whether to serve the parties. The staff, who had 
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proceeded to serve the customers not involved with the sit-in, were shocked when these 
customers refused to eat their food and joined the protest.  The owner asked one woman: 
 Is your dinner all right, ma‟am? 
 Oh, I‟m sure it‟s just fine. 
 But you aren‟t eating it. 
 I know. You see it wouldn‟t be very polite of me to begin eating before my 
friends also had been served.
60
 
Other patrons followed suit, they either refused service or ate their meals slowly, 
becoming a part of the protest. At this point, the owner approached Jimmy Robinson and 
offered to seat all the black patrons and serve them in the basement. Farmer responded, 
“No ma‟am. We will not eat in the basement.” The owner suggested, “If you clear out the 
two rear booths, then all the colored people can sit there, and I will have them served.” 
Again, Farmer politely declined with a “No thank you; we are quite comfortable where 
we are.”
61
  
Growing frustrated with the situation, the owner threatened to call the police. Farmer 
responded, “That might be the appropriate thing for her to do.”
62
 
 When the police arrived, they witnessed no one disturbing the peace and asked the 
owner why she called the police? She replied, “I want you to throw these people out.”
63
 
The police stressed they could not throw people out of an establishment if they were not 
in violation of any law. The police officers informed the women, that those sitting in her 
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establishment were not trespassing because she was open for business, and they were not 
causing a riot, thus the police had no justification to remove them from Jack Spratt. Not 
pleased with the officers‟ response, the owner said, “well now, won‟t you throw them out 
on the grounds that we reserve the right to seat our patrons and would serve some of them 
in the basement.”
64
 Growing annoyed with the woman, a police officer said, “No lady, 
there‟s nothing in the law that allows us to do that. You must either serve them or solve 
the problem yourself the best way you can.”
65
 As the police left the Jack Spratt 
coffeehouse, the owner ordered the servers to serve all the parties in the protest.  
 The first nonviolent direct action protest ended with the groups eating their meals, 
paying their bills, leaving good tips, and leaving the Jack Spratt establishment hoping that 
a permanent change in policy was in place. Jimmy Robinson later wrote a letter to Jack 
Spratt to thank the restaurant for its service and change in policy. The Chicago CORE 
chapter, in subsequent protests, did witness the policy change.
66
 
 The sit-in protest at Jack Spratt reflected CORE‟s determination to move the 
country toward equality. CORE‟s approach was action oriented and focused. Unlike the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, CORE believed direct 
action, not legal action, was the solution for blacks in the United States. They wanted 
people and communities to choose integration and eliminate racism on their own, not 
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because a court ordered it. These men and women envisioned a society that “challenged 
[discrimination] directly, without violence or hatred, yet without compromise.”
67
  
 For the Chicago CORE chapter, the battle between racial segregation and racial 
harmony continued in June of 1943. While the sit-in protest at Jack Spratt was successful, 
other establishments in Chicago continued their discriminatory practices. Stoner‟s 
restaurant, a local business in Chicago‟s loop district, openly discriminated against black 
and racially mixed groups that tried to integrate the restaurant. Known for its good food, 
Stoner‟s restaurant was crowded daily with customers waiting in lines for empty tables. 
George Houser took the lead with this direct action protest. After several test visits in 
1942 to Stoner‟s establishment, he concluded that management was extremely hostile to 
any type of integration. This mentality did not deter Houser and Chicago CORE, but 
rather it increased their determination to end the practice of restaurants not serving 
blacks. 
 Houser sent two white females to Stoner‟s restaurant to begin negotiations. The 
negotiations started with one question: why did Stoner pursue these practices? Stoner 
replied: 
I would lose all [my] white trade if colored people came to [my] restaurant…. 90 
percent of [my] trade [is] from women and they would not want to eat beside 
Negroes, [and] if the two races ate in the same restaurant it would lead to 
interracial marriage….
68
  
 
 Stoner denied any responsibility for his discriminatory practices. Houser and 
Chicago CORE responded with sit-in protests. Stoner stayed true to his policy and 
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refused service to the black and racially mixed groups. Houser and Chicago CORE 
responded by handing out leaflets encouraging people not to support an establishment 
that discriminated on the basis of race. Feeling the economic pinch of the protest, Stoner 
began to seat and serve the black and racially-mixed protest groups, but in other ways 
deep-rooted discrimination persisted. After lengthy waits, the servers seated these protest 
groups, and, once seated, they received inedible meals made from garbage and smothered 
in spices, like salt.    
 Stoner felt persecuted by the CORE protest. “Why pick on [me]?” he asked, 
“Don‟t other restaurants discriminate as well?”
69
 Houser and Chicago CORE responded 
by investigating the “policies of all eating establishments within an area of sixteen square 
blocks in the loop.” 
70
 The investigation revealed all the restaurants within the sixteen-
block radius of the 50 loop had non-discriminatory practices and served all patrons. 
 Chicago‟s CORE members turned its attention to executing a large-scale sit-down 
at Stoner‟s restaurant in June 1943 after they had exhausted all measures to persuade 
Stoner to change his policy. Sixty-five persons (sixteen blacks—forty-nine whites) 
pledged to remain in Stoner‟s restaurant, whether seated or standing, all night long, until 
all sixty-five persons had been served. At 4:30 on a Saturday afternoon, white 
participants in twos, threes, and fours entered Stoner‟s restaurant. The servers found no 
difficulty seating all these white participants. The first interracial group did not 
experience the same welcome when it entered the restaurant at 5:15 PM. Stoner‟s staff 
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ignored and refused to serve the group, while other patrons received service.
71
 The group 
remained, standing quietly at the entrance of the restaurant, until a server, pressured by 
white patrons, not with the CORE groups, motioned them to a booth. Stoner, not pleased 
with this action, kicked one of the white participants in the leg when he sat down at the 
booth. 
 With the seating of this group, a third group of ten CORE members (nine blacks-
one white) entered and requested service. For the next hour and a half, the group of ten 
persons stood patiently at the front of the restaurant. Stoner called the police on numerous 
occasions, hoping for the police to remove the protest groups. The authorities, having no 
grounds to remove the groups, were curious about what was taking place; and they told 
Stoner that there was, “nothing they could do, for the interracial group was far from 
causing a disturbance.”
72
 
 The sit-down protest attracted positive attention from the patrons in Stoner‟s 
restaurant. Many white patrons and Stoner‟s employees expressed sympathy for the 
agenda of CORE and its protest. Servers and black bus persons whispered sentiments 
like, “Keep it up; we‟re all with you,” [and] “[I] plan to quit my job if you are not 
seated.”
73
 Eventually, an elderly white woman invited one of the black female protesters 
to sit at her table because she was appalled that “there were restaurants in Chicago that 
did not serve blacks.” 
74
 Several patrons thought these practices took place “down South, 
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but not here.”
75
 Following suit, other diners began to invite these CORE members to their 
tables, and when only two protesters remained, a server seated them. Applause 
accompanied the seating of the last two CORE members, Farmer recalled, “ The black 
busgirls beamed [and] an old gray-haired lady, eyes blazing, looked up into my face as 
we passed by and shouted, Bravo!”
76
 The outcome at Stoner‟s restaurant, Farmer added, 
was a “fitting climax to a well-organized executed non-violent demonstration for racial 
justice.”
77
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RECONCILING THE JOURNEY OF RECONCILIATION: THE REVEALING OF 
THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY  
1947 
Irene Morgan-Kirkaldy was simply tired the day she refused to give up her seat to 
a white patron on a Greyhound bus. Traveling from Virginia to Baltimore, Morgan-
Kirkaldy abided by all the state statues as she sat in the segregated section of the bus. 
When a white couple boarded the crowded bus, Morgan Kirkaldy was told to give her 
seat to the white patrons. Morgan refused and sparked a new defiance of racism, that of a 
freedom fighter.  
Morgan-Kirkaldy was forcibly removed from the bus by police officers and 
arrested for violating the state statue that stipulated segregation of the races on public 
vehicles. She went to jail, but refused to pay the $100 fine for "defying Virginia's Jim 
Crow laws." 
78
 She admitted to her guilt for resisting arrest, but fought against the charge 
of violating segregation laws. This fight manifested itself into the Supreme Court case of 
Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Morgan-Kirkaldy‟s first attorney, a civil rights lawyer in Richmond, argued not in 
opposition to the principle of segregation on bus travel within Virginia, but rather against 
segregation on buses traveling from Virginia to other states. The core of his argument 
was that this type of segregation hindered interstate commerce. Morgan and her attorney 
lost the case, but won an appeal to the US Supreme Court. In 1946, Thurgood Marshall, 
William Hastie, and Leon Ransom argued Morgan-Kirkaldy‟s case before the Supreme 
Court. These NAACP attorneys used to their advantage the nation‟s disdain for 
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“Fascism” and “Nazism” when they argued how hypocritical it was for this nation to 
“sanction racial oppression at home, when it just emerged victorious in its death struggle 
against the apostles of racism.” 
79
 
Justice Reed of Kentucky, in response to the NAACP‟s argument, stated that 
“segregation imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce,” since “it is too much 
trouble to have bus riders changing seats as buses roll from one state to another.” 
80
 Thus, 
the Supreme Court of the United States found racial segregation on buses and trains 
unconstitutional because of the hassle to enforce, and not the blatant discrimination it 
fostered.
81
   
A decade before Rosa Parks refusal to give up her seat on a bus sparked the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, Morgan-Kirkaldy‟s actions launched the era of the freedom 
rider. She never labeled herself an activist, but she influenced one of the largest active 
protests against segregation in this country. The “Journey of Reconciliation” found its 
protest roots within the Morgan decision of 1946. 
 As August Meier and Elliot Rudwick have written in CORE: A Study in the Civil 
Rights Movement, 1942-1968, the Journey of Reconciliation “demonstrated the inherent 
limitations of legalism, and provided an excellent opportunity to prove the value of 
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nonviolent direct action.”
82
  The Supreme Court handed down a social altering decision, 
but compliance to that decision proved challenging. The prospect of integration on buses 
and trains faded with the increase in violent reaction towards blacks who challenged Jim 
Crow.  
The most alarming incident involved the beating of Isaac Woodward in February 
1946. Woodward, a veteran returning home from a Georgia military base on a Greyhound 
bus, was arrested in Batesburg, South Carolina, after having a verbal disagreement with 
the bus driver over “racial etiquette.”
83
 Chief of Police Linwood Shull, along with a 
deputy, pulled Woodward from the bus and began beating him. When they finished, 
Woodward was blind in both eyes. Raymond Arsenault, author of Freedom Riders: 1961 
and the Struggle for Racial Justice, wrote that Woodard “survived fifteen months fighting 
the Japanese in the Pacific to only run afoul of two white men who saw fit to gouge out 
his eyes with the blunt end of a billy club.”
84
 The egregious actions of Shull and his 
deputy prompted a FBI investigation and indictment in 1946, but to no avail; an all-white 
jury in Columbia, South Carolina, came back with a not guilty verdict, even with sworn 
testimony from army doctors about Woodward‟s beating.  
Wilson Head, a World War II veteran, also tested the compliance of the Morgan 
decision in July 1946. Traveling from Atlanta to Washington on the Greyhound line, 
Head encountered threats from hostile drivers, passengers, and police officers. 
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Maintaining a nonviolent approach, Head arrived in Washington unharmed and proved 
that while by no means safe, compliance with the Morgan decision was attainable. His 
positive experience acted as a stepping stone for the Congress of Racial Equality to set 
out and test the Morgan decision in other Jim Crow states. This Journey, as August Meier 
and Elliot Rudwick noted in CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement was the first 
“real national campaign… a project that would provide CORE with a national image and 
arouse the energy of the many local chapters….
85
 
86
 
Bayard Rustin and George Houser started the initial discussions of the Journey of 
Reconciliation in the summer of 1946. Both men envisioned a trip from Washington, 
D.C., to New Orleans, Louisiana, with the goal of national strategy and movement as the 
focal point of the Journey.  The Journey was “an entering wedge for CORE into the 
South.”
87
 This wedge into the South was important because of the lack of CORE chapters 
in that region. As Houser noted, “… it wasn‟t easy to organize them at this point, 
especially with the two words „racial equality‟ in our name. But with a definite project 
around which to rally, we felt there was a possibility of opening up an area seemingly out 
of reach.”
88
   
Rustin and Houser were convinced that Jim Crow discrimination on the buses was 
the perfect target for National CORE to strike at, for as Houser explained it, “touched 
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virtually every black person, and was demeaning in its effect and a source of frequent 
conflict.”
89
  
By mid-September when the executive committee arrived in Cleveland, Rustin 
and Houser had a plan prepared for the Journey. Taking into consideration the dangers of 
challenging Jim Crow in the South, Rustin and Houser secured the support of the 
executive committee of CORE and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), making the 
Journey a joint venture. Rustin and Houser worked with FOR‟s Racial-Industrial 
Department over the next few months to finalize the project, adding a training session 
component and restricting the Journey to the Upper South. While Rustin and Houser felt 
penetrating the Deep South would have a greater impact, they heeded the warnings of 
their southern contacts who stressed that “an interracial journey through the deep South 
would provoke wholesale violence.”
90
 Penetrating the Deep South, according to James 
Peck, one of the participants, would “simply have meant immediate arrest of all 
participants, an end to the trip—and possibly of us.”
91
 The purpose of the Journey was to 
influence “the masses of people, both Negro and white, to renounce Jim Crow traveling 
in accordance with the decision of our highest court.”
92
   
  In preparation for the journey, the FOR‟s Racial-Industrial Department also 
suggested that a series of nonviolent-themed lectures should take place in the cities in 
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order to give “some purpose to the trip outside of simple tests and experimentation.”
93
 
According to Meier and Rudwick, the rationale behind having these lectures was to teach 
black and white southerners the benefits of using the nonviolent direct action platform for 
“when Negroes spontaneously begin to resist illegal Jim Crow practices in the South, 
violence will certainly take place on a wide scale unless some group [these black and 
white southerners] dedicated to nonviolence evolves a pattern in which both resistance 
and reconciliation are possible.”
94
 While the main goal was to test compliance, CORE 
and the Fellowship wanted to spread their philosophy of nonviolent direct action in the 
South. The two organizations also decided that all the participants be male—a decision 
that the women of CORE felt was paternalistic— perceiving that the mixture of race and 
sex “would possibly exacerbate an already volatile situation.”
95
 
CORE chapters began to spread the news of the pending journey into the South 
among fellow Civil Rights organizations, and they received endorsements and support 
from notable black leaders—A. Philip Randolph, Howard Thurman, and Mary McLeod 
Bethune. The National Association for the Advancement of Color People (NAACP), 
however, refused to actively support CORE and the journey. Thurgood Marshall, the 
NAACP‟s chief counsel, was the first to voice his disapproval of CORE‟s national 
campaign. Speaking at an NAACP Youth conference in November of 1946, Marshall 
criticized the pending actions of the Journey and warned the crowd against “well 
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meaning radical groups in New York.”
96
 While never mentioning CORE or FOR directly 
Marshall predicted that “a disobedience movement on the part of Negroes and their white 
allies, if employed in the South, would result in wholesale slaughter with no good 
achieved.”
97
 Marshall took a more personal approach when he said, “you know Rustin, 
you are insane to try this, just dumb.”
98
 After reading Marshall‟s stern criticism in the 
New York Times Houser, Rustin, and A.J. Muste, head of the FOR, understood that it was 
“more imperative that we think through our campaign properly.”
99
 Houser, Rustin, and 
Muste knew that arrests of the participants were inevitable and they would need the 
assistance of the NAACP‟s attorneys during the Journey.  Thus it was important that 
CORE and FOR have the support of the NAACP. Their response published in the 
Louisiana Weekly in January 1947, and written by Rustin, stressed CORE and FOR‟s 
firm commitment to nonviolent direct action and to the Journey of Reconciliation. Rustin 
wrote, 
I am sure that Marshall is either ill-informed on the principles and  techniques of 
non-violence or ignorant of the processes of social change.  Unjust social laws 
and patterns do not change because supreme courts deliver opinions. One need 
merely observe the continued practices of Jim Crow in interstate travel six months 
after the Supreme Court‟s decision to see the necessity of resistance. Social 
progress comes from struggle; all freedom demands a price. 
  
 At times freedom will demand that its followers go into situations where even 
death is to be faced…. Direct action means picketing, striking, and  boycotting as 
well as disobedience against unjust conditions, and all of these methods have 
already been used with some success by Negroes and sympathetic whites…. 
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I cannot believe that Thurgood Marshall thinks that such a program would lead to 
wholesale slaughter…. But if anyone at this date in history believes that the 
“white problem,” which is one of privilege, can be settled without some violence, 
he is mistaken and fails to realize the ends to which man can be driven to hold on 
to what they consider privileges. 
 
This is why Negroes and whites who participate in direct action must pledge 
themselves to non-violence in word and deed. For in this way alone can the 
inevitable violence be reduced to a minimum? The simple truth is this: unless we 
find non-violent methods which can be used by the rank-and-file who more and 
more tend to resist, they will more and more resort to violence. And court-room 
argumentation will not suffice for the activation which the Negro masses are 
today demanding.
100
 
 
Rustin‟s stern and direct tone did not change Marshall‟s stance against the campaign, but 
NAACP leaders like executive secretary Walter White and Roy Wilkins, editor of  The 
Crisis, understood that CORE and its participants in the Journey were moving ahead with 
the ride, and they looked upon the Journey as an opportunity to invigorate NAACP 
chapters in the South.  
Rustin and Houser believed that the racial climate in the country was coming to a 
boiling point. The time was right to put into action a campaign that had the potential to 
evoke substantive change in the country. The Journey of Reconciliation began on April 9; 
just four months after Harry Truman had created the President‟s Commission on Civil 
Rights. The movement was perfect to showcase nonviolent direct action in the movement 
to establish racial equity in the United States of America. 
In January Houser and Rustin began to prepare for the Journey of Reconciliation. They 
planned a scouting trip along the route mapped out in the Upper South. They were 
meticulous in the observance of all the Jim Crow laws in Virginia and North Carolina, 
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thus avoiding any altercation that could lead to arrest. The goal of their reconnaissance 
was to set up public speaking appearances, rally locations, and housing for the Journey‟s 
participants. It was during this trip that Houser and Rustin were made aware of the 
“other” NAACP: a faction within the organization that admired and supported all the 
advances court victories brought to the African American community, but who wanted to 
see the movement take action outside of the courtroom. The Journey for the “other” 
NAACP represented an action that could take the movement to the next level. 
Rustin and Houser next began to put together the 16-member group of Journey 
participants. This was an elite group of eight white men and eight black men who 
represented diverse religious and secular backgrounds. The racially-mixed group was 
comprised of men with white collar jobs, who had completed college, or were completing 
some level of professional training. In addition to Rustin and Houser, the participants 
included the following white and black men: 
  
White participants:  
 
James Peck—pacifist and editor of the WDL News Bulletin 
 Homer Jack—a Unitarian minister and pacifist who was one of the 
 founding members of CORE 
 Worth Randle—an active member in CORE and a biologist 
 Igal Roodenko—a peace activist and New York printer 
 Joseph Felmet—a conscientious objector and law student from North 
 Carolina 
 Louis Adams and Ernest Bromley—two Methodist ministers from North 
 Carolina 
  
 Black participants: 
 
Dennis Banks—a jazz musician from Chicago 
 Conrad Lynn—a civil rights attorney from New York 
 Eugene Stanley—an instructor of agronomy at North Carolina A&T 
 College in Greensboro 
40 
 
 William Worthy—a pacifist with radical journalistic ties to the New York 
 Council for a Permanent FEPC  
 Andrew Johnson—a law student from Ohio 
 Wallace Nelson—a pacifist and conscientious objector 
 Nathan Wright—a social worker from Ohio 
101
 
 
102
 
 
For many of the sixteen participants this journey marked the first time they would take a 
national nonviolent direct action campaign into the South. Most of the men were in their 
twenties, devout pacifists with limited experiences with the Jim Crow South. This level 
of inexperience Houser and Rustin had to address. Only Rustin, with his unplanned 
freedom ride in 1942, really knew what to expect on this journey.  
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Rustin experienced firsthand the volatility of southern Jim Crow on a bus trip 
from Louisville to Nashville in 1946. While riding on the bus, Rustin recalled, 
I was wearing a red necktie—it was hot and I had it open and it was dangling—
and as I boarded the bus, a woman was sitting with a child on her lap. And the 
child, as I was jiggling for my ticket and my tie was flying and my bags were 
going, the child reached over and grabbed my tie and the mother hit it and said, 
don‟t touch a nigger…. I had not seen this kind of thing before, so I went back 
and sat down and I began doodling in the back seat by myself, and I all sudden 
something began to happen. Next to me was a Negro couple, who had a box with 
chicken in it and having the best time on earth. And I said, how many years are 
we going to let that child be misled by its mother—that if we sit in the back and 
are really having fun, then whites in a way have the right to say they like it in the 
back…. I vowed then and there I was never going through the South again 
without either being arrested or thrown off the bus.
103
 
 
Rustin moved to the white section of the bus, refused to sit back in the black section, and 
calmly told the driver “his conscience would not allow him to obey an unjust law. 
Thirteen miles north of Nashville the police met the bus where four officers began to beat 
Rustin—tossing him back-and-forth, ripping his clothes and causing him to, as he 
recalled, “shake with nervous strain.”
104
 Rustin never broke with his pacifist Gandhian 
principles of non-violence even when the police captain, shocked by Rustin‟s civil 
disobedience, declared, “Nigger you‟re supposed to be scared when you come in here.”
105
 
Believing Rustin was a “crazy nigger,” the police captain released him and Rustin won a 
small victory on his first freedom ride.
106
 
Using this experience, Rustin and Houser devised an intense training program that 
addressed the lack of experience of the participants.  The orientation of these men 
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included topical seminars and socio-dramas that the men acted out. Many of these same 
training techniques had been used by FOR peace activists and CORE chapters to 
understand potential problems when staging nonviolent direct action campaigns. These 
seminars and socio-dramas taught the men the fundamental principles of nonviolent 
direct action and how to apply those principles in the face of volatile situations, like 
“What if the bus driver insulted you? What if you were actually assaulted? What if the 
police threatened you?” These were very predictable scenarios that could unfold during 
the journey.  The intensity of the training, Jim Peck recalled, “left the riders exhausted 
but better prepared for the challenges to come.”
107
  
   The socio-dramas and scenarios were not the only important aspects of the 
training; also important were the detailed instructions which Rustin and Houser devised 
and gave to each participant. Safety for all the participants was a primary goal of Rustin 
and Houser on the Journey. Houser and Rustin devised a training that equipped the men 
with the necessary physical and mental skills to survive the Journey of Reconciliation. 
Known later as You Don’t Have to Ride Jim Crow, this detailed instruction manual 
emphasized not only how to stay safe while practicing civil disobedience, but also that 
the Supreme Court‟s ruling was law. The instruction manual emphasized seven main 
points: 
 
WHEN TRAVELING BY BUS WITH A TICKET FROM A POINT IN ONE STATE TO A 
POINT IN ANOTHER STATE  
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1. If a Negro, sit in a front seat. If you are white, sit in a rear seat. 
2. If a driver asked you to move, tell him calmly and courteously: “As an 
interstate passenger I have a right to sit anywhere in this bus. This is the law 
as laid down by the United States Supreme Court.” 
3. If the driver summons the police and repeats his order in their presence, tell 
him exactly what you told the driver when he first asked you to move. 
4. If the police ask you to “come along” without putting you under arrest, tell 
them you will not go until you are put under arrest. Police have often used the 
tactic of frightening a person into getting off the bus without making an arrest, 
keeping him until the bus has left and then just leaving him standing by the 
empty roadside. In such a case this person has no redress. 
5. If the police put you under arrest, go with them peacefully. At the police 
station, phone the nearest headquarters of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, or one of their lawyers. They will assist you. 
6. If you have money with you, you can get out on bail immediately. It will 
probably be either $25 or $50. If you don’t have bail, anti-discrimination 
organizations will help raise it for you. 
7. If you are arrested the delay in your journey will only be a few hours. The 
value of your action in breaking down Jim Crow will be too great to be 
measured.
108
 
 
With the men properly trained, the group of sixteen divided themselves up 
between the Greyhound and Trailways bus companies. Each had two sub-groups, one 
being the designated testers and the other the observers. It was imperative that each man 
knew his role on the bus; thus according to James Peck, “which individual sat where on 
each lap of our trip would be planned at meetings of the group on the eve of 
departure.”
109
 What was clear was that one interracial pair would always sit in the white 
and black sections of the buses; while one black and white observer sat in each section to 
listen to what the other passengers were saying. These observers also took the 
opportunity to educate the riders on the Morgan decision and held the bail money if any 
of the testers was arrested. These major roles were rotated among the sixteen men on 
                                                          
108
 Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 40.   
109
 Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 40.   
44 
 
each lap of the journey. It was imperative that each man knew the importance of all the 
roles. Each one of these roles ensured that the careful organization, tight discipline, and 
adherence to non-violent direct action remained intact. Rustin and Houser emphasized 
that emotion alone would not destroy Jim Crow, but that skillful strategy would. They 
reiterated in the training sessions that “an unorganized and undisciplined assault on 
segregation would only play into the hands of the segregationists, discrediting the 
philosophy of nonviolence and postponing the long-awaited desegregation of the 
South.
110
 
The initial leg of the Journey from Washington, D.C., to Richmond, Virginia, on 
April 9 was successful. Neither group on the Greyhound or Trailways line encountered 
any challenge to their right to sit anywhere on the buses. As Rustin noted, “the Negroes 
in the group sat up front and the whites in the rear.”
111
 More satisfying was observing 
other passengers crossing the color line. “A white couple,” as Rustin recalled, “sat on the 
back seat of the Greyhound with two Negroes, while a Negro woman sat beside a young 
white man in the center of the bus, while leaving vacant a seat next to a Negro man.”
112
 
The success of not having any violent altercations continued from Richmond to 
Petersburg, Virginia, due to the Richmond courts being inundated with cases testing 
interstate travel. The high level of cases contributed to, as Rustin noted, “no more arrests 
being made there.” 
113
 While no arrests were made, Rustin and his counterparts did notice 
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a change in the attitude among passengers on the busses. The second day of the Journey, 
April 10 proved eye-opening to Houser, Roodenko, and Peck. All three men encountered 
the internalized mindset of segregation in the South. Houser and Roodenko, sitting in the 
rear of the Greyhound bus, spoke to a Negro man, who noted that “a Negro man might be 
able to get away with riding up front here, but some bus drivers are crazy, and the farther 
South you go, the crazier they get.”
114
 Peck‟s encounter was different from that of Houser 
and Roodenko. He did not engage in conversation with black passengers when he sat in 
the rear of the Greyhound bus, but was cautiously observed by those passengers. Two 
black women watching Peck read his New York Times noted with laughter that, “he 
would not know what it was all about if he was asked to move.”
115
   
The first two days of the Journey proved successful in upholding the Morgan 
decision and challenging Jim Crow in America. The third day of the Journey produced 
incidents which these men would encounter the further south they traveled. Conrad Lynn, 
a black New York attorney, was the first Journey participant arrested for sitting in the 
second row of the Trailways bus. Explaining the Morgan decision to the bus driver, Lynn 
was told by the bus driver he, “was in the employ of the bus company, not the Supreme 
Court, and he followed company rules about segregation.”
116
 The driver went on to say, 
“Personally, I don‟t care where you sit, but I have my orders.”
117
 When Lynn refused to 
move, the police were called, and a warrant signed by the magistrate in Petersburg 
dictated that Lynn was guilty of disorderly conduct. For not obeying “the reasonable 
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request of the bus driver to move to the rear, in compliance with the company rules,” 
Lynn was arrested.
118
 Lynn was later released on a bond of $25 dollars and rejoined the 
third leg of the Journey.  
The third day of the campaign revealed people‟s differing views on the Journey of 
Reconciliation and the fight against Jim Crow. Three distinctive mindsets became 
apparent early on; people were either supportive, against, or neutral when it came to the 
Journey.
119
 A black porter, for example, expressed his disdain for what Lynn was doing. 
Talking directly to Lynn, he said, “What‟s the matter with him? He‟s crazy. Where does 
he think he is? We know how to deal with him. We ought to drag him off.”
120
  
The first incident of violence on the Journey took place on the Chapel Hill to 
Greensboro, North Carolina, leg of the trip. Just three days into the Journey, Johnson, 
Felmet, Rustin, and Roodenko were all arrested the black men, Rustin and Johnson, for 
disorderly conduct and refusal to obey the bus driver, and the white men, Felmet and 
Roodenko, for interfering with the arrests of Rustin and Johnson. This leg of the Journey 
seemed no different from the others. There were passengers, black and white, who 
supported what these men were doing and those who opposed the Journey. The day 
turned violent when Peck suffered a hard blow to his head by a white taxi driver, who 
argued that the Journey participants were “coming down here to stir up the niggers.” 
121
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Peck following his Journey training did not retaliate against the taxi driver, but rather 
white and black bystanders reprimanded the driver for his violent actions. The potential 
for an escalation in violence was clear at the police station. While Reverend Charles 
Jones, a white Presbyterian minister in Chapel Hill, waited for the men‟s $50 bonds to be 
posted, he overheard white taxi drivers saying, “they‟ll never get a bus out of here 
tonight.”
122
 Reverend Jones quickly drove the men to his home while being pursued by 
the taxi drivers. Soon after, Jones received an anonymous phone call demanding him to 
“get those damn niggers out of town or we‟ll burn your house down.”
123
 The Journey 
participants thought it wise to leave Chapel Hill before nightfall, and with the assistance 
of the police were driven in two cars to Greensboro. 
Arriving in Greensboro the men continued their Journey with two test cases from 
Greensboro to Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Boarding Greyhound busses, Lynn, 
Nelson and Bromley encountered resistance not from bus drivers, but rather from the 
other passengers. Bromley, sitting next to a white South Carolinian who suggested “in 
my state he would either move or be killed,” decided to use the test as a teaching 
opportunity to inform the man of the Morgan decision. The journey acted as a teaching 
opportunity on several legs of the trip. When white passengers inquired why black 
journey participants were not being forced to move, bus drivers and fellow passengers 
explained the decision of the Supreme Court in the Morgan case. In many cases, the 
explanation was accepted without any contention. In one particular incident, however, 
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two white women on the Winston-Salem to Asheville, North Carolina, leg of the trip took 
seats in the Jim Crow section of the bus. 
Day 10 of the Journey was uniquely different from the other legs of the trip. On 
April 19 Homer Jack and Nathan Wright bought reserved seats on a train car from 
Nashville to Louisville. Initially, Jack and Wright had no problem boarding the train, but 
this soon changed when the conductors inquired about Wright‟s passenger status. The 
conductors, while collecting tickets, asked Jack if Wright were his prisoner. When Jack 
replied no, that they were friends, the conductors insisted that Wright move to the Jim 
Crow car. Citing company rules, the conductors stated, “this is the way it is done down 
here.”
124
  Wright refused to move and, in response, the conductors threatened arrest and 
said, “If we were in Alabama, we would throw you out of the window.”
125
 When they 
arrived in Bowling Green, Kentucky, no arrests were made and the train leg of the 
journey proved successful.  
Worthy, Houser, Bromley, and Nelson tested the Morgan decision on three other 
occasions on the Norfolk and Western and Southern Railway railroads. While they met 
with consternation by conductors, none of the men was turned away or forbidden to sit in 
the section of his choice and no arrests, even when threatened, were made.
126
  
The last leg of the bus trip went from Charlottesville, Virginia to Washington, 
D.C., on April 23. Banks, Peck, and Randle rode without incident the first two hours of 
the trip. Banks rode by himself in the front of the Trailways bus, while Peck and Randle 
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rode in the Jim Crow rear of the bus. When the bus arrived in Culpepper, the bus driver 
asked Banks to move to the rear of the bus. Banks refused, and an hour-and-a half later a 
warrant was issued for his arrest on the grounds of “not obeying the order of the 
driver.”
127
 The bus driver never said anything to Peck, even though he was in violation of 
the company policy, which stipulated “That white persons shall not sit in the rear.”
128
  
Fifteen cities in four states were traveled by the interracial Journey participants 
with twenty-six compliance tests and twelve arrests, all on the Trailways bus lines. 
129
 
130
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Conrad Lynn, Bayard Rustin, Andrew Johnson, Joseph Felmet, Igal Roodenko, Dennis 
Banks, James Peck, and Wallace Nelson were all arrested for violating Jim Crow 
segregation company policies. While all the men were released on bonds that ranged 
from $25 to $400 dollars, they had to face trials for their violation of state laws. The trials 
for these infractions quickly followed the end of the Journey of Reconciliation. Most of 
these trials were resolved to the satisfaction of CORE and the Journey participants. Of 
greatest concern were the Chapel Hill trials. Andrew Johnson and Joe Felmet were 
among the first to stand trial for breaking state Jim Crow laws. In June 1947, Rustin, 
Johnson, Felmet, and Roodenko stood trial for violating North Carolina‟s Jim Crow laws. 
Both Rustin and Johnson received minor fines, but Felmet and Roodenko were each 
sentenced to thirty days on a road gang. The judges in these cases emphasized their 
disdain for the actions of white participants in the Journey; thus the harsher sentences. 
One judge went on record as saying that he “purposely discriminated against the white 
person[s] involved.”
131
 The men appealed the court‟s decision to the Orange County 
Superior Court in March 1948, but an all-white jury after twenty minutes of deliberation 
agreed with the lower court‟s decision. With the convictions sustained, the judge 
increased the sentences of Rustin and Johnson to thirty-day road gang terms. This 
sentence for Rustin, Johnson, Felmet, and Roodenko was upheld by the State Supreme 
Court in January 1949.
132
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                James Peck and Dennis Banks went on trial in Asheville, North Carolina, and 
were represented by Curtis Todd, a black attorney from Winston-Salem.
133
 The men were 
indicted on the charge of violating Jim Crow law. Judge Sam Cathey, from the start of the 
trial, emphasized that, “We pride ourselves on our race relations here [in Asheville].”
134
 
The reality of Jim Crow was firmly in place within the Asheville courtroom. As Peck 
recalled:   
In the courtroom where we were tried I saw the most fantastic extreme of 
segregation in my experience—Jim Crow Bibles. Along the edges of one Bible 
had been printed in large letters the words „white.‟ Along the page edges of the 
other Bible was the word ‟colored.‟ When a white person swore in he simply 
raised his right hand while the clerk held the Bible. When a Negro swore in, he 
had to raise his right hand while holding the colored Bible in his left hand. The 
white clerk could not touch the colored Bible. 
135
  
  
 Witnesses for the state—the police and bus driver— emphasized how the men were not 
disorderly and educated them and other passengers on the Morgan decision. Todd argued 
that the Morgan decision, a decision that neither the judge nor the state‟s attorney was 
familiar with, protected Peck and Banks from prosecution. After borrowing a copy of the 
Morgan decision from Todd, Judge Cathey, with blatant disregard for the decision, 
rendered a verdict of the maximum thirty-day sentence for Peck and Banks.
136
 
          The Journey of Reconciliation came at a time when men and women were trying to 
change the social construction of American society. They wanted to make men and 
                                                          
133
 Curtis Todd drew attention to the trial because he was the first black attorney to 
appear in an Asheville court. There were no black attorneys in Asheville during this 
period. 
134
 Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 49.   
135
 Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 49.   
136
 Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 52.   
52 
 
women of all cultures aware of the epidemic of inequality in the country. The Journey 
became, as Ollie Stewart, a writer for the Baltimore Afro-American, noted, “a watershed 
event [where] history was definitely made.” 
137
 The Journey challenged the Jim Crow 
mentality that was internally indoctrinated into how people lived. These men set out to 
change how people thought, felt, and acted.  CORE wanted an integrated society that was 
capable of rising above racial segregation and that would insure for blacks and whites a 
greater democracy. The Journey of Reconciliation, for CORE, could invoke this 
fundamental change and achieve an open society in the nation. These men were bringing 
direct attention to the “wounds inflicted by 350 years of deprivation.”
138
 They tested the 
vitality of racial democracy in this country. What these idealistic men and women failed 
to foresee was the arduous battle that a Jim Crow society was ready to mount to maintain 
segregation.  
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UNTIL THE CUP THAT WE DRINK FROM IS THE VERY SAME: THE 1961 CORE 
FREEDOM RIDE 
 
We knew they would probably beat us before we got there. We were willing to 
give our all so men of every race, creed, and color may be equal before the law. 
We‟ll batter your segregation institutions until they crumble to dust.  
140
 
 
William Barbee—American Baptist Theological Seminary student 
and 1961 Freedom Ride participant 
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We‟ll go on until we win, though, we were pretty battered today. I‟ve always felt 
strongly that segregation is wrong. This was something we could do—it wasn‟t 
far away in the Congo. I realized I couldn‟t stand by and talk about it.
141
 
 
   Susan Wibur—An eighteen-year-old Peabody College student. 
 
 The goal of the 1961 Freedom Rides was to end racial segregation on interstate 
bus transportation, as well as to combat the discriminating practice of Jim Crow. As 
James Farmer recalled, 
It was February 1, 1961, my first day at my desk as national director of CORE. 
Several letters were already before me from blacks in the South, complaining that 
despite the Irene Morgan Supreme Court decision in 1946 and the Boynton 
decision in 1960, when they sat on the front seat of an interstate bus or tried to use 
waiting room facilities other than those consigned to blacks, they were beaten, 
ejected, or arrested. What do decisions of the United States Supreme Court mean? 
They asked.
142
 
 
The Freedom Rides tested the enforcement of the 1960 Boynton v. Virginia decision. In 
1958 Howard University law student Bruce Boynton was arrested for trying to 
desegregate the whites-only restaurant in the Trailways terminal of Richmond, Virginia. 
The Supreme Court in December of 1960 overturned Boynton‟s conviction and stipulated 
that state-driven laws condoning segregated lunch counters, restroom facilities, and 
waiting rooms were unconstitutional for interstate passengers. This ruling furthered the 
constitutional bite of the Morgan decision of 1946, which prohibited racial segregation on 
interstate trains and buses.  
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Farmer faced the dilemma of having constitutional decisions that favored 
desegregation, but local and state governments not willing to enforce those decisions. 
Black southerners, according to Raymond Arsenault, wanted to understand why “black 
Americans [were] still being harassed or arrested when they tried to exercise their 
constitutional right to sit in the front of the bus or to drink a cup of coffee at a bus 
terminal restaurant?”
143
 Gordon Carey and Tom Gaither, two members of Farmer‟s staff, 
proposed during a staff meeting another Journey of Reconciliation. Both Carey and 
Gaither, after a long bus trip from South Carolina to New York endorsed forming a small 
group of men and women to challenge Jim Crow segregation in bus and train terminals. 
A project of this magnitude fit perfectly in with, as Arsenault noted, “The scrappy 
nonviolent movement that had emerged since the Greensboro sit-ins.”
144
 They envisioned 
that a “Ride for Freedom,” a phrase coined by Billie Ames, a longtime CORE member, 
was just what Farmer needed to rectify the black southern dilemma.
145
  
The Freedom Ride mirrored the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, as Farmer noted, 
with “small interracial groups riding interstate busses through the South with blacks 
sitting on front seats and the whites on back seats, refusing to move when ordered.”
146
 At 
each terminal stop, as Carey suggested, “whites [would] go into the waiting room „for 
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colored‟ and blacks into the waiting room „for white‟.”
147
 While similarities existed 
between the Journey of Reconciliation and the Freedom Ride of 1961, the goal of Farmer 
and CORE was not to duplicate the Journey, but to win equality for blacks in the South. 
CORE was determined to, as Farmer recalled, “to put the movement on wheels… to cut 
across state lines and establish the position that we were entitled to act any place in the 
country, no matter where we hung our hat and called home, because it was our 
country.”
148
 There was no longer a call, as Farmer stated, “for a „reconciliation„, but for 
„freedom‟.”
149
 As John Lewis, one of the Freedom Riders, recalled, “There was a tone of 
demand in that phrase, a sense of proclamation, of no waiting. Freedom.  As in „Freedom 
Now‟.”
150
 CORE wanted to hold the federal government accountable for not enforcing 
the laws. CORE„s initiative, “if, in some way,” Lewis later noted, “might become more 
politically dangerous for the federal government not to enforce those laws than to enforce 
them, things would begin to change. If, for example, those states were forced to visibly—
even violently—defy the law, with the whole nation looking on, then the federal 
government would be forced to respond in ways it had not so far.”
151
   
 There were major differences that existed between the two action movements. 
First, CORE opened up the Freedom Ride of 1961 to men and women; second, the group 
would penetrate into the Deep South. Carey proposed covering a mapped route from 
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Washington, D.C., to New Orleans that covered parts of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana. Finally, Farmer and his staff discussed the use of the jail-in tactic during 
the Freedom Ride. They were going to ask all participants to choose to stay in jail, if 
arrested. The “jail-no bail” was a Gandhian technique that, Farmer explained made, “the 
maintenance of segregation so expensive for the state and city that they would hopefully 
come to the conclusion that they could no longer afford it. Fill up the jails, as Gandhi did 
in India; fill them to bursting if we had to.”
152
 The Freedom Ride of 1961 was a capital 
idea and as Farmer thought, “a superb answer to the question „What next?‟”
153
  
 While the idea was bold, it was still just an idea. Farmer and his CORE staff 
needed to take this action plan and put it in motion. Marvin Rich, Jim McCain, and Carey 
took the lead in organizing the Freedom Ride, while Gaither like his predecessors, 
Houser and Rustin, made a preliminary trip on the proposed route.  Following the same 
procedure, he coordinated housing for the participants, set up rallies, and tried to secure 
support from local NAACP chapter leaders.
154
 The most important part of Gaither‟s 
advance scouting trip was to gauge the state of race relations in the southern cities and 
states marked by the Freedom Ride campaign. Gaither encountered mixed reactions from 
southern blacks as he continued his scouting trip. There were blacks who wanted no part 
of the northern CORE troublemakers, while others were indecisive over whether to help 
or hinder the CORE initiative. In the end, Gaither was able to find support for the 
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Freedom Riders. Gaither relied heavily on the staple organizations in the black 
community to support the Freedom Ride and its Riders. He secured for the Riders, within 
black Baptist churches to private black colleges, sponsors from Virginia to Louisiana. 
Gaither guarded his elation because he understood that these sponsors were taking a huge 
risk in supporting the Freedom Ride. What these communities promised in early April 
might not manifest into actual action come May when the Riders showed up in the 
cities.
155
 
 Gaither‟s observation of the white southerner‟s compliance with the Morgan and 
Boynton decisions was less optimistic. Southern defiance and the belligerent attitude of 
the whites Gaither encountered in Mississippi and Alabama stunned him. “If the Freedom 
Riders challenged the ultra-segregationists of the Deep South without the benefit of 
police protection,” Gaither concluded, “they would be lucky to escape with their 
lives.”
156
 Gaither, not one to sugarcoat a situation, noted in his report to Farmer that 
Anniston and Birmingham were two cities that had great potential of being “very 
explosive trouble spots without a doubt.”
157
 
 The next step in establishing the Freedom Ride was getting approval from the 
National Action Committee (NAC) at the February 11-12 council meeting in Lexington, 
Kentucky. The approval and subsequent support from the NAC were crucial, for there 
existed, according to Farmer, a perception that CORE chapters and members did not want 
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a “mass movement, but a small, tightly disciplined cadre of well-trained individuals.”
158
 
The Freedom Ride was a symbol of a new National CORE at the forefront of the Civil 
Rights movement. 
 Farmer, following CORE protocol, wrote to President John F. Kennedy, Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—J. Edgar 
Hoover, the Interstate Commerce Commission chairman, and the presidents of Trailways 
and Greyhound corporations to inform them of the impending Freedom Ride. Farmer 
recalled later that this step was “in line with the Gandhian principle of being open and 
aboveboard, informing officials—even those unfriendly to the cause—of what we 
intended to do, how, and when.”
159
  Farmer wrote first to President Kennedy:  
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The President 
The White House 
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 
 
My dear Mr. President: 
  
We expect you will be interested in our Freedom Ride, 1961. It is designed to 
forward the completion of integrated bus service and accommodations in the 
Deep South. About fifteen CORE members will travel as inter-state passengers on 
Greyhound and Trailways routes. We leave Washington early in May and, 
traveling through Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and 
Mississippi, plan to arrive in New Orleans on Wednesday May 17
th
. 
 
The group is interracial, Two-thirds are Southerners. Three are women. We 
propose to challenge, en route, every form of segregation met by the bus 
passenger. We are experienced in, and dedicated to, the Gandhian principles of 
non-violence. 
 
Our plans are entirely open. Further information is available to all. 
 
Freedom Ride is an appeal to the best in all Americans. We travel peaceably to 
persuade them that Jim Crow betrays democracy. It degrades democracy at 
home. It debases democracy abroad. We feel that there is no way to overstate the 
danger that denial of democratic and constitutional rights brings to our beloved 
country. 
 
And so we feel it our duty to affirm our principles by asserting our rights. With 
the survival of democracy at stake, there is an imperative, immediate need for 
acts of self-determination. “Abandon your animosities and make your sons 
Americans,” said Robert E. Lee. Freedom Ride would make that “All your sons—
NOW!” 
         
Sincerely yours, 
James Farmer 
National Director 
April 26, 1961
160
 
 
 Farmer, with endorsement from the NAC and the protocol of alerting officials, 
went forward with planning the Freedom Ride. He and his staff decided to recruit, 
through an application process, twelve to fourteen participants and bring them to 
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Washington, D.C., for a week of intensive training before embarking on the ride. The 
riders would range in age and be split between the Greyhound and Trailways bus 
companies. The Freedom Ride of 1961 followed Rustin and Houser‟s 1947 Journey 
outline. The group of thirteen assembled in Washington, D.C., at the Fellowship House in 
late April for their training, and, as Farmer recalled, “would leave Washington on May 4, 
travel through Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, 
and arrive in New Orleans on May 17, the seventh anniversary of the Brown decision.”
161
 
Farmer and his staff planned a detailed Freedom Ride itinerary that included all 
the cities and some of the meetings they would hold on the trip.  The itinerary, according 
to Farmer, went as follows, 
May 4—Leave Washington; arrive Richmond, Virginia, Virginia Union University 
May 5—Leave Richmond; arrive Petersburg, Virginia, Bethany Baptist Church 
May 6—Leave Petersburg; arrive Lynchburg, Virginia, 8
th
 Street Baptist Church 
May 7—Leave Lynchburg; arrive Greensboro, North Carolina 
May 8—Leave Greensboro; arrive Charlotte, North Carolina 
May 9—Leave Charlotte; arrive Rock Hill, South Carolina 
May 10—Leave Rock Hill, South Carolina; arrive Sumter, South Carolina for two 
nights 
May 11—Day off in Sumter 
May 12—Leave Sumter; arrive in Augustus, Georgia 
May 13—Leave Augustus, Georgia; arrive Atlanta, Georgia 
May 14—Leave Atlanta, Georgia; arrive Birmingham, Alabama 
May 15—Leave Birmingham, Alabama; arrive Montgomery, Alabama 
May 16—Leave Montgomery, Alabama; arrive Jackson, Mississippi 
May 17—Leave Jackson, Mississippi; arrive New Orleans, Louisiana for 
Freedom Rally
162
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163
 
 
 James Peck, one of the original Journey participants, was familiar with this 
outline as he was the only returning rider to the Freedom Ride. He felt, after fourteen 
years, a rebirth of the original Journey rider‟s dream of social equality, but also 
acknowledged there was an ideological difference between this new group and the 
original Journey riders.
164
 In Peck‟s words,  
It was a very different type of group from the one, which had gathered in 
Washington fourteen years previously for the same type of project. It included a 
number of what has become known as the „new Negro.‟ Southern students who 
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took part in the sit-in movement and for whom arrest or the threat thereof had 
become commonplace. Most of the group were young people in their twenties. 
Very few of them were pacifists.
165
 
  
 While Peck‟s observations, in hindsight, had merit, Farmer and CORE wanted a 
unique group of participants that were committed to the ideological principles of the 
CORE organization. CORE put in place an application to select the twelve to fourteen 
Freedom riders. Each applicant had to include a letter of recommendation from a pastor, 
teacher, or co-worker and had to write a letter explaining, as Arsenault noted, “their 
commitment to nonviolence and the struggle for civil rights.”
166
 Farmer wanted people 
who looked at non-violence as a lifestyle and not just a strong civil rights tactic. One 
other stipulation was parental permission for those volunteers under the age of twenty-
one.
167
 By late April, Farmer and Carey, had a plethora of applications to mold their 
group of Freedom riders.     
The new riders included, 
James Farmer—the forty-one-year old National Director of CORE 
Joe Perkins—a black twenty-seven-year old CORE staff member 
Dr. Walter Bergman—a sixty-one-year old white professor of education 
at the University of Michigan 
Frances Bergman—the fifty-seven-year old, former elementary school 
teacher and wife of Dr. Walter Bergman 
Reverend B. Elton Cox—a twenty-nine- year old black minister  
Albert Bigelow—a fifty-five-year old white navy veteran of World War II 
Hank Thomas—a black nineteen-year-old Howard University student 
Jimmy McDonald—a black twenty-nine-year-old part-time CORE staff 
member and folk singer 
Charles Person—an eighteen-year old Morehouse College student  
John Moody—a thirty-year-old black student at Howard University  
                                                          
165
    James Peck, Freedom Ride, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 115. 
166
    Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 99. 
167
    Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 99. 
64 
 
John Lewis—a twenty-one-year old black student at Tennessee Bible 
Institute in Nashville 
Ed Blankenheim—a twenty-seven-year old white CORE activist 
Genevieve Hughes—a white twenty-eight-year old CORE field secretary  
James Peck—original Journey rider and CORE pacifist 
168
 
 
Many of the new black riders were not over thirty and were as August Meier and Elliott 
Rudwick noted, “products of the southern student sit-in movement….”
169
 Each black 
rider brought unique life and civil rights experiences to the Freedom Ride. 
 Hank Thomas was a last-minute replacement for John Moody his ill-stricken 
Howard University college roommate.
170
 What Thomas lacked in orientation training and 
age, he more than made up for in firsthand experience with the Jim Crow South. Thomas 
was one of eleven children who sharecropped cotton in Georgia by the age of eight. 
When asked what led him to the Freedom Ride, Thomas recalled years later, “I can‟t say 
it was one. When you grow up and face humiliation every day, there is no one thing. You 
always felt that way.”
171
 Coming from this impoverished background, the Freedom Ride 
for Thomas was a direct strike against the dehumanization suffered by southern blacks 
like him.
172
 
 Jimmy McDonald was the ideal participant to relieve the mounting stress of the 
Freedom Ride. A folk singer from New York, McDonald remembered that, “they wanted 
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„me to go… to lead the singing.‟”
173
 McDonald‟s vocal ability was not his only 
contribution, but also how he came to reflect the new ideal of the “New Negro.” He was, 
as John Lewis later noted, “a very playful, bohemian, Greenwich Village guy, [who] 
added comic relief and a touch of whimsy to the band of Freedom Riders.”
174
 McDonald, 
though, was a “loose cannon that exhibited the least discipline amongst the Freedom 
Riders. He was, as Arsenault described, “… uncomfortable with the interracial nature of 
CORE and generally dismissive of nonviolence as a viable philosophy, [and] he viewed 
the bus journey through the South as a chance for adventure and a „great ride.‟”
175
 In 
1969, McDonald recalled, “I was not sent because I had a lot of intellect … certainly I 
was not in there because I wanted to be like Gandhi.”
176
 
 Charles Person, the youngest Freedom Rider at eighteen, was a student at 
Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia. Person had a vast array of experience with sit-in 
and jail-in campaigns. He was also a part of the NAACP Youth Council at Morehouse 
and was active in the Atlanta Committee on Appeal for Human Rights. This ride was 
personal for Person, a native of Atlanta, who watched his father work as an orderly at 
Emory University Hospital. Person grew up wanting to be a scientist and in 1960, the all-
white Georgia Institute of Technology denied him admittance. He hoped the ride could 
change the future for young men and women having aspirations to go to the best schools 
and achieve their dreams.
177
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 John Moody, the thirty-year-old Howard University student was active in his 
college‟s chapter of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee‟s Nonviolent 
Action Group (NAG). Moody and NAG staged several sit-in protests in Washington, 
Maryland, and northern Virginia. Raised in Philadelphia, Moody was active in civil rights 
from a young age; as a leader in his local NAACP Youth Council. Moody was both 
intrigued and terrified by the world of Jim Crow; he showed vacillation toward the 
Freedom Ride initiative as the May 4 start date approached. He eventually, due to this 
uncertainty and the flu, temporarily dropped out of the Freedom Ride on the last day of 
orientation.
178
     
 Reverend Benjamin Elton Cox, the oldest Southern black Freedom Rider at 
twenty-nine next to James Farmer, was an old wise soul in a young body. His fellow 
Freedom Riders knew him as “Beltin‟ Elton” for his charismatic and loquacious nature as 
a preacher. One of sixteen children and initially a high school dropout, when he finished 
his divinity degree and was ordained in 1958, he became the head pastor at the Pilgrim 
Congregational Church in High Point, North Carolina. Reverend Cox was at the forefront 
of the fight because of his militant advocacy for the Civil Rights Movement. From his 
leadership in local school desegregation efforts to serving as the NAACP Youth council 
advisor, Cox remained involved in the civil rights movement. Farmer personally asked 
Cox to join the Freedom Ride because of his commitment to nonviolent direct action. 
Cox contributed the “divine guidance” needed for the Freedom Ride to maintain its 
nonviolent direct action pledge.
179
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 Joe Perkins, a former medical technician in the army, grew up in Owensboro, 
Kentucky, completed four years at Kentucky State University, and majored in music 
education at Howard University before transferring to the University of Michigan. While 
at the University of Michigan, Joe and other graduate students became involved in the 
Ann Arbor Direct Action Committee. He picketed Kresge and Woolworth‟s department 
stores in support of the southern sit-in movement and organized a stand-in at the Newport 
Beach on Lake Erie. Joe eventually took a leave of absence from the University of 
Michigan to work full-time for CORE as a field secretary. With arrests and direct action 
campaigns in Louisville, Covington, and numerous other cities, Perkins earned as 
Arsenault noted, “a reputation as a skilled and fearless organizer.”
180
  
 John Lewis, the captivating twenty-one-year old representative of the Nashville 
Movement was by far the most experienced black Freedom Rider. A member of the 
Nashville Christian Leadership Council, by the time he learned of the Freedom Ride, he 
had a record of five arrests and had tested the jail-no bail as a viable nonviolent tactic in 
the movement.  
These young men and women or the “New Negro” had, like their older 
counterparts, an “unquestioning commitment to securing equality for blacks in the United 
States.
181
  Their devotion was due to their belief, as John Lewis noted on his application, 
to “human dignity [being] the most important thing in [their] life. This is [the] most 
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important decision in my life, to decide to give up all if necessary for the Freedom Ride, 
that Justice and Freedom might come to the Deep South.”
182
 
 The white participants were older than their black counterparts with different life 
experiences, but those experiences contributed to their commitment to the Freedom Ride. 
Dr. Walter Bergman and Francis Bergman, his wife, were the oldest participants in the 
ride. Walter Bergman, at sixty-one, brought unique activist experiences stemming from 
his leadership in the teachers‟ union in the 1930„s and 1940„s. As a retired administrator 
with teaching experiences at the University of Michigan and Wayne State University, Mr. 
Bergman served as the first president of the Michigan Federation of Teachers. After a 
brief stint in military service in Europe, Bergman lived in Germany where he served as a 
civilian educator in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and later 
in the U.S. government‟s de-Nazification program.
183
 Returning to the states in 1948, 
Bergman rekindled his relationship with the Michigan Federation of Teachers and 
became the director of research for the Detroit Board of Education.
184
 
 Frances Bergman, at fifty-seven was the second eldest rider. Like her husband, 
whom she met and married in the late 1940‟s, she was a peace activist in her own right. A 
former elementary educator and administrator, Frances was a seasoned northern civil 
rights activist by the time of the Freedom Ride campaign. Both Bergman and his wife 
Frances were committed socialists, as well as activists in the ACLU and the Committee 
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for a Sane Nuclear Policy.
185
 Their activism led them by 1958 to participate in CORE 
picketing initiatives against segregation in chain stores, swimming pools and hotels in 
Detroit, Michigan.
186
 Frances also represented a change from the Journey of 
Reconciliation ride, which was male. She and Genevieve Hughes were the only two 
females on the Freedom Ride. 
187
 
 Albert Bigelow, the fifty-five- year-old navy war veteran, in no way fit the 
traditional image of a peace activist, but he had been a force in the anti-nuclear crusade 
initiative in the late 1950‟s. As a founding member of the Committee for Non-Violent 
Action (CNVA), he gained national attention when, in protest of the United States testing 
of nuclear warheads, he captained the Golden Rule in the Pacific. The former navy 
captain turned Quaker opposed the use of nuclear technology after witnessing the 
physical devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bigelow, determined to end the use of 
nuclear armament, warned President Dwight D. Eisenhower that though “our voices have 
been lost in the massive effort of those responsible for preparing this country for war… 
we mean to speak now with the weight of our whole lives.”
188
 This commitment to 
pacifism and non-violent direct action made Bigelow a good Freedom Rider. 
 Ed Blankenheim, a twenty-seven-year-old Korean War veteran and father of two, 
was involved in Tucson civil rights activities. Initially, a member of Tucson‟s NAACP 
Youth Council, Blankenheim formed the Students for Equality as a local Tucson CORE 
chapter. Blankenheim‟s experiences as a marine recruit in Paris Island, South Carolina, 
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made him cautious of challenging the racial mindsets of the Deep South. Blankenheim 
recalled, “[I] was being invited on a trip into the Deep South as part of a mixed race 
bomb… I was no less concerned about the danger of my commitment, but all that I had 
seen in the South and all that I had learned stared me down. I had come too far and I 
couldn‟t turn back.”
189
 
 Genevieve Hughes, the feisty twenty-eight-year-old CORE field secretary, was 
adamant about showing the world a true Southern woman.  After being asked why she 
joined the Freedom Riders, she explained, “I figured Southern women should be 
represented so the South and the nation would realize all Southern people don‟t think 
alike.”
190
 Hughes moved to New York City following her graduation from Cornell and 
became involved in the local CORE chapter. Hughes‟s appointment to CORE field 
secretary in 1960 completed her transition from conservative Wall Street to full-time non-
violent direct activism. She was “as graceful,” as John Lewis recalled, “And gentle as her 
name,” and she was “not afraid to speak up when she had strong feelings about 
something.”
191
 
James Baldwin wrote in his Foreword to James Peck‟s Freedom Ride, 
If we cannot reorganize our society on a more human and equitable basis, we will 
soon, as citizens, have lost any ability to reorganize it at all. This is why the 
Negro‟s struggle in America today is of the greatest importance for all Americans, 
whether they know it or not. Countless people, both white and black, are now 
undergoing the most brutal hardships in order to drive this fact deep into the 
public consciousness. Here is the testimony of one of them: and the moral of his 
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story is that, however painful it may be for us to change, not to change will be 
fatal.
192
 
 
James Peck was the only returning Journey participant to the Freedom Rides.  The 
Journey had made desegregation a reality, and as Peck later wrote, had “ordinary Negro 
passengers no longer confined to the rear seats.”
193
 What it did not do was destroy 
segregation. As Peck noted, “ the outstanding comparison [between the Journey and 
Freedom Ride] was that, in terminals and at the rest stops—even in Virginia‟s larger 
cities where the white and colored signs had been removed—segregation still prevailed as 
it had aboard the busses in 1947.”
194
 The persistence of Jim Crow segregation motivated 
Peck to return fourteen years later and fight to convince people that they no longer had to 
ride Jim Crow busses, or to accept segregation in public facilities like terminal waiting 
areas and restaurants. 
 These seven blacks and six whites assembled in Washington, D.C., for an initial 
orientation to hear the rationale for why CORE was embarking on this Freedom Ride.  
Farmer provided an overview of what the next two weeks would entail. He revealed both 
the pessimistic and optimistic outcomes, as well as the challenges, which the Freedom 
Riders would face. He also emphasized that this was a CORE initiative and everyone 
involved needed to be as one in regards to non-violent direct action. If riders could not 
adhere to these CORE principles, they needed to remove themselves from the project. 
After Farmer‟s initial greeting of the riders, he turned the podium over to Carl Rachlin, a 
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forty-two-year-old civil rights and labor attorney from New York City. Serving as 
CORE‟s general counsel, Rachlin proceeded to inform the Riders of their constitutional 
rights—both state and federal—pertaining to interstate travel. He went into detail about, 
as Farmer recalled, “the Supreme‟s Court‟s ruling on the issues and summarized the 
current situation. From his viewpoint, he told [the Riders] what to do if and when [they] 
were arrested….”
195
 Farmer wanted these men and women to understand the legal aspect 
of the Freedom Rides, but he also placed great importance on the sociological mentality 
of the South. Bringing the perspective of both a sociologist and experienced social 
activist into the orientation, Farmer painted a realistic picture for the Riders of what they 
should expect from the South.  As Farmer later noted, the sociologist “elaborated on the 
mores and folkways of the areas through which we would be riding and described the 
lengths to which the local populace probably would go to force compliance with their 
sacrosanct racial customs.”
196
 Farmer was determined not to sugar coat what the Riders 
would encounter in the Deep South. Engrained in the southern populace was a strong 
defiance mentality that the Riders had to know could lead to, as the social activist 
suggested, “clobberings and death.”
197
 
 Throughout the week of training, the Riders had long discussions over the gravity 
of what they were about to carry out. There was a level of electricity but also a serious 
undertone to the conversations and training. Freedom Riders, like John Lewis, shared 
their experiences with Jim Crow and the use of non-violence. Each of their stories was 
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indicative of why these men and women felt it necessary to participant in this CORE 
initiative.
198
 “The discussions,” Farmer later explained, “were neither academic nor 
undisciplined rapping; each person, after all, was offering to put his or her life on the line. 
The air was filled with electricity, not frivolity.”
199
 The Riders, in addition to discussions, 
were encouraged to read non-violent action rhetoric. For Farmer, it was important for the 
Riders to understand the teachings of Gandhi and other advocates of non-violent 
principles. The Riders had to prepare themselves for every type of response to their non-
violent direct action. These men and women had to embrace the true nature of Gandhi‟s 
Satyagraha and reflect, through their actions, their commitment to civil disobedience.   
As Dr. Martin Luther King explained the principles of nonviolence, 
We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure 
suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. We will not 
hate you, but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws. Do 
to us what you will and we will still love you. Bomb our homes and 
threaten our children; send your hooded perpetrators of violence into our 
communities and drag us out on some wayside road, beating us and 
leaving us half-dead; send your propaganda agents around the country, 
and make it appear that we are not fit, culturally and otherwise, for 
integration, and as difficult as it is, we will still love you. But we will soon 
wear you down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our freedom we 
will so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win you in the 
process. We will not only win freedom for ourselves, but our victory will 
be a double victory.
200
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The Freedom Ride campaign and CORE would have serious ideological problems if the 
Freedom Riders were not fully committed to the above non-violent sentiment as a 
lifestyle and not just a tactic.  
 The most intense part of training came with the socio-drama sessions. Gordon 
Carey took the lead in coordinating several real bus and lunch counter scenarios that the 
Riders could expect. The Riders took turns being either observers, adversaries, or 
functionaries in the role-playing sessions. “Several played,” according to Farmer, “the 
role of white hoodlums coming in to beat up the Freedom Riders on the buses or at the 
lunch counters in the terminals.”
201
 “The dramas were for survival,” Farmer recalled, “not 
entertainment [thus] people were thrown out of bus seats and clubbed, knocked off lunch 
counter stools and stomped.”
202
 The all-too realistic sessions went on for three days 
because Farmer wanted to insure the Riders had the proper survival skills in place for the 
real threat of violence. Each Rider had an opportunity to play each role and critique their 
actions and reactions. Fueled with intense emotion were the discussions that followed 
each sociodrama. “It was quite an experience,” according to Ben Cox. “We were knocked 
on the floor, we poured Coca-Cola and coffee on each other, and there was shoving and 
calling each other all kinds of racial epithets, and even spitting on each other, which 
would inflame you to see if you could stand what was going to come.”
203
 For most of the 
Riders, these intense sociodramas symbolized their first encounter with the essence of 
Jim Crow. Emotionally drained by the arduous training, many of the Riders found these 
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Jim Crow scenarios a disturbing ordeal and questioned whether the initiative was worth 
the real threat of maltreatment. 
 Farmer decided to ease the emotional tension of the group by taking them to Yen 
Ching Palace, a Chinese restaurant in downtown Washington D.C. on the eve of their 
departure.
204
 As John Lewis recalled, “As we passed around the bright silver containers 
of food someone joked that we should eat well and enjoy because this might be our Last 
Supper.
205
 Evident was the fictive kin bond that formed among the men and women 
embarking on this life-altering experience. The emotions settled, and a genuine 
camaraderie filled the room as the Freedom Riders continued their meals. As the dinner 
ended, Farmer wanted all of the Riders to know that they were not obligated to go on this 
ride. As Farmer remembered,  
I spoke briefly from my chair at the head of the table. There were no theatrics, no 
melodrama; the situation itself was too fraught with emotion for embellishment. I 
told the group, which had become like family, that no one was obligated to go on 
the trip except possibly me. There was still time for any person to decide not to 
go. Everyone should ask himself or herself at that point whether or not he or she 
really wanted to go. If the decision was negative, there would be no recrimination, 
no blame, and CORE would pay transportation back home. … I stated that no one 
had to announce a decision right then. He or she could tell me later or just not 
show up at the bus terminal in the morning, whichever was easiest.
206
 
 
After a moment of silence suggested by Farmer over a prayer, the men and 
women left the restaurant and returned to the Fellowship House in a somber mood.
207
 
Some Riders decided to talk over Farmer‟s offer in a large grouping, debating the 
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positives and negatives of participating in the CORE initiative.  Most privately pondered 
the events they would encounter, and decided over the few hours whether they were 
going to show up at the bus terminals. Whether in the group or in private, the Riders 
reaffirmed the seriousness of the Freedom Ride campaign. They mulled over the intense 
training they had just finished and the real threat of bodily harm and even death. They 
fully understood, with the waivers they signed releasing CORE from any liability, the 
gravity of this Ride. Many completed wills, called family and friends, and spent their last 
night in a restless sleep contemplating their unpredictable future.  
Even Farmer had doubts about how many Riders would show up the next 
morning. The several calls he received that evening from leaders of other civil rights 
organizations added to his doubts. While some calls were supportive, one in particular 
from Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP and Farmer‟s former boss, left Farmer nervous. 
“Wilkins asked somewhat facetiously,” Farmer, explained, “if CORE was actually going 
to go through with its „joy ride‟.” Farmer, while annoyed by Wilkins‟ sarcastic tone, set 
his pride aside and, reaffirmed CORE and the Riders‟ commitment to the Freedom Ride 
initiative. 
208
 While Farmer presented a strong front, he, as Arsenault explained,  
Replayed the evening‟s events in his mind, [and] began to worry that he had 
unwittingly sown the seeds of failure with his offer to let the volunteers back out. 
He was not one to wallow in self-doubt, but this time he could not help but second 
guess himself. Why hadn‟t he left well enough alone? Had he come this far only 
to see his dream dissolve in a torrent of needless panic fostered by his own well-
meaning but careless words? What would happen to CORE and the movement if 
word got out, as it surely would, that the Freedom Riders had lost their nerve? 
These questions haunted him as he awoke on the most important morning of his 
life.
209
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The next morning at breakfast, every Rider showed up “prepared,” as Farmer later 
noted, “for anything, even death.”
210
 There was a level of commitment that these men and 
women had not only to the Freedom Ride initiative, but also to seeing the destruction of, 
as Arsenault explained, “the hypocrisy and complacency of a nation that refused to 
enforce its own laws and somehow failed to acknowledge the utter indecency of racial 
discrimination.”
211
 
  At the station, the Riders proceeded to divide themselves into two groups, one to 
ride the Greyhound bus and the other to take the Trailways bus. Before embarking on the 
Freedom Ride, a few supporters greeted them from the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), NAG, and CORE. The calm in the atmosphere was in no way 
reflective of the gravity of this momentous occasion. The lack of media attention did not 
discourage Farmer and the Riders. Even though CORE had released a large quantity of 
press releases about the Freedom Ride initiative, the press coverage did no distract the 
Riders from their ultimate goal. The absence of banners, protesters, and signs did not 
lessen the feeling, in the Riders‟ mind, that they were about to start a revolution that 
would change the United States of America. Farmer proceeded to hold a press 
conference, explaining the philosophy of nonviolent direct action and CORE‟s adoption 
of the “jail-no bail” strategy. “If there is an arrest,” Farmer recalled, “we will accept that 
arrest. We will not pay fines because we feel that by paying money to a segregated state 
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we would help it perpetuate segregation,” he added, “and if there is violence we will 
accept that violence without responding in kind.”
212
 
 Four journalists did agree to accompany the Riders on the initiative. The brave 
courageous journalists included: 
Charlotte DeVree— a fifty-one-year-old white New York writer  
Simeon Booker—a forty-three year-old black feature writer for Jet and Ebony 
magazines 
Ted Gaffney-- a thirty-three-year-old black photographer from Washington
213
 
Moses Newson—a thirty-four-year-old black editor of the Baltimore Afro-
American
214
 
  
 Charlotte Devree, often mistaken as a Freedom Rider, was a freelance writer from 
New York and a CORE member. Devree wanted to write an accurate account of the 
ride.
215
 Simeon Booker was an experienced journalist as a former Neiman Fellow at 
Harvard, who understood the racial hostility of the South. Much of his experience and 
notoriety came from the captivating articles he wrote about the 1955 Emmett Till murder 
case. Ted Gaffney worked as a part-time freelance journalist and photographer for 
Johnson Publications. While Gaffney was on the Freedom Ride as a journalist, his 
personal experience as a Freedom Rider gave him a profound connection with the Riders. 
Gaffney, fifteen years earlier had, conducted his own test of the Morgan decision while 
riding on a bus from Washington to Fort Eustis, Virginia. Gaffney, a year before the 
Journey of Reconciliation, stood his ground with the driver who frequently asked him to 
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move to the rear of the bus. Moses Newson, a journalist for the Memphis Tri-State 
Defender, had the most experience with southern defiance of civil rights. Having covered 
both the 1956 Clinton, Tennessee, and the 1957 Little Rock Nine school desegregation 
stories, Newson understood the volatility of the South. Although not Riders themselves, 
Charlotte DeVree, Simeon Booker, Ted Gaffney, and Moses Newson showed tremendous 
courage in boarding those buses. 
216
 
 After receiving instructions from Farmer on the proper way to arrange themselves 
on the busses, the Riders separated, bought their tickets, checked their bags, and boarded 
the Greyhound and Trailways busses. The pilgrimage through the Deep South started 
with little fanfare. Fellow passengers and drivers made no physical or verbal objection to 
the Riders, an unexpected but pleasant surprise, boarding the busses and sitting in the 
different sections or as interracial pairings on the bus.  
 Fifty miles south of Washington, D.C., in Fredericksburg, Virginia, the Riders 
faced the first test of tolerance. A small town known for its Confederate heritage and 
devotion to racial segregation, Fredericksburg had not complied with the Boynton case. 
The Riders walked into the terminal and encountered, as Gaither‟s report noted, the 
“WHITE ONLY” and “COLORED ONLY” signs over the restrooms. But while a few 
residents had cold stares, “there was no disruption,” Lewis later explained, “as we used 
rest rooms traditionally designated for another race and ordered drinks at a counter that 
never would have served us before…. [It was as if] they knew we were coming and 
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baked us a cake.”
217
 The reaction of Fredericksburg to the CORE Freedom Ride was a 
surprise that left the riders perplexed about what to expect for the remainder of the trip.
218
 
 The Riders boarded the busses to travel to Richmond, their next stop. The Riders 
would spend a night at Virginia Union College, a black institution close to the bus 
terminal. After their experience in Fredericksburg, the Riders did not know what to 
expect, but Farmer anticipated problems in the city that had been the capital of the 
Confederacy. Compounding this uncertainty was that NAACP leaders had encouraged 
their members not to show support for the Freedom Ride. Even without local support 
from the NAACP, the Riders, according to Lewis came across, “No signs, No trouble. 
Nothing but a few cold stares.”
219
 The Riders, without incident, desegregated the 
Richmond bus terminals, but the success of Fredericksburg and Richmond was 
bittersweet for Peck. Revisiting the Richmond terminal fourteen years later, Peck knew 
that the physical signs of Jim Crow segregation were gone, but the psychological mindset 
of Jim Crow was present. Peck recalled, “It was disheartening to me that in a city such as 
Richmond, which is not far from the nation‟s capital and where the color signs had been 
removed, Negroes were sticking to the formerly separate and grossly unequal colored 
waiting rooms and restaurants.”
220
 The psychological accommodation to second-class 
citizenship was still evident in the city of Richmond at the Greyhound and Trailways bus 
terminals. The power of Jim Crow in Richmond saddened and angered Peck, for he 
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understood that the Freedom Ride would be a hollow victory if black southerners refused 
to destroy the control Jim Crow had over them.
221
  
 The next day the Riders boarded the busses and headed for Petersburg. Just 
twenty miles south of Richmond, Petersburg was a railroad town, 40 percent black, and 
home of Virginia State University.  While Jim Crow segregation existed in Petersburg, 
when the Riders arrived, they encountered as Gaither explained, “relatively few 
manifestations of ultra-segregationist extremism.”
222
 By the time the Freedom Riders 
arrived in Petersburg, the Petersburg Improvement Association (PIA) had succeeded in 
desegregating lunch counters with sit-in demonstrations. The President of the Bus 
Terminal Restaurants had not only desegregated restaurants in the Petersburg Trailways 
terminal station but in other cities as well. The PIA had set change in motion nine months 
before the Freedom Riders ever set foot in Petersburg. Their work, though, helped the 
Riders to test the Boynton case without serious incident.
223
  
 The Riders were welcomed with enthusiastic cheers by blacks in the community. 
Black residents of Petersburg escorted the Riders to cars that awaited to take them to the 
Bethany Baptist Church, where one of the Riders, Albert Bigelow, would speak that 
evening. The tiny-red church was bursting with excitement over the Riders and what they 
had to tell the community. The message, Lewis recalled, was that “no place was too small 
and no people were too powerless to do what we on the busses were doing.”
224
 Bigelow 
relayed that sentiment with sincerity when he stated that “the Freedom Riders were 
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committed to not only the fight for equal justice, but also to the redemptive spirit of non-
violence.”
225
  
 The next morning the Riders boarded the busses, happy with their successes thus 
far, but concerned about their next stop at Farmville. The Riders knew anything was 
possible in Farmville, the heart of Prince Edward County. The small farming community 
had showed defiance before with school desegregation in 1959. Instead of integrating the 
black and white children, the county had closed all public schools. While the white 
children went to private schools, black children went two years without any type of 
schooling. This was Farmville‟s way to maintain its Massive Resistance campaign.
226
 
 Without incident, the Riders were served in the terminal, but, Lewis noted later, 
“we couldn‟t help noticing that the „WHITE‟ and „COLORED‟ signs at the Farmville 
terminal had not only not been removed, but they had been freshly painted on our 
behalf.”
227
 The trouble the Freedom Riders thought they were going to encounter did not 
materialize because the town‟s residents did not seem interested in what they were doing. 
There was little attention given to the Freedom Riders as they “violated” de facto Jim 
Crow in Farmville, the center of the Massive Resistance in Virginia.
228
  
 Lynchburg was the next stop in Virginia. The town, one-fifth black in population, 
was home to Macon‟s Woman‟s College, Lynchburg College, the Virginia Theological 
Seminary—a black seminary, and a prosperous tobacco economy. The Riders were 
confident that the bus terminals would comply with the law because of the town‟s 
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positive race relations. The Riders encountered, for the most part, a compliant 
community. The only physical indication of separation in the Trailways terminal was, as 
Peck recalled, “a divider in the middle of the counter, making persons on one side 
virtually invisible to those on the other.”
229
   
Divided amongst eight churches that night, the Riders faced a range of reactions 
to their initiative. From Frances Bergman‟s elation at the “warmest reception thus far” to 
Ben Cox‟s uneasiness at Lynchburg‟s disturbing strangeness, the black community in 
Lynchburg perplexed the Riders. Within just two hundred miles, it was clear that there 
existed a different mindset toward what equality truly meant. Reverend Cox, shocked by 
the pastor‟s acceptance of racial segregation, tried to inspire the congregation to fight 
against the Jim Crow mentality. The unenthusiastic pastor, Cox recalled, said to the 
congregation, “If God had wanted us to sit in the front of the bus he would have put us 
there.” The docility of a leader in the black community became an educational 
opportunity for those Riders who had limited experience in the South. For Cox, the 
notion of accommodating to racial injustice was infuriating and unacceptable.
230
 
 Daville, a mill town south of Lynchburg, was the last stop in Virginia. The 
Freedom Riders did not know what to expect upon their arrival. At the Greyhound-
Trailways terminal, the Riders met with resistance for the first time. The hostility on the 
part of black and white residents was evident immediately when the Riders stepped off 
the busses. Ed Blankenheim faced resistance first when a black server refused to wait on 
him at the “colored counter.” Request after request by Blankenheim went unanswered by 
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the black waiter whose white boss threatened to fire him if he served a white Freedom 
Rider. Discouraged by the outcome, Blankenheim boarded his bus. When the second bus 
arrived, an hour-and-a-half later, Genevieve Hughes, Walter Bergman, and James Peck 
challenged the segregated lunch counters and after a brief discussion with the manager 
received refreshments.
231
  
 The first stop in North Carolina was Greensboro, a city with a liberal reputation 
stemming from the 1960 sit-in campaigns and its voluntary enforcement of the Brown 
decision.  According to Peck, though, Greensboro was “the first city where the color 
signs started to become the rule,” where “the first greetings to arriving bus passengers are 
oversized signs all around the building with arrows pointing to the colored waiting 
room.” 
232
 What the Freedom Riders did not anticipate in Greensboro was a white 
community retaliating against a continued militant civil rights movement. The image of 
Greensboro as the center of the southern civil rights struggle polarized the white 
community and created a racial backlash against civil rights agitators. As the civil 
approach to racial integration dissipated in Greensboro, there was a significant rise in 
white defiance.
233
 
 The rise in defiance did not discourage the black residents of Greensboro or the 
Freedom Riders. In large numbers, the black residents came out to Bennett College and 
Shiloh Baptist Church to hear the Freedom Riders. Farmer spoke at the Shiloh Baptist 
Church that evening and stressed his devotion to “make segregation so costly the South 
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can‟t afford it.” He added that, “life is not dear and sweet that we must passively accept 
Jim Crow and segregation…. If our parents had gone to jail, we wouldn‟t have to go 
through the ordeal now. Our nation cannot afford segregation. Overseas it gives Uncle 
Sam a black eye. Future generations will thank us for what we have done.”
234
 Farmer, 
emotionally drained, emphasized to the audience that it would take more than a two-week 
Freedom Ride and thirteen riders to create lasting change. For any type of substantive 
change to take place, the black South had to fight with a strong vigor that no white 
defiance could destroy. 
  On Monday morning, May 8, the Freedom Riders left Greensboro and headed for 
Charlotte. Upon their departure, there was heightened apprehension because the Freedom 
Ride would begin its descent into the Deep South. The Riders, as Peck explained, were 
“venturing into territory not covered by the 1947 Journey.
235
 As the Ride continued, they 
were unaware of what dangers or successes lay ahead of them. 
 The “Queen City,” Charlotte was known for its textile and banking industry, and 
it was the largest city in the Carolina Piedmont. Charlotte in 1961 was twenty-eight 
percent black and committed to segregation along racial lines. Black residents in 
Charlotte knew their place and understood that serious consequences existed if anyone 
crossed that racial line. The same indoctrination existed in Charlotte as in Lynchburg 
because “the immutability of racial segregation,” as Arsenault noted, “even in the most 
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mundane aspects of life, was a given, and anyone who crossed the color line in Charlotte 
was asking for trouble.”
236
  
 Charles Person soon understood the unspoken mentality of Jim Crow in Charlotte. 
Arriving in Charlotte‟s Union Station, as Peck recalled, “He didn‟t even think of it as a 
test. He simply looked at his shoes and thought they needed a shine.”
237
 The young 
Atlanta Rider sat and remained in the whites-only shoeshine chair waiting for service or 
arrest. Upon arrival of a police officer and the threat of arrest, the Riders decided to 
replace Person with Joe Perkins in the shoeshine chair. Within minutes, the Charlotte 
police arrested Perkins on a charge of trespassing. Perkins, the first Freedom Rider 
arrested was thus able to test the jail-no bail strategy. With his bail set at fifty dollars, 
Perkins told Ed Blankenheim, the observer for this leg of the Ride, not to pay it. Perkins 
spent two-nights in city jail before the authorities transferred him to the country jail to 
await his trial.
238
 
 Thomas Wyche, a NAACP attorney, represented Perkins before Judge Howard B. 
Arbuckle. Perkins, Blankenheim, and Wyche were all surprised when Judge Arbuckle, 
cited the Boynton case, and dismissed the case.  Blankenheim and Perkins thus headed 
victorious for Charlotte‟s Union Station, but that victory was short-lived. As they left, 
they encountered the police officer who had arrested Perkins. He warned them to “get the 
hell out of town,” because Charlotte was not going to “let no New York nigger come 
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down here and make trouble for us and our good nigras.”
239
 Ignoring the threat, 
Blankenheim and Perkins boarded a bus to join their fellow Riders in Rock Hill, the first 
stop in South Carolina. 
 Charlotte may have had the first arrest, but as Blankenheim and Perkins soon 
found out, Rock Hill would be the first town in which the Riders would face serious 
trouble. The cotton mill town was ripe for a violent confrontation; just three-months prior 
to the arrival of the Riders, the Rock Hill Movement led by Reverend C.A. Ivory and 
SNCC volunteers, had enjoyed success with its jail no-bail sit-in campaign and civil 
rights activism continued to grow amongst the Rock Hill residents. On the other hand, 
Rock Hill‟s white population, or as Senator Ben Tilman referred to them, “the damned 
factory trash,” was filled with white supremacists who directed their blame for falling 
cotton prices and the crop lien system toward Rock Hill‟s black residents.
240
 The racial 
tension in Rock Hill was so evident that Lewis knew they “were in trouble as soon as I 
stepped off the bus.”
241
  
 Lewis, in his 1998 memoir Walking with the Wind, recalled just how much 
trouble the Riders would face in Rock Hill: 
As Al Bigelow and I approached the “WHITE” waiting room in the Rock Hill 
Greyhound terminal, I noticed a large number of young white guys hanging 
around the pinball machines in the lobby. Two of these guys were leaning by the 
doorjamb to the waiting room. They wore leather jackets, had those ducktail 
haircuts and were each smoking a cigarette. 
 “Other side, nigger,” one of the two said, stepping in my way as I began to walk 
 through the door. He pointed to a door down the way with a sign that said 
 “COLORED.” 
                                                          
239
     Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 121.  
240
    Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 121.  
241
    Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 121.   
88 
 
 I did not feel nervous at all. I really did not feel afraid. 
 “I have a right to go in here,” I said, speaking carefully and clearly, “on the 
 grounds of the Supreme Court decision in the Boynton case.” 
I don‟t think either of these guys had ever heard of the Boynton case. Not that it 
would  have mattered. 
 “Shit on that,” one of them said. 
 The next thing I knew, a fist smashed the right side of my head. Then another hit 
me square in the face. As I fell to the floor, I could feel feet kicking me hard in 
the sides. I could taste blood in my mouth. 
At that point Al Bigelow stepped in, placing his body between mine and these 
men, standing square, with his arms at his sides. 
It had to look strange to these guys to see a big, strong white man putting himself 
in the middle of a fistfight like this, not looking at all as if he was ready to throw a 
punch, but not looking frightened either. 
They hesitated for an instant. Then they attacked Bigelow, who did not raise a 
finger as these young men began punching him. It took several blows to drop him 
to one knee.  
At that point, several of the white guys by the pinball machines moved over to 
join in. Genevieve Hughes stepped in their way and was knocked to the floor. 
That finally brought a reaction from a police officer who had stood by and 
witnessed the entire scene. He stepped in, pulled one guy off us and said, „All 
right, boys. Y‟all‟ve done about enough now. Get on home.”
242
  
 
Heeding the police officer‟s warning, the hoodlums retreated home. Several other 
officers showed up within minutes and some, to the amazement of Lewis, Hughes, and 
Bigelow were sympathetic. One officer asked Lewis, Hughes, and Bigelow, if they 
wanted to press charges. “We said no,” Lewis recalled, “to the offer to press charges. 
This was simply another aspect of the Gandhian perspective. Our struggle was not against 
one person or against a small group of people like those who attacked us that morning. 
The struggle was against a system, the system that helped produce people like that.”
243
 
Lewis, Hughes, and Bigelow did not look at the young men who attacked them as their 
enemies, but as victims of a Jim Crow system. The problem of Jim Crow was much 
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larger than the attack on Lewis, Hughes, and Bigelow and to bring attention to the attack 
was, as Lewis recalled, “a distraction, a sideshow that would draw attention away from 
where it belonged, which in this case was the sanctioned system of segregation in the 
entire South.”
244
 Lewis, Hughes, and Bigelow refused to leave the Rock Hill Terminal. 
Instead, they joined their fellow riders in the restaurant for what Lewis called “his hard-
earned cup of coffee.”
245
 The Freedom Riders faced their first test of violence that day 
and held true to Gandhian principles. More importantly, the attack against Lewis, 
Hughes, and Bigelow brought larger media attention to the ride and its participants.
246
 
 The Trailways bus arrived to a locked and closed Rock Hill terminal.  While a 
group of whites loomed around the station and followed the riders to the Friendship 
Junior College, all of the riders reunited without any violent altercation. While the Riders 
exchanged stories on the day‟s events, a Rock Hill resident mended Lewis and Bigelow‟s 
injuries with Band-Aids from a first-aid-kit. 
 The next morning the riders returned to an opened Rock Hill bus terminal where 
they observed, in the white waiting room, as Peck noted, “a test team [sitting] there 
unmolested.” The Riders could have faced the same violence this day as they had the 
previous day, but “the hoodlums,” as Peck recalled, did not stage a repeat performance.
247
 
The Riders‟ first major violent confrontation was behind them, but the unforeseen 
eruption of violence that lay ahead was on the minds of every rider. 
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  The Riders arrived to closed signs posted on the doors to the Chester bus 
terminal.
248
 They proceeded on to Winnsboro, where Hank Thomas, the youngest of the 
riders, along with James Peck waited for service at the whites-only lunch counter. Barely 
in their seats, Peck recalled that the “restaurant owner dashed away from the counter to 
call the police.”
249
 Upon the officer‟s arrival, he directed Thomas to come with him. Peck 
interceded and indicated, to the police officer, that Thomas had the constitutional right to 
eat at this lunch counter. The police officer responded to Peck by arresting him for 
interfering with arrest and Thomas for trespass. While the rest of the Riders headed to 
Sumter, Frances Bergman, the observer on this leg of the trip, stayed behind with Thomas 
and Peck. Both men were placed in separate Jim Crow cells for hours while Bergman, as 
Peck later lamented, “braved the hate-filled town alone trying to find out what the 
authorities intended to do” with Peck and Thomas.
250
 Bergman recalled years later how 
she was referred to as “nigger lover,” and how she was told to “get out of town” for they 
had, “no use for her kind here.” She went on to say in a testimonial,  
For the first time I felt that I have, a glimpse of what it would be like to be 
colored. This thing made me realize what it is to be scorned, humiliated and made 
to feel like dirt…. The whole thing was such an eye-opener for me…. It left me so 
filled with admiration for the colored people who have to live with this all their 
lives. It seems to me that anything I can do now, day or night, would be 
enough…. Somehow, you feel there is a new urgency at this time. You see the 
courage all about you.
251
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 After ten hours in jail, two police officers drove Thomas, in the middle of night, 
back to the Winnsboro bus terminal. As the police officers drove away, Thomas observed 
a mob of white segregationists in the parking lot. The white men ordered Thomas “to go 
into the nigger waiting room.” Thomas, knowing this was a potential lynch mob, defied 
the order and, with crazy boldness, refused and instead went directly pass the white mob 
into the white waiting room and purchased a candy bar. Before the white mob could 
react, Thomas recalled years later, a local black minister screamed out, “get in the car and 
stay down.” Both men expected “gunshots, but they didn‟t come.”
252
  Because of the 
brave actions of the local black community, Thomas escaped a lynch mob waiting to kill 
him that night. These men and women refused to accept the status quo of Jim Crow. 
Twenty-five miles later in Columbia and in the safety of a NAACP leader‟s home, 
Thomas recalled, “He saved my life, because they were going to kill me.”
253
  Peck‟s 
release was more complicated due to a second arrest for illegal transport of alcohol across 
the border. Farmer returned from Sumter with Ernest Finney Jr., a local black attorney, to 
bail Peck out. The second arrest, Farmer recalled, “Delayed one bus for a while. I bailed 
Jim out, and though knowing my lawyer would have conniptions, I urged him to jump 
bail so the Freedom Ride could continue on schedule.”
254
 Peck complied with Farmer‟s 
request and the men traveled to Sumter to rejoin the other riders. The original charges of 
trespass and interfering with arrest were dropped because “local officials,” according to 
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Peck, apparently concluded that [their] cases would not hold in view of the Supreme‟s 
Court‟s Boynton decision.”
255
  
 Sumter was the last stop in South Carolina, and the Riders tested the facilities 
with no violent confrontation. After a night in Sumter, the Freedom Ride journeyed to 
Augusta, Georgia, where the atmosphere was quite civil. All the riders sat in the terminal 
restaurant and ate, marking the first time that blacks had eaten in Augusta‟s terminal 
restaurant. “Our presence,” Peck explained, “at the tables drew little attention. Neither 
racist hoodlums nor mere curiosity seekers gathered.”
256
  The group sent Herman Harris 
and Walter Bergman back to the Trailways restaurant that evening to test the facilities 
again because they were amazed that the same city, which earlier in the year arrested a 
black soldier for trying to integrate a lunch counter, served them without incident. Harris 
and Bergman “were served courteously,” and with no violent confrontation.
257
  
 The Riders next tested the Boynton decision in Athens, Georgia.  As Peck 
recalled, “Freedom Riders were served at the lunch counter without question,” and he 
noted that an observer “might have imagined himself in a rest stop up North rather than 
deep in Georgia.”
258
  At both the Greyhound and Trailways terminals, the Riders 
encountered desegregated facilities that heeded the Boynton decision. It was positive 
proof, for the Riders, that change in the Deep South was possible. The destruction of Jim 
Crow segregation and implementation of integration was no longer a dream, but a reality 
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achieved. Leadership was a key component in why the Riders did not encounter any 
violent confrontations in Sumter, Augusta, Athens, and Atlanta.
259
 
 The Riders stayed in Atlanta for two days before heading into Alabama. While in 
Atlanta, the riders stayed in the Atlanta University dorms and met with Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., who resided in Atlanta. During a dinner with King, the Riders described in 
detail what they had encountered. King took this opportunity to emphasize the 
importance of nonviolent direct action and his elation over the successes gained thus far 
in the Freedom Ride. In a private conversation with Simeon Booker, the journalist from 
Jet and Ebony, King confided, “You will never make it through Alabama.”
260
 Sources in 
King‟s SCLC organization were privy to evidence suggesting a plot to derail the Freedom 
Ride.
261
 
 The ultra-segregationist front in Alabama did not hide the fact it was devoted to 
the Jim Crow mentality. From the police sergeant to the governor, their racial hatred was 
clear. Governor Patterson, a year before the Freedom Rides, had even predicted that 
“you‟re going to have rioting on your hands if they try forced integration,” he added and 
elaborated that “I‟ll be one of the first ones stirring up trouble, any way I can.
262
 Alabama 
was not willing to comply with any law that went against the old tradition of the color 
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line. The Freedom Riders were venturing into this deep southern defiance environment 
willing to face all challenges.     
 Unbeknownst to the Riders, the Alabama Knights of the Ku Klux Klan were 
constructing a plan to deal with the Freedom Riders when they hit the Alabama border. 
Provided with information from the Birmingham Police Department, Sergeant Tom 
Cook, Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” Connor, and a group of ultra-
segregationist Klansmen devised a plan to disrupt the Freedom Ride initiative and 
maintain white supremacy in Alabama. The plan called for, as Arsenault explained, “a 
rude welcome for the invading „niggers‟ and „nigger lovers‟ who were about to violate 
the timeworn customs and laws of the sovereign state of Alabama.”
263
 Cook and Gary 
Thomas Rowe, an Eastview Klavern #13 member and FBI informant, developed the 
violent attack against the Freedom Riders in several meetings. Rowe collected and turned 
over information to the Birmingham FBI office that indicated Cook, along with, members 
of the Birmingham Police Department and officials of the Alabama Highway Patrol 
would cooperate in the attack. “You will work with me and I will work with you on the 
Freedom Riders,” Cook guaranteed “We‟re going to allow you fifteen minutes…. You 
can beat ‟em, bomb ‟em, maim ‟em, kill ‟em. I don‟t give a shit. There will be absolutely 
no arrests. You can assure every Klansman in the country that no one will be arrested in 
Alabama for that fifteen minutes.”
264
 Rowe reported to his Birmingham FBI contacts all 
the information collected at these planning meetings. J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, had 
many opportunities to forewarn Farmer and the Riders, but instead “instructed the 
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Birmingham field office to use care in furnishing information to the Birmingham police 
department, and discretion in its contacts with Bull Connor and Tom Cook in light of 
Cook‟s contacts with Rowe.”
265
 The FBI took an idle stance, even with the damaging 
evidence, against the perpetrators of this violent plot. Hoover had a clear idea that these 
Klansmen, with the help of the local authority, planned “to beat the Freedom Riders into 
submission.”
266
 He knew that the Warrior Klavern planned to place three Klansmen on 
one of the busses in Atlanta. He was privy to the press release drafted by Bobby Shelton, 
the Imperial Wizard of the Alabama Knights, who stated that, “it was up to the 
constituted authorities of Alabama to stop any demonstrations by CORE, but if state 
authorities did not do their duty, the Alabama Knights, KKK Inc. would do all they could 
to force the CORE representatives to leave Alabama.”
267
 Nine days before the vigilante 
attack against the Freedom Riders took place; Hoover knew the details of the plan and 
conveyed some of Rowe‟s assessment to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Deputy 
Attorney General Byron White, and other Justice Department officials. Even with this 
partial information, Kennedy, White, and the other officials in the Justice Department did 
not inform the Freedom Riders. The lack of “special instructions” by the Justice 
Department was the official reason given for the negligence of the Federal government in 
Alabama.
268
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 Unaware of the plan, when the Riders returned to the dorms that evening they 
went over the next phase of the Freedom Ride. This final briefing set in place, as Farmer 
recalled, “The division of responsibilities for the most ominous leg of the journey, the 
ride through Alabama.”
269
 Being the National Director of CORE, Farmer stressed he 
would be lead tester on the Trailways bus, and James Peck would be the tester on the 
Greyhound bus. It was imperative that, as Farmer explained, “Discipline and compliance 
be strict and tight.”
270
 There was no room for error as the Riders entered Alabama. 
Alabama was the prime opportunity, even with the frightening challenges awaiting them, 
for the Riders to highlight to the world nonviolent direct action. 
 Farmer never did get the chance to lead the Riders into Alabama. Several hours 
after the group adjourned their meeting, Farmer received a telephone call from his mother 
telling him of his father‟s death. In his 1985 memoir Lay Bare the Heart: An 
Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement, Farmer remembered the last conversation 
he and his father had: 
Ten days earlier, during the training session in Washington, D.C., my father lay in 
a bed at Freedman‟s Hospital, in serious condition with medical complications 
following surgery to remove a cancerous growth on the tongue…. He thought 
long and hard, probably recalling his own childhood and youth growing up in 
South Carolina and Georgia, sixty to seventy years ago. Finally, he looked at me 
through eyes dulled by strong pain killers and dimmed by the knowledge of his 
own terminal illness. He said, Well, son, I think you will be all right through 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and maybe even Georgia. But in „Bama, 
they will doubtless take a potshot at you. With all my heart, I hope they miss. Can 
you leave a copy of your itinerary? I complied. Son I wish you wouldn‟t go. But 
at the same time, I am more proud than I have ever been in my life, because you 
are going. Please try to survive.
271
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Farmer‟s mother requested that her son come home immediately to help bury her 
husband, his father.
272
 When making the decision to return home, Farmer confessed he 
could not “really explain the confusion of emotions. There was of course, the 
incomparable sorrow and pain, but, frankly, there was also a sense of reprieve, for which 
I hated myself. Like everyone else, I was afraid of what lay in store for us in Alabama, 
and now that I was to be spared participation in it, I was relieved, which embarrassed me 
to tears.”
273
 Farmer, exhausted and ashamed, informed the Riders of his immediate 
departure to Washington the next morning at breakfast. He named Joe Perkins as lead 
tester on the Greyhound bus, and put Jim Peck in charge of the Ride. Farmer emphasized 
that he could be reached by phone at anytime. Bewildered by Farmer‟s announcement, 
the Riders were at a loss for words and worried what lay ahead of a leaderless Freedom 
Ride.
274
 
On May 14, 1961, Mother‟s Day, the Freedom Riders boarded their respective 
busses, and due to time schedules, left an hour apart from each other. Both busses headed 
for Anniston, Alabama, and then for Birmingham. While there was a high level of 
apprehension, the Riders remained determined to end Jim Crow segregation in Alabama. 
 As the Greyhound bus entered the Anniston station, the carnage began with a 
mob of fifty white men greeting the Freedom Riders with ball bats, clubs, and iron pipes. 
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With no police in sight, the mob led by William Chappell, Klan leader, “set upon the 
vehicle,” according to Peck, “denting the sides, breaking windows, and slashing tires.”
275
 
The Riders remained on the bus while watching the mob intensify its efforts to get on the 
bus or lure the Riders off the bus. As Genevieve Hughes recalled, “One man stood on the 
steps, yelling, and calling us cowards.”
276
 For nearly twenty minutes, the brutal assault on 
the bus continued before the police arrived. Upon their arrival, no arrests occurred, and 
the bus driver used a path created for him to leave the station. Escorted by an Anniston 
police car and followed by the mob, the damaged Greyhound bus made its way to the city 
limits. Deserting the bus at the city limits, the police car returned to Anniston, and the 
Freedom Riders found themselves facing another violent attack by the mob. The second 
attack tested the Riders‟ commitment to the Freedom Ride initiative and nonviolent direct 
action. Lewis, though not there, recounted the vile nature of the attack:  
The mob arrived, two hundred of them, circling the bus and smashing the 
windows. They tugged at the door, which had been pulled shut. They screamed at 
the riders, who were sprawled on the floor of the bus, avoiding the flying glass. 
Then someone in the crowd hurled a firebomb, a Molotov cocktail, through the 
back window. As thick smoke and flames began to fill the bus, the riders rushed 
the door and found they couldn‟t open it. The mob now pushing the door shut, 
trapping the people inside. At that point, a passenger in the front of the bus pulled 
a pistol and waved it at the crowd outside. He was a white man, Eli Cowling. He 
was an Alabama state investigator who had been traveling undercover to keep an 
eye on the riders. Now it was no longer a priority for him to keep his identity 
secret. His life was on the line along with everyone else‟s on that bus. The crowd 
backed off. Out the emergency exit door, led by Al Bigelow, tumbled the riders, 
choking and coughing. One by one they fell to the grass, the last one climbing out 
just as the bus was rocked by a blast—the fuel tank exploding. Now the mob 
moved in… … Henry Thomas was clubbed as he staggered away from the bus; 
somebody swung a baseball bat into the side of his head. Genevieve Hughes had 
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her lip split open. Rocks and bricks were heaved from people in the crowd too 
afraid to come closer.
277
 
 
For the first time, the Freedom Riders faced the intensified violence of the South and 
feared for their lives. “I got real scared,” Hank Thomas revealed later, “ … the bus caught 
afire and everything got out of control. There was a possibility I could have survived the 
mob, but I was just so afraid of the mob that I was gonna stay on that bus. I mean, I just 
got that much afraid.
278
 
 The Freedom Riders survived that day, no thanks to the local authorities. Aware 
of the imminent dangers that still existed in Anniston, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, the 
pastor of Birmingham‟s Bethel Baptist Church, led a convoy of cars into Anniston to 
transport the Riders back to Birmingham. Shuttlesworth emphasized to the volunteers 
that this convoy had to be nonviolent, “Gentlemen, this is dangerous,” he explained, 
“but… you mustn‟t carry any weapons. You must trust God and have faith.”
279
 Out of 
respect for Shuttlesworth, the men agreed, but once out of Shuttlesworth‟s sight, the 
“deacons” did not rely on their faith, but the shotguns and ammunition they hid under 
their seats. The convoy arrived to find the police holding back a hostile white mob. The 
“deacons” promptly displayed their weapons, the ones they were encouraged not to bring, 
as they loaded the physically and emotionally wounded Freedom Riders into the cars. 
The defenders of white supremacy‟s heinous and unprovoked attack against the 
Freedom Riders in Anniston were brutal and unjust, but the Riders remained firm in their 
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stance against Jim Crow.  The second round of attacks began when the Trailways bus was 
still in Atlanta. Peck and the other riders noticed regular passengers getting out of line as 
a group of white men spoke with them. Not putting much thought in it, Peck along with 
the Bergmans, Person, Harris, Moore, Reynolds, and three of the white men from the 
group boarded the bus.
280
 Shortly after leaving the station the three men revealed their 
true identity and agenda, and the experience became, as Booker later explained, “a 
frightening experience… the worst encountered in almost 20 years of journalism.”
281
 
Yelling “you niggers will be taken care of once you get in Alabama,” the Klansmen 
continued to make racial slurs and threats in hopes of intimidating the Riders. While the 
Riders remained in their seats, not breaking with their integrated seating, they did become 
alarmed as they approached Anniston and the threats intensified.
282
 
 Unaware of what happened in Anniston the hour before, Peck and his fellow 
Riders went into “an eerily quiet” Trailways station. Peck, as lead tester, followed 
protocol, walked to the lunch counter, and purchased some sandwiches. While waiting 
for the bus to leave, still unaware of the brutal attack earlier, the Riders heard an 
ambulance but did not give it much thought. The nervous anxiety and uneasiness of the 
Riders soon changed to heightened fear. The Riders found out the direct connection they 
had to the ambulance siren when John Olan Patterson, the bus driver, explained, “we 
have received word that a bus has been burned to the ground and passengers are being 
carried to the hospital by the carloads.” Patterson, who was no fan of the Riders, further 
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declared, “A mob is waiting for our bus and will do the same to us unless we get these 
niggers off the front seats.”
283
 Holding steadfast, the Riders did not move and reminded 
Patterson that they had the constitutional right to sit anywhere on the bus. Disgusted by 
the Freedom Riders‟ clear defiance, the Klansmen took action and said: “Niggers get 
back. You ain‟t up north. You‟re in Alabama, and niggers ain‟t nothing here.” Then 
without provocation one of the Klansmen struck Person in the face and another hit Harris.  
Dragging both men into the aisle the Klansmen viciously beat Person and Harris, but both 
men refused to strike back and kept with the Gandhian principle of nonviolence. When 
Peck and Walter Bergman tried to intercede, the Klansmen turned their attention toward 
the two white men. Both Peck and Bergman received violent blows to the head that 
knocked the men to their knees. Peck recalled years later: 
I found myself face downward on the floor of the bus. Someone was on top of me. 
I was bleeding. Bergman‟s jaw was cut and swollen. None of us realized that he 
also had received a crushing blow on the head… Finally, all of our group—whites 
and Negroes—and one Negro passenger who had not gotten off, had been forced 
to the back of the bus. The hoodlums—along with a pregnant woman whom they 
brought abroad—sat in the very front. The seats in between remained empty. At 
that point, the driver agreed to proceed to Birmingham. Some of us doubted 
whether he would really head there or turn up some obscure side road for another 
mob scene. For the entire two-hour ride to Birmingham, the hoodlums craned 
their necks to make sure we didn‟t move into any of the empty rows of front 
seats.
284
  
 
In direct violation of the Riders civil rights, the Klansmen reestablished Jim Crow 
segregation on the Trailways bus. With this restored order in place, Patterson—along 
with a police officer boarded the bus. The police officer revealed his elation at the melee 
that had taken place, and confirmed to the assailants they did not have “worry about no 
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lawsuits. I ain‟t seen a thing.”
285
 Once the police officer vacated the bus, Patterson started 
the two-hour drive to Birmingham, also content with the new seating arrangement. The 
Klansmen continued to taunt the beaten Riders over the course of the bus ride. Between 
the bodily and psychological threats, the Riders thought it best not to test the Morgan or 
Boynton decision. Simeon Baker, one of the journalists, recalled that one of the 
hoodlums—blocking passage from the back of the bus to the front—taunted the Riders 
with: “Just tell Bobby [Kennedy] and we‟ll do him in, too.”
286
   
Severely beaten and scared, the Riders maintained their commitment to the 
Freedom Ride and to nonviolence. Not knowing what to expect when they arrived in 
Birmingham, Peck and Person agreed they would be the first to face any white 
supremacist mob. The men and women fully understood, now, that they were no longer 
in the South anymore, but in the Deep South in Alabama—the heart of a southern 
defiance that had every intent of staying unmovable. These men were proud of, “Every 
channel of communication,” as the New York Times journalist Harrison Salisbury noted, 
“every medium of mutual interest, every reasoned approach, every inch of middle ground 
[being] fragmented by the emotional dynamite of racism, reinforced by the whip, the 
razor, the gun, the bomb, the torch, the club, the knife, the police and many branches of 
the state apparatus.”
287
  
As the bus made its way to Birmingham, the white mob, positioned at the 
Greyhound station, regrouped and headed to the Trailways station to “welcome” their 
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northern agitators. “We made an astounding sight,” Rowe recalled, “men running and 
walking down the streets of Birmingham on Sunday afternoon carrying chains, sticks, 
and clubs. Everything was deserted; no police officers were to be seen except one on a 
street corner. He stepped off and let us go by, and we barged into the bus station and took 
it over like an army of occupation. There were Klansmen in the waiting room, in the rest 
rooms, in the parking area.”
288
 These men positioned themselves to ambush the Freedom 
Riders and carry out their elaborate plan of protecting the Jim Crow South. The bus 
arrived in Birmingham at 4:15 in the afternoon. The Freedom Riders entered a quiet, 
rather peaceful station, and proceeded to test the facilities. Peck and Person were first to 
enter the white waiting room. Both men moved towards the whites-only lunch counter 
and within seconds, the mob began to strike Person in his face. When Peck tried to 
intervene, the mob, according to Peck, “grabbed [both men] and pushed [them] towards 
the alleyway leading to the loading platform. As soon as we got into the alleyway and out 
of sight of onlookers—mainly reporters—in the waiting room, six of them started 
swinging at me with fists and pipes. Five others attacked Person a few feet ahead.”
289
 
While Person was able to escape the pummeling of his attackers, Peck was not as lucky. 
The continued blows Peck received left him unconscious in a pool of his own blood. 
While Peck and Person endured the wrath of the segregationist mob, the other Freedom 
Riders and journalists avoided the onslaught of violence. A couple lost themselves in the 
crowd of passengers in the station, while others boarded the city bus or found a cabdriver 
willing to take them to a safe location. Walter Bergman and Ike Reynolds were not so 
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lucky and could not escape the white mob. Both men received blows from the enraged 
white men that left them either unconscious or semiconscious. The peaceful, rather quiet 
station that the Riders entered had become a war zone filled with hateful unlawful 
violence. For fifteen minutes, the Riders faced the wrath of Southern Defiance unwilling 
to give up their way of life. These men wanted to annihilate these northern agitators and 
thus send a message to the world that racial segregation was forever intact in Alabama.
290
 
 Once the violent attack was over, the Freedom Riders made their way to the 
parsonage at Bethel Baptist Church. Visibly weakened, frightened, and discouraged by 
the mob attack, Peck, in his leadership role, tried to lift the spirits of the Riders. Peck and 
the Riders knew that a serious conversation on the future of the Freedom Ride needed to 
take place, but it would have to wait because of Peck‟s dire physical condition. After 
emergency surgery at Jefferson Hillman Hospital, to repair the wounds he had sustained, 
reporters surrounded Peck looking for an exclusive interview. While weak from the 
surgery, Peck welcomed the reporters and recounted for them the vicious events that took 
place in Anniston and Birmingham. In a soft voice, he told the nation, “The going is 
getting rougher,” but he vowed, “I‟ll be on that bus tomorrow headed for 
Montgomery.”
291
 With that brief statement, Peck revealed the courage and determination 
possessed by all the Freedom Riders. These men and women, who had suffered physical 
and emotional wounds in Anniston and Birmingham that day, remained loyal to the 
Freedom Ride movement. They were willing not only to continue the fight for justice in 
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the Deep South, but also to sacrifice their lives to, as Arsenault stated, “redeem the land 
of Jim Crow.”
292
  
 That evening, Fred Shuttlesworth held a mass meeting at the Bethel Baptist 
church, and those who were there heard the firsthand accounts of what had happened at 
the bus stations. The Riders implored the men and women to join this movement and not 
passively accept second-class citizenship. Shuttlesworth ended the night with an inspiring 
sermon about the event of the day. In which, he declared, “this is the greatest thing that 
has ever happened to Alabama, and it has been good for the nation. It was a wonderful 
thing to see these young students—Negro and white—come, even after the mobs and the 
bus burning. When white and black men are willing to be beaten up together, it is a sure 
sign they will soon walk together as brothers…. No matter how many times they beat us 
up, segregation has still got to go. Others may be beaten up, but freedom is worth 
anything.”
293
 
 Staff members and Freedom Riders informed Farmer of the melee that had 
erupted in Anniston and Birmingham. Initially plagued with a mixture of emotions from 
pride in the Freedom Riders to guilt for not being physically there, Farmer set aside his 
feelings and used the violent outbreak to bring attention to the Freedom Ride. “When I 
saw the photograph of the burning bus on the front page of the Washington Post,” Farmer 
recalled, “I called my staff in New York and directed them to superimpose that 
photograph on the flame of the torch of the Statue of Liberty immediately and to use that 
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composite picture as the symbol of the Freedom Ride.”
294
 Farmer wanted the nation to 
see what one American was capable of doing to another American. Farmer, still dealing 
with the death of his father and his mother‟s grief, did not return to the Freedom Riders 
until Tuesday, so he sent Gordon Carey down to evaluate the situation. Farmer, after 
receiving press reports, firsthand accounts from Freedom Riders, and Shuttlesworth, 
faced the agony of whether to end or continue the Freedom Ride. He, along with the 
Riders, understood that more violence was a possibility and, after serious debate, Farmer 
decided to end the Freedom Ride. While Farmer was reluctant to make this decision, he 
wanted to protect the Riders from any further violence. While some Riders agreed with 
Farmer, in a vote, the overwhelming majority voted to continue the ride. Peck, the most 
severely beaten, led the charge to continue. “To back down at this juncture,” Peck 
recalled years later, would “be interpreted as meaning that violence had triumphed over 
nonviolence. It might convince the ultarsegregationists that by violence they could stop 
the Freedom Riders. My point was accepted and we started our meeting to plan the next 
lap, from Birmingham to Montgomery. We decided to leave in one contingent on a 
Greyhound bus leaving at three in the afternoon.”
295
  
The Riders not only regained the spirit needed in order to finish what they had 
started, but also they inspired others to get involved. Diane Nash, a leader in the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Nashville, expressed the same sentiment as the 
Riders after hearing about the violent attack against them. In a phone call to Farmer, 
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Diane extended her help with the Freedom Ride. Years later, Farmer recalled the 
conversation with Diane: 
Diane: Your group of Freedom Riders are so badly chewed up that they cannot go 
on now. Would you have any objections to members of the Nashville Student 
Movement going in and taking up the Ride where CORE left off. 
 
 Farmer: You realize it may be suicide 
 
Diane: We fully realize that but we can‟t let them stop us with violence. If we do, 
the movement is dead. Whenever we start a drive, all they will have to do is roll 
in the violence and we will turn over and play dead. Your group has been 
battered; let me send in fresh nonviolent troops to carry the Ride on. Let me bring 
in Nashville students to pick up the baton and run with it.
296
 
 
   
  On Monday, May 15, the Riders received a call from Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy. They emphasized to the Attorney General the seriousness of the situation; 
Simeon Booker recalled he told Kennedy, “We are trapped.”
297
 Shuttlesworth echoed 
Booker‟s concerns to Kennedy. Upon hearing what the Riders, Booker and Shuttlesworth 
had to say, Kennedy arranged for the local police to provide protection for the Freedom 
Riders. Kennedy declared, “Mr. Connor is going to protect you at the station and escort 
you to the city line.”
298
   
Even with a heavier presence of media, Klansmen were still lurking around the 
bus station, thus establishing a high probability of a repeat attack. Whether or not 
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Kennedy came through with police protection for the Riders, the group decided at a 
morning meeting that they would board the three o‟clock bus headed for Montgomery. 
The Riders were willing to gamble that a repeat attack would not take place because of 
the media attention now surrounding the Freedom Ride. Upon arrival, the Riders found 
that a white mob as well as, police and media, were there in full force. As the Riders 
made their way to the door, Klansmen tried to prevent them from entering, but the police 
kept the mob from not allowing the Riders to pass. With the mob yelling racial epithets 
and screaming threats, the Riders proceeded to the ticket counter and purchased their 
tickets to Montgomery.  
The Riders went into the waiting room to wait for a boarding announcement, but 
the announcement would never come. Instead, the Riders found themselves in a stalemate 
with Governor Patterson, Eugene “Bull” Connor, and the mob of Klansmen. The 
Governor, ignoring the directive of the attorney general, declared, “The citizens of the 
state are so enraged that I cannot guarantee protection for this bunch of rabble-
rousers.”
299
 Eugene “Bull” Connor mirrored this sentiment when he added, “I have said 
for the last twenty years that these out-of-town meddlers were going to cause bloodshed 
if they kept meddling in the South‟s business.”
300
 The disdain for the Riders that 
Patterson and Connor expressed was clear. Their defiance of the Justice Department 
infuriated Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who demanded that they protect the Riders, 
these men and women who “under the law were entitled to transportation by the 
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Greyhound bus.”
301
 Kennedy emphasized that “the Government [was] going to be very 
upset if this group did not get to continue their trip [because] we‟ve gone to a lot of 
trouble to see that they [CORE Freedom Riders] get to [take] this trip.”
302
 Kennedy‟s 
request fell on deaf ears in Alabama and thus his frustration with Jim Crow and 
Alabama‟s defiance only escalated throughout the day. His frustration culminated when 
he warned George Cruit, the manager of the Birmingham Greyhound bus station,  “… 
Somebody better get in the damn bus and get it going and get these people on their 
way.”
303
 Even with this warning and the threat to send in an Air Force plane for the 
Riders, the Freedom Riders remained in the waiting room of the Greyhound station with 
no way to Montgomery. With no end in sight for the impasse, the Riders discussed 
whether it wise to continue this stalemate. The Riders concluded that to preserve the 
Freedom Ride they had to break the stalemate and continue to Montgomery or New 
Orleans by plane. The Riders wanted to avoid further bloodshed for themselves and the 
black community in Birmingham. After several hours of phoned-in bomb threats, flight 
cancellations, and a heated debate over whether to continue to Montgomery or New 
Orleans, the Freedom Plane left at 10:58 P.M. for New Orleans. 
 Years later James Farmer recalled,  
When the courageous band of thirteen had met in Washington, D.C., at the 
end of April, I had not dreamed that in a few short weeks a new kind of 
civil war would rock the nation—a war not “without violence,” but with 
violence on only one side. We had not dreamed that Jim Crow would so 
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quickly be stood on its head and its supporters driven into trenches in a do-
or-die battle to save it. But so it was.
304
  
 
 The Freedom Riders throughout the initiative, as Meier and Rudwick noted, 
“Insisted upon their rights to use waiting rooms and lunch counters, and successfully 
challenged-- even with the threat of violence and arrest--, the segregation that still 
prevailed despite the Boynton decision.”
305
  Determined to change society, the Freedom 
Riders put their lives on the line. White and black men and women worked together 
testing laws and demanding equal treatment for all citizens. They wanted an integrated 
society that was willing to end discriminating aggression and become a truly democratic 
country. The Freedom Riders did not complete their journey to New Orleans on the bus, 
but their ride catapulted CORE, the drive to end racial segregation, and nonviolent action 
to the forefront of the Civil Rights Movement. Sadly, the same organization that had 
devoted itself to the principle of nonviolent action and integration in seven short years 
would turn its back on that philosophy. The voluntary or forced removal of white 
members from CORE in 1968 left an organization that was strikingly different from the 
CORE represented by the Freedom Riders in 1961.    
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WE‟RE SICK AND TIRED OF BEING SICK AND TIRED: THE TRANSITIONAL 
CORE YEARS 1960-1966 
 
 
Bayard Rustin recalled: 
 
…in the few years that have passed since the first flush of sit-ins, several 
developments have taken place that have complicated matters [the civil rights 
movement]… [one] is the spread of the revolution to the North; and [another] is 
the expansion of the movement‟s base in the Negro community.
306
 
 
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960‟s was going through a physical and ideological 
change. It was no longer the movement that focused on voter registration and the 
integration of lunch counters, but rather began to concentrate on housing, school 
integration/better-educational opportunities, police protection, and employment; all social 
issues that affected the northern “urban black belts.” Participants in the movement found 
very little solace in destroying Jim Crow and gaining legal access to public 
accommodations, which they “lacked money [and opportunity] to use.” The vision of the 
movement had to go beyond just race relations, but there was an understanding in the 
1960‟s of the significance of economic relations.  
From a constitutional standpoint blacks gained tremendous ground in the ten 
years that followed the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision. Even 
though Jim Crow was on the decline blacks still suffered from the persistence of de facto 
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segregation in socioeconomic institutions. Civil rights organizations were slow to realize, 
as Bayard Rustin noted that: 
 
More Negroes are unemployed today than in 1954, and the unemployment gap 
between the races is wider. More Negroes attend de facto segregated schools 
today than when the Supreme Court handed down its famous decision, while 
school integration proceeds at a snail‟s pace in the south, the number of Northern 
schools with an excessive proportion of minority youth proliferates. And behind 
this is the continuing growth of racial slums, spreading over our central cities and 
trapping Negro youth in a milieu which, whatever its legal definition, sows an 
unimaginable demoralization. … These are the facts of life which generate 
frustration in the Negro community and challenge the civil rights movement. At 
issue, after all, is not civil rights strictly speaking, but social and economic 
conditions.
307
  
 
Blacks were fighting not just for equality through the movement, but for a social 
and economic way of life. The civil rights movement was evolving into a social 
movement that challenged the barriers to full opportunities and real equality.  The CORE 
of the 1960‟s began to recognize this evolution of the civil rights movement and found it 
fundamentally changing as well. The 1960‟s for CORE was a watershed era that 
established new leaders, directives, and ideologies for the organization. This change 
created a division of goals for CORE as a whole, with the southern chapters focusing on 
voter registration, while the northern chapters turned their attention to the socioeconomic 
plight of the urban black poor and the ghettos they inhabited. The northern black was 
“stymied by obstacles of far greater magnitude than the legal barriers he was attacking 
before: automation, urban decay, de facto school segregation;” none of these issues 
disappeared with the demise of Jim Crow.
308
 What became apparent in the North was that 
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employment and housing initiatives could not rely solely, as Farmer noted at the 1961 
Convention, “on sympathy with the South.”
309
  
 While the national office recognized that an aggressive direct action campaign 
was needed to attack the problems of the urban black ghettos, applying civil disobedience 
to northern initiatives was complicated. Local northern chapters, which would initiate 
these campaigns, had not developed the techniques needed to insure success within their 
communities. Complicating this issue was the important struggle that existed, as Sam 
Kushner, a Los Angeles CORE member, noted, “between those who wanted more 
militancy… more picketing, and another group who wanted CORE to follow „CORE 
steps‟ of careful and long-drawn out negotiation.”
310
   
Farmer even emphasized that CORE had “not yet devised enough techniques or 
used enough imagination “to eliminate discrimination in the North.
311
 
Northern CORE chapters remained steadfast in their opposition to discriminatory 
practices in housing, employment, and education within their communities, but they 
lacked the “methods, procedures, and examples of attack,” or as Genevieve Hughes of the 
Berkeley CORE chapter noted, they “lacked an action orientation.”
312
 A leader in Boston 
CORE commented: “At the moment we have no employment project. We are in the 
process of making a decision to concern ourselves—the exact nature of our commitment 
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is not yet clear….”
313
 The absence of a sound tactical approach diminished the self-
confidence needed to fight northern discrimination. In the winter and summer of 1961, 
national CORE set up training workshops and conferences in California to combat this 
issue within northern local chapters, and followed these programs up with employment 
and housing institutes in Ohio in 1962.  
These workshops along with trial-and-error campaigns on the part of northern 
chapters led to the emergence of useful tactical approaches to confronting discrimination 
in employment and housing. 
 Some of these tactics involved direct action platforms, while others, though more subtle 
in action, were still very effective. Seattle and Long Island CORE chapters circulated lists 
of white neighborhoods that sold homes to buyers without regard to race. This action 
helped many middle-class black families to buy homes in all-white communities. A more 
direct action approach, used by Los Angeles and Philadelphia CORE chapters, was 
“Operation Windowshop” in which groups of blacks took tours of model homes in 
suburban housing developments. This tactic, even though widely tried in northern 
chapters, proved to be unsuccessful because of the hesitancy of black families to move to 
predominantly white neighborhoods. Both the Syracuse and Philadelphia chapters found 
that,  
Our CORE complainants were very few, just a handful and mostly people looking 
for a halfway decent row house on the fringes of the ghetto. We always suggest 
that they go and look at the new developments in the Northeast (which is 100% 
white), but only one or two have gone up there. We tried to conduct an ‟Operation 
                                                          
313
 1961 Convention, Oldham Prs; Tony Salotto to Carey [Spring 1961], CORE Archives; 
Genevieve Hughes, Report, Dec. 1961, CORE Archives; Boston CORE Report [ca. Feb. 
1962], CORE Archives in Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 183. 
115 
 
Windowshop‟ through the churches, NAACP, etc., but were totally unsuccessful.   
In about four Sundays, we got about five carloads of onlookers.”
314
  
 
Sit-ins and picketing were two direct action methods used in housing initiatives in 1961. 
Both Brooklyn and New York CORE chapters used the direct action of a sit-in on July 4, 
1961, at a Brooklyn rental office and met with success when they acquired an apartment 
for a black Brooklyn resident. Brooklyn CORE continued its use of direct action with sit-
ins at Lefrak Realty Company and the Ira Management Corporation in October 1961. 
Both sit-ins generated a large turnout of participants willing to picket these 
establishments in order to desegregate white apartment complexes. While the Lefrak 
Realty Company sit-in climaxed with an eighteen-hour standoff and Ira Management 
Corporation a twenty-five hour standoff, the most intense Brooklyn CORE housing sit-in 
was a seventeen-day “dwell-in” in which members brought “card tables, sleeping mats 
and other furniture into an apartment at a development that refused to rent to a black IBM 
supervisor.”
315
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With the success of Brooklyn CORE‟s direct action sit-ins, other northern 
chapters followed suit beginning in the winter of 1962. Chapters in Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Newark, Washington, New Jersey and Syracuse applied the sit-in technique 
to gain equality in housing for middle-class blacks in the early 1960‟s. The 
predominantly white chapter of Ann Arbor, Michigan, took a slightly different approach 
to sit-ins. Under the leadership of Anna Holden, the Ann Arbor CORE chapter 
established the Ann Arbor Fair Housing Association (AAFHA) to “secure substantial 
support from the black community.”
316
 Beginning in January, the AAFHA began eight 
months of demonstrations and protests that included continuous picketing, and Sunday 
marches at Pittsfield Village—a development that refused to rent to an interracial couple. 
These marches, along with endorsements from local politicians, led to the first black 
family living in Pittsfield Village in the summer of 1962. The continued use of direct 
action sit-ins and protests in the spring of 1963 led to three additional black families 
moving into Pittsfield Village.
317
 
While the eastern chapters of CORE had great success using direct action to 
pursue housing initiatives, their western counterparts were, as Genevieve Hughes 
concluded, “rather timid about sit-ins. …The West Coast is two years behind the East 
Coast in the use of direct action in housing.”
318
 Los Angeles CORE became the first 
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chapter on the West Coast to use the sit-in on a housing initiative. Assisting a black 
physicist not allowed to purchase a $24,000 home in Monterey Park, members launched a 
protest, and after five weeks were successful in desegregating the community. This 
campaign was the first of many over the next twelve months by Los Angeles CORE. 
Some of these protests led to arrests, forty including people arrested in a demonstration 
against housing practices in Wilmington, California. Members using passive resistance 
sat shoulder to shoulder with arms and legs interlocked and “refused to cooperate with 
law officers, who were forced to “unscramble” them and drag them limp to the paddy 
wagon.”
319
 At the height of the Los Angeles chapter‟s use of sit-ins, it launched an 
initiative against Don Wilson, a prominent suburban developer. The protest lasted for 
eighteen months and led to 250 arrests of CORE chapter members in Los Angeles.
320
 
Northern CORE chapters used these housing initiatives by 1963 to “secure homes 
and apartments for middle-class blacks in white neighborhoods.”
321
  The objective of 
New York CORE and other northern chapters was, as Farmer noted, “not merely to 
provide more housing, but to provide integrated housing, an open city and open 
society.”
322
 National CORE felt the country was moving in the direction of racial equality 
through integrated housing. These men and women believed in the “perfectibility of 
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human society,” the belief in progress, and the “inevitability of integration.” They 
assumed that a social acceptance of integration had taken place for, 
 
 1. Had not the Negro been freed from slavery and made a citizen? 
 2. Had not lynching been virtually abolished? 
 3. Had not segregation been declared unconstitutional? 
 4. Had not the walls of segregation indeed crumbled? 
5. Had not the younger generation of white Americans, together with many of 
their elders, accepted the idea that integration was inevitable? 
6. Had not many white citizens, even those who vigorously oppose every step 
toward integration, privately admit, It‟s here.
323
 
 
What National CORE continually faced was the hostility directed towards integration. 
The intentional exclusion of the African American community from American society 
was deliberate and supported in both the North and South. As far back as in the 19
th
 
century, George Washington Cable noted, “the slavery of civil caste can only in part be 
legislated away.” Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg expanded on this point when they 
wrote, “during the more than half-century in which [blacks] have been excluded from full 
participation in American life, the barriers to assimilation [integration] have become 
more complex.”
324
 These four barriers are: 
 
1. The entrenchment of the white man‟s sense of group position, not only in the 
South, but throughout the nation. 
2. The continuing spatial segregation of [blacks]. 
3. The cultural deficit of the [black] masses in a rapidly changing culture. 
4. The enduring reality of the black community. 
  
                                                          
323
 Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict, 
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,Inc., 1964), 105-106. 
324
 Killian and Grigg, Racial Crisis, 110.  
119 
 
These barriers confirmed for the African American that,  
… Discrimination and segregation did exist, and while the outlines of the pattern 
may be vague, the core of it is solid. Some statuses which are open to whites are 
closed to [blacks], and while [blacks] may be admitted to others, they are not 
allowed full participation. [Blacks] therefore live in a somewhat separate world: 
he inhabits certain sections of town; he has his own church and social activities; 
and he is barred from most of the private clubs and organizations and from many 
public facilities.
325
 
 
Local CORE chapters wanted to change this mindset in society. These chapters 
understood constitutionally what blacks‟ rights were, but they also recognized that there 
was a need to attack the legacy and social justification of racism and its most defined 
symbol—segregation.  The legality of segregation had come to an end, but that did not 
mean “that progressive, essentially peaceful integration was inevitable.”
326
 For this to 
happen, CORE needed to appeal to “a law higher than man-made law,”
327
 for African 
Americans were confronted with an “ancient problem, the problem of being black in 
America, a white man‟s world. … they lived in a society in which to be unconditionally 
“American”  was to be white, and to be black was a misfortune.”
328
 National CORE and 
its local chapters wanted to redefine the socially constructed idea of being „American.‟ 
For that to happen, “the meaning of “American” had to lose its racial modifier, “white.” 
Integration required a sincere acceptance by all Americans that it was just as good to be a 
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black American as to be a white American.”
329
 Herein lay the problem National CORE 
and its chapters faced. In redefining “American,” the organization was redefining “the 
sense of group position so that the status advantage of the white man was no longer an 
advantage and [black] Americans could acknowledge their ancestry without apologizing 
for it.”
330
 Northern CORE chapters felt their direct action employment, housing, police 
protection, and school integration initiatives were fundamental to changing the socially 
constructed idea of being an “American.” The pursuit of these initiatives allowed CORE 
chapters to fight for change, but in that pursuit the men and women of CORE had to 
reevaluate their ideology and action plan.  
The first area in which these chapters fought for change was in employment.  
Local CORE chapters found they had to take a stronger stance with their employment 
initiatives because of the miniscule advancement of northern blacks in employment. A 
comparison between white and non-white (for most purposes the black working 
population) income showed very little gain by blacks in the seven year period from 1954-
1961. According to Killian and Grigg in “Tokenism—Too Little, Too Late,” 
 
In 1954, the median annual income of white families was $4399; of nonwhite 
families, $2,410. The nonwhite median income was 56 percent that of the white. 
… In 1957, the white income had increased by 10.1 percent to $5,166, but the 
Negro had slipped back. Nonwhite income had increased only 14.7 percent to 
$2,764 a year, and was now only 53.5 percent of the white income. … The 
uncertain and tantalizing course of change continued between 1960-1961, when 
the median family income of nonwhites actually decreased by 1.3 percent, while 
that of white families was increasing by 2.5 percent. So, the Negro had lost 
ground again—his income was now only 53.4 percent that of the white American, 
a net loss of 2.6 percentage points since 1954 ….There is no clear-cut evidence 
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that the Negro is moving inexorably toward a position of equality in the American 
economy; there are signs that he may be slipping back slowly.
331
 
 
  Local CORE chapters blamed the widening income gap on the discriminatory 
hiring practices of white northern employers and the lack of educational opportunities for 
blacks in the North. For this to change, CORE changed its demands, actions, and 
practices it had in place against companies and eventually schools. CORE took a step 
back and looked at the larger picture, which showed that the black man was the 
 
Last man on the escalator, and thus more “likely to have little seniority in newly 
opened areas of employment. Moreover the [black working class] … still lacked 
the whole-hearted support of organized labor. But the most significant fact about 
the employment status of [the black working class] was their continued 
concentration in the low-skill occupation in an economy which had less and less 
requirement for unskilled labor.
332
 
 
These were among the issues that CORE chapters faced during the 1960‟s. 
By 1963, CORE chapters were still disappointed in the token achievements they 
were making with their direct action employment campaigns, and they were embarrassed 
by the limited success they had achieved with these initiatives. Detroit CORE even 
declared after helping blacks secure jobs and promotions with the Detroit Free Press, 
“While we realize this is a small number… it is significant because it indicates an active 
implementation of their fair employment policy… a step in the right direction.”
333
 Some 
CORE chapters conceded that “We have been satisfied too long with token 
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employment.”
334
 The small number of jobs gained through these employment initiatives 
did not reflect a significant equity change in employment for blacks. New York CORE 
only gained vague promises from its employment initiatives with the Daily News, and the 
East St. Louis chapter spent months in negotiations with Baptist ministers and major 
employers but only secured five jobs. Washington CORE, with the threat of boycotting, 
was promised nondiscriminatory hiring practices by major clothing and drug store chains, 
and the picketing against and boycotting of a beer establishment by the Los Angeles 
CORE, over several months, led to the hiring of only two black drivers. The level of 
frustration escalated with the minimal success of these employment initiatives, and 
CORE chairman Julius Hobson, for one, indicated that he “refused to accept it.”
335
 Their 
initiatives were reflective of as Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg noted in Racial Crisis in 
America, “… a man trying to put out a bonfire with a teacup. As each ember is 
extinguished through “tokenism,” the fire blazes more furiously in another place and 
demands more heroic efforts to smother the glowing core of discontent.”
336
 
CORE chapter‟s limited progress was a reflection of how their direct action 
initiatives rarely changed the discriminatory practices of employers in the North. The 
mindset of the nation was slow to change after years of direct action initiatives, and 
CORE members expressed frustration with black and white intellectuals, “pink tea 
methods, sometimes well meaning but getting us nowhere.”
337
 “It was one thing to feel,” 
Hal Brown noted, “that what you have done was successful—it is another to want to go 
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through it again. Blacks did not want to continue this simply in order to get minimal 
gains.”
338
 
Both local CORE chapters and national CORE crusaded for a more determined 
effort to change employer-hiring practices in the North. Setting in place a plan to increase 
equal employment in its communities at the 1962 Council meeting, national CORE 
encouraged the local chapters to fight for “very specific demands,” which far exceeded 
tokenism, and stressed to employers their “responsibility to locate, select, train—if 
necessary—and hire nonwhite employees.”
339
 The once strong emphasis on merit 
employment, hiring the most qualified person, regardless of race, became irrelevant on 
the local and national level. As Gordon Carey, national CORE field director, noted in a 
letter to Denver CORE,  
 
Now, National CORE is talking in terms of “compensatory” hiring. We are 
approaching employers with the proposition that they have effectively excluded 
Negroes from their work force for a long time and that they now have a 
responsibility and obligation to make up for their past sins.
340
 
 
National CORE dedicated their initiatives and actions to the above platform in December 
1962, when it boycotted the Sealtest Dairy Company. Not satisfied with the preferential 
hiring agreement, CORE fought to increase the number of blacks working at Sealtest 
through compensatory hiring. CORE, Lincoln Lynch, black chairman of Long Island 
CORE, noted was, “… trying to drive home to all businesses that the negative policies of 
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yesterday and even the positive policies of yesterday are not going to survive.”
341
 After 
two months of boycotting Sealtest Dairy Company, national CORE and the metropolitan 
chapters in New York secured employment for ten blacks and were promised “initial 
exclusive priority to all job openings, except those of contractual obligations during 1963 
to Negroes and Spanish-Americans.”
342
 
Shortly after the Sealtest Dairy boycott, Long Island CORE turned its attention 
toward hiring practices by major banking institutions. The branch met with minimal 
success at first, but by 1963 had secured the preferential hiring of thirty black and Puerto 
Rican workers within a four-month period. Long Island CORE also negotiated 50 percent 
of all new job openings held for blacks and Puerto Ricans. Long Island CORE was not 
alone in expanding its direct action initiatives. By April 1963, Philadelphia CORE 
revealed the discriminatory hiring practices of trade unions in the construction of 
municipal buildings. First, Philadelphia chapter took the fight directly to the doorsteps of 
Mayor James Tate‟s home, and then it picketed his reception room at City Hall on two 
occasions. By May, Mayor Tate briefly stopped construction on the municipal 
building.
343
 
The traditional tactic of negotiating with businesses was becoming a relic of the 
past. Local CORE chapters were taking a more militant approach in their picketing 
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techniques. Brooklyn CORE reflected this more radical approach with the Ebinger 
Bakery initiative. Over the course of several months, members of Brooklyn CORE 
picketed the Ebinger Bakery in pursuit of jobs for blacks in the community. The initiative 
came to a boiling point in August 1962, when seven Brooklyn CORE members blocked 
trucks at the bakery‟s garage, resulting in their arrest. The use of this tactic in acquiring 
thirteen jobs was a breakthrough for Brooklyn CORE.
344
 
Another tactic used by northern CORE chapters was the “sit-out,” in which 
participants blocked traffic in city streets. New Haven CORE, headed by Blyden Jackson, 
used this method in two sit-outs during the winter of 1961-62 to address the uprooting of 
poor blacks by urban renewal. Several hundred blacks sat on curbs, not blocking traffic, 
in the hopes that their direct action would lead to the passing of a fair-housing ordinance 
making decent housing available to lower-class blacks. When the bill failed to pass the 
following spring, New Haven CORE  sat-in at City Hall, blocking the entry way and 
resulting in the arrests of several participants. In the spring of 1963, New York University 
CORE, in a departure from the direct action sit-in, put to use the tactic of filing 
complaints with the city to correct housing code violations. Working with the East Side 
Tenants Council, New York University CORE picketed slumlords whose buildings had 
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code violation.
345
 While success for New York City CORE and New Haven CORE was 
minimal, both chapters introduced a directional change for CORE in thought and action. 
CORE devoted more time to employment initiatives in the spring of 1963. Expanding its 
attention beyond retail stores, CORE highlighted the discriminatory hiring practices of 
banks, consumer-goods manufacturers and the construction trades. Picketing and 
boycotts were the direct action tactics customarily used to fight this discrimination, but a 
more militant stance was taken in the summer of 1962, when CORE went beyond just 
asking for more jobs for blacks, and instead demanded “… agreements which guaranteed 
“compensatory” or preferential employment policies.”
346
   
Another issue of importance to northern CORE chapters was de facto segregation 
in education. CORE chapters across the North found black children in overcrowded and 
inferior schools well after the Brown ruling of 1954. While some CORE chapters gave 
testimony at school board hearings, others picketed the school boards.
347
 The latter 
approach was strongly endorsed by James Farmer.
348
 Chicago CORE in 1960 picketed 
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the school board and advocated that the district transport black students out of 
overcrowded black schools to the less congested white schools. By the fall of 1962, the 
Chicago school board opted to erect more Jim Crow mobile classrooms instead of 
integrating the black students into predominantly white schools. Chicago CORE‟s 
response was to picket the construction area where the classrooms were being built. By 
September of 1962, Oakland and Berkeley CORE followed suit and launched similar 
school board protests.
349
 Local CORE chapters met with resistance from the beginning of 
their education initiatives. Determined to eliminate de facto segregation in education, 
CORE chapters began to employ different direct action methods. In Bergen County, New 
Jersey, CORE in February of 1962 carried out an all night sit-in. Norman Hill, Verma 
Hill, and Gordon Carey—three national CORE staff—members participated in this sit-in 
at the Englewood City Hall, and were among the eleven arrested for this protest. By 
August, Long Island CORE with the help of chairman Lincoln Lynch “dramatized an 
NAACP de facto school segregation case” with an all-night vigil in the superintendent‟s 
office. This was followed a month later with San Francisco CORE staging an overnight 
sit-in at the Board of Education.
350
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In addition to sit-ins, local chapters used boycotts to end de facto segregation in 
education. Brooklyn CORE with the help of Reverend Milton Galamison‟s Parents 
Workshop for Equality in New York City Schools, launched a boycott in September 
1962. The two organizations urged a small group of black parents to remove their 
children from the segregated black schools and hold a twenty-six hour Board of 
Education sit-in. Feeling pressure from the direct action of Brooklyn CORE and 
Reverend Galamison‟s organization, officials from the Board of Education placed the 
black children in largely white-populated schools. Bergen County, New Jersey, and 
Syracuse, New York, CORE quickly followed Brooklyn CORE‟s education initiative. In 
September of 1962, each chapter boycotted against all black elementary schools. 
Syracuse CORE‟s one-day boycott led to a promise by the board to investigate the 
problem, and after a close study—the board closed the two Jim Crow black schools. 
Individuals in the North also fought against de facto segregation in education. Mr. and 
Mrs. Jerome Bibuld, an interracial couple who were members of Brooklyn CORE, in 
1962 removed their children from P.S. 282, a predominantly black school. Elaine and 
Jerome, who played an active role in their children‟s education, found the educational 
standards low at P.S. 282. When the Bibulds discovered their ten-year-old son Douglas, a 
fifth grader, was doing third grade work, they took their children out of the school and the 
Board of Education sued them for violating the state attendance law. The Bibulds and 
other Brooklyn CORE members responded by holding a 120-hour sit-in. This sit-in, 
according to the New York Amsterdam News, “changed the heart of the Board of 
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Education,” and it granted a transfer of the Bibuld‟s children to the integrated PS 130 
School.
351
 Englewood CORE soon followed this boycott with a three-day boycott against 
the all-black Lincoln school, which resulted in no action by the Board of Education. Not 
deterred, Englewood held another boycott in February of 1963 to end the segregating 
policies at Lincoln.
352
  
These local CORE chapters wanted black children to have a quality education. 
They battled against this form of de facto segregation because it, 
   
Constituted a vicious circle in which educational inferiority perpetuated itself. 
Undereducated parents sent culturally deprived children to school to be taught by 
inadequately prepared teachers and to go in turn, to inferior Negro colleges to 
become the parents and teachers of another generation of Negro children.
353
 
 
The evidence of the above sentiment was overwhelming in the 1960‟s.  In 1953-1954, Eli 
Ginsberg conducted a case study of 81 segregated high schools in large southern cities. 
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He concluded that “only three out of every one hundred graduates from segregated Negro 
high schools in the South were qualified for a good interracial college.”
354
 CORE 
recognized that black children in many segregated Negro schools both in the North and 
South received an education that was inferior to its white counterpart. Black children at 
an alarming rate were failing academically, and proof of this came in the form of 
universal standardized tests. 
One such test was the “Florida Twelfth Grade Test.” This standardized test, which 
was administered to all high school seniors, was designed to show a student‟s knowledge 
in English, mathematics, science, social studies, and humanities. By 1954, “93.6 percent 
of Negro seniors who took the test scored lower than 50 percent of the white seniors,” 
and 90 percent of black students, compared to 40 percent of white students, fell below the 
mean score of 200.
355
 The Twelfth Grade Test became a part of the admission 
requirements in southern universities in 1957 to promote, as Admiral Hyman Rickover 
noted, a “quality education.” The mean score of 200 was made the automatic cut-off 
point for all high school seniors taking the exam and applying to southern universities.  
Five years after these mandates were put into place, the damage of de facto school 
segregation was clear. As Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg noted in Racial Crisis in 
America: 
Of 6,673 Negro high school seniors who took the Twelfth Grade Test in 
the spring of 1962, only 139, or 2 percent, made scores of 300 or better on 
the test! Only 475, slightly over 7 percent, made scored 200 or higher. In 
the same year, 41 percent of white high school seniors scored 300 or 
better, and 64 percent scored  200 or better. But 93 percent of the Negro 
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seniors scored less than 200 and evenhigher proportion than the 90 percent 
in 1954!
356
 
 
These data were a rude awakening to the quality of education for black children not only 
in the South, but also for northern CORE chapters in their own communities.  
As the Civil Rights movement gained momentum in the 1960‟s, CORE had an 
identity crisis. Its chapters in the North and South were gaining ground with their 
campaigns, but the organization was geographically and ideologically divided between 
North and South and local versus National CORE. Northern chapters entered into the 
urban sectors and brought attention to the plight of the black poor, but in the process 
realized their organization‟s identity did not reflect the black poor whom they were 
supposed to be helping. National and northern CORE chapters were made up largely of 
educated middle class black and white people thought to be, as Cleveland CORE member 
Tony Perot stated, “an elitist group.”
357
 Northern CORE chapters worked to improve 
housing, employment, and school opportunities for poor working class blacks, but there 
was a social and economic distance between the organization and the community it was 
trying to help. “There was, as August Meier and Elliot Rudwick noted, in fact, 
considerable anxiety over what was regarded as CORE‟s inadequacy in relating to the 
black community, both because of the organizations disproportionately white 
membership and the predominantly middle-class status of people, whether white or black, 
who were attracted to CORE.” 
358
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There was a growing feeling amongst the local northern CORE chapters that there were 
not enough black members in CORE. Juanita Nelson, a Cleveland CORE member, 
recalled as early as 1943 the chapter was “mostly white,” and that CORE had “more 
whites than Negroes.”
359
 Compared to the southern chapters, which rarely sought out 
white members, northern chapters were characteristically white and “not solid in the 
black community.”
360
 While National CORE recognized this growing concern, it stayed 
committed to maintaining an interracial organization. Gordon Carey, national field 
director, assured CORE members that they:  
 
Should not be disturbed about the apathy of the Negro community in participation 
in CORE. This is a problem that every group faces throughout the North. It is 
unfortunate; it is difficult to deal with… but it is always possible to develop an 
interracial group in spite of this.
361
  
 
National CORE was committed to the destruction of racism through the actions of an   
interracial non-violent direct action organization. The sentiment on the local level did not 
reflect the same devotion to this national motto. By the early 1960‟s, for example, 
Columbus CORE was so heavily white that a black Ohio State University student was 
“bitter” that a picket of the Rollerland Skating Rink consisted “ largely, if not completely, 
of Caucasians.”
362
 The CORE of 1942 envisioned a national federation of local interracial 
groups working to abolish racial discrimination by direct non-violent methods. By the 
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mid-1960‟s, the reality was that these groups were predominantly white. In the North 
East, where 27 chapters existed by 1965, Walter Brooks, field secretary, noted it was his 
“impression that the majority of people at chapter meetings were white and that these 
groups on average were 60% white.” 
363
  
The trend of white dominated chapters also existed in San Diego CORE. Hal 
Brown, who joined San Diego CORE in 1961, said whites constituted 90% of the chapter 
when it was founded and by 1964 made up 80% of the chapter. There was as Hal Brown 
noted, a “great white sophisticated image… that controlled meetings thru their knowledge 
of parliamentary procedures”
364
 This overwhelming presence of a more educated, 
experienced, and sophisticated white contingent kept blacks from becoming chapter 
leaders. “Black members,” according to Hal Brown, “were taking a secondary role in the 
CORE chapter, and were reluctant to voice their opinions,” a reality that discouraged 
blacks in the community from joining the organization.
365
 CORE chapters wanted to 
define themselves as an “independent community based membership organizations 
composed of people acting on their own behalf.”
366
 The goal was to establish a 
“neighborhood community organization and political action.”
367
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The interracial philosophy that animated the organization in 1942 was lacking 
within the CORE chapters in the 1960‟s. There was a chasm between the chapters and the 
black community. “We have not had,” Chicago Southside CORE‟s black chairmen 
stated,” the support we hoped from the community…. We are continually looking for 
some new approach to this problem but at this point we really have not met with too 
much success.”
368
 Even the very successful Boston CORE by late 1963 and early 1964 
was dominated by white membership. Richard Brown, a Boston CORE member, 
lamented that: 
  
At meetings whites did more talking than blacks. Actually there were 
more whites who attended meetings. It was a source of embarrassment, in 
fact, that more than 80% of the people at the meetings were white, and … 
the prominence of the whites in the chapter was one reason why the 
chapter did not have the black community behind it.
369
 
 
 CORE chapters were further distanced from the black community because of their 
bourgeois image. Education was a contributing factor to this bourgeois image. By the 
1962 convention membership was defined as “primarily middle to upper middle-
class.”
370
 Black members were, as Inge Powell Bell noted in CORE and the Strategy of 
Nonviolence, “highly mobile; children of semi-skilled or unskilled working class fathers,” 
who “had risen to professional or clerical jobs.” White members, on the other hand, 
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constituted the upper middle-class defined as the “liberal intelligentsia.”
371
 This socio-
economic description put CORE and its chapters “out of touch” with the “rank and file 
Negro.”
372
  As Walter Brooks of New Haven CORE noted, “street people did not like the 
presence of smart white people.”
373
 The CORE of the old days, as Fredericka Kushner 
observed, 
 
Used to be a spiritual emphasis—love your neighbor—the Gandhi an philosophy, 
and pacifism—but this kind of philosophy did not go over in a Negro community 
and we had few Negro members therefore. Whites in the past could afford to sit 
around and think about their spiritual well being. But Negroes could not afford to 
feel around with that kind of thing for Negroes we had to have a more practical 
type of appeal… we had to go into the Negro community.
374
 
 
The same attitude prevailed in the Long Island CORE chapter, where one woman noted,  
 
It was fine to begin as interracial, and this worked in white communities. But once 
you work in black communities, you must present black faces. Blacks needed the 
feeling that it was an organization for their problems and if white faces were in 
the organization, they did not get this feeling. It is impossible to organize them if 
you are not of them.
375
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Northern CORE chapters felt that “when we presented our face to the public, it should 
always be a black face.”
376
 The black community as early as 1942, according to Bayard 
Rustin, believed that “these are Negroes‟ problems and Negroes will have to work them 
out.”
377
  The above sentiment by the 1960‟s argued that whites needed to take a 
background role in CORE. “If whites were used,” according to David Dennis a member 
of National CORE,” instead of blacks by CORE then the local people would still feel 
dependent on whites and not get the idea that they could manage their own struggle.”
378
 
Having black leaders in CORE signified that they were capable and not impotent or 
inferior leaders in the movement. There was a growing belief that “blacks should control 
the things that have to do with their lives… and control their destiny.”
379
 CORE came to 
represent for many black members a way to “abolish racial discrimination, not integrate 
in the sense of living next door to whites… and nurture black pride.” 
380
 It was 
increasingly important to have, as Anna Holden, an active member of D.C. CORE, noted, 
“blacks in key leadership positions for credibility and strength in the black community. A 
minority movement that does not have its main base in the minority community is 
ridiculous for its main source of strength should be primarily black.”
381
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The elitist perception of CORE, especially among “grass-root blacks,” hindered the 
organization‟s growth, but it was not the only contributing factor. The tactic of direct 
action was a deterrent to some blacks because they found it offensive. Working-class and 
poor blacks were not willing to chance arrest during a protest or demonstration. Other 
factors thought to deter blacks from joining CORE ranged from concerns about 
interracial dating, a lack of a strong physical presence in the black church and 
community, and the actions of radical whites. For many blacks the interracial status of 
CORE became a tactic, not a lifestyle. These black men and women wanted an equal 
society in which to raise their families. They did not desire to mix culturally with their 
counterparts, evidenced by their concern over interracial dating. The rift between CORE 
chapters and local black churches contributed to the lack of black membership. CORE 
desired to present itself as an organization that created its power base from grassroots 
membership, yet its relationship with the black church, a core element in the black grass 
roots community and movement, was lackluster. Chapters meeting outside these black 
communities only distanced the organization further from the community. There was a 
growing feeling that black leadership in chapters was crucial in order to establish a base 
in the black community. This black leadership according to Norman Hill would “secure 
more black support for CORE,”
382
 an arduous task because of the strong hold more 
established civil rights organizations had over the black community. CORE had to 
contend with organizations like the NAACP and black politicians who according August 
Meier and Elliot Rudwick, “enjoyed close ties with religious and fraternal 
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organizations.”
383
 According to Inge Powell Bell, “CORE leaders at the national and 
local levels began considerable soul searching into their failure to compete successfully 
for the allegiance of the Northern Negro masses.”
384
 An informal conversation between 
National Director James Farmer and a leader of a Bay Area CORE chapter reflected this 
sentiment: 
 Farmer: We have to think how do we reach the masses. 
 
J: CORE has failed because we are afraid to get down on the street with those 
masses of people who are really seeking something. The people most vulnerable 
are the people seeking for identification, and we don‟t reach them.
385
 
 
CORE was determined to reach the black masses, and the first step toward 
making inroads was appointing black men and women to key leadership positions in 
CORE chapters. Whether on the East or West Coast, CORE chapters found themselves 
placing black men and women in leadership roles. A prime example was George Wiley in 
Syracuse; Gladys Harrington in New York; Louis Smith in Philadelphia; Shirley Lacey in 
Englewood, New Jersey; Julius Hobson in Washington; Walter Carter in Baltimore; 
Oliver Leeds in Brooklyn; Robert Curvin in Newark; Arthur Evans in Cleveland; Lincoln 
Lynch of Long Island; Earl Walter in Los Angeles; Wilfred Ussery in San Francisco; and 
Harold Brown of San Diego CORE.  
With this new black leadership CORE chapters went into the ghettos to recruit 
new members. They used a variety of tactics to increase their presence in the black 
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community. From speaking engagements in the community to moving their meetings to 
the “heart of the Negro community,” CORE chapters were “desperately trying to get 
more Negroes involved.”
386
 CORE chapters realized that “much of the program had been 
aimed toward the bourgeois, the educated,” and they “we‟re not going to get off the 
ground that way.”
387
  Between 1962 and 1965, CORE chapters established stronger “ties 
with the Negro community.” Philadelphia, San Francisco, New Haven, and Ann Arbor 
CORE were the first to acquire facilities for meetings in the ghetto. Cleveland, St. Louis, 
and Syracuse CORE followed in 1963 by establishing meeting places in the black 
community.
388
 
The trend was firmly in place by the spring of 1963, and this physical action 
proved beneficial for these CORE chapters in the coming months. With the recruitment 
of black members by Oakland and Cleveland CORE, there was a shift in the make-up of 
certain northern and western CORE chapters. Chapters once overwhelmingly white, like 
Philadelphia and St. Louis CORE, under black leadership revolutionized their 
membership to reflect the grassroots black community. CORE emphasized its 
commitment to bridging the gap between the organization and the black masses at the 
1964 CORE convention in Durham, North Carolina. With the theme “The Black Ghetto: 
An Awakening Giant,” CORE leaders and members devised a new action planned that 
called for, “community centers, work training, and political organization of welfare 
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recipients, all projects that would, build up a real lower class membership and attack 
directly the economic, social, and political problems of the masses of Negro poor.”
389
 
These new community organizations moved CORE chapters in a direction that 
established a congenial relationship between themselves and the black masses. 
Increasingly, CORE‟s make-up reflected more African American members than white 
members. Baltimore CORE reflected this trend at the 1966 convention with three-fourths 
of its delegates being African American. Northern CORE chapters penetrated into the 
black ghettos to recruit from the masses who had been underrepresented in the 
movement.  
While Philadelphia, Oakland, Brooklyn, New Haven, St. Louis, and Cleveland 
CORE chapters met with success, not all chapters were successful in creating this shift in 
membership. Several CORE chapters were unable to recruit “grass-roots blacks” into 
their group. “In our few recruiting attempts,” according to a Syracuse CORE leader, 
“which involved canvassing the ‟ward‟ and speaking in several churches, we have been 
notoriously unsuccessful. Perhaps our orientation is wrong…. We are attempting  to 
revolutionize a staunchly Republican city…where the Negro leadership itself has not 
demonstrated much dynamism.”
390
  
 Unlike Syracuse, Brooklyn CORE was successful in recruiting poor working-
class blacks and addressing problems that affected their community. By the summer and 
fall of 1962, Brooklyn CORE developed initiatives that not only addressed school and 
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employment integration, but also brought attention to health and sanitary conditions.
391
 
The picketing actions of Brooklyn CORE against Beth-El hospital and its dumping of 
garbage on Brooklyn Borough Hall were “an attempt to develop a grassroots approach 
toward the elimination of the everyday reality of discrimination in the ghetto, an effort to 
involve people … in direct nonviolent action on their concrete problems.”
392
 According 
to Meier and Rudwick, the goal of these initiatives was to “encourage an approach which 
[led] to more roots in the Negro community, which in turn would make, civil rights a 
reality for the great bulk of working-class Negroes.”
393
  
By the mid-1960‟s, the Congress of Racial Equality was at a crossroads. Many of 
the local northern chapters recognized that community organization, instead of direct 
action, in the black ghettos was fundamental to the future of CORE. These chapters set 
new priorities in order to bridge the rift between the organization and the black working 
class. They increasingly fostered community centers and skills training programs in the 
black community that appealed to ghetto residents. 
A significant shift took place in CORE that had a direct affect on the core ideals 
of the organization. There existed geographical divides between northern and southern 
chapters, but more importantly was the ideological divide between national CORE and its 
local chapters. This divide caused a fracturing in the organization that turned men and 
women, once friends, into bitter enemies.  
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THE OPENING OF PANDORA‟S BOX: CORE AT A CROSSROADS 
 
CORE‟S RULES OF ACTION 
 In 1942, CORE devised its Rules of Action for its chapters to follow. The 
founding members based these acts upon CORE‟s goal of erasing the color line. The 
rules noted, according to historian Inge Powell Bell, “All groups affiliated with national 
CORE [would] agree to follow the nonviolent procedure in all action which they 
sponsor.”
394
 The notion of nonviolence was important to CORE because it symbolized, as 
Bell noted, “(1) the power of active good will and no retaliation; (2) the power of public 
opinion against an injustice; (3) the power of refusing to be a party to injustice, as 
illustrated by the boycott and the strike.”
395
 For the founding members, this nonviolent 
tactic was the best approach to the challenge of eliminating racial discrimination and 
injustice. They envisioned this tactic, Bell declared as, “a lasting resolution to [racial 
discrimination] through a spirit of good will and understanding.”
396
 The end goal of this 
action plan was to create an integrated environment, where people‟s character had more 
value than their skin color.  
 For twenty years, men and women in CORE followed these Rules of Action with 
great devotion. They lived the lifestyle of nonviolence and concentrated on integrating 
society.  The organization was a unified entity that did not stray away from its goal of 
making color a non-issue. The Journey of Reconciliation, the Freedom Ride, and the 
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plethora of direct action protests are all examples of this solid ideological and strategic 
image of CORE. Yet a change took place in CORE in 1962. CORE was in the midst of, 
as James Hicks, a writer for the New York Amsterdam News, noted, a “Wind of 
Change.” Hicks lamented that “Militant Negroes are knocking on the doors of the status 
quo pleading in various ways for a change in the scheme of things … [and] they are 
asking for a better deal for the Negro.”
397
  The new dynamic within CORE refused to be 
slave to the system of white supremacy in the United States. This new cohort associated a 
new importance to being a black person in this country. This cohort led CORE in a new 
direction. These men and women, according to Paul Zuber, a civil rights attorney, “got 
mad and discovered that [they] had been the chumps for ninety years. They suddenly 
realized that [they would] remain second class citizens until they did something about 
it.”
398
 
 It was in the above climate that fundamental changes took place in CORE.   The 
northern chapters by 1962, with a rapid increase in new membership, ideology and 
strategy, focused less on the concept of integration and nonviolence, but, instead, stressed 
black separatism and the tribulations of poor blacks. The existence of the northern urban 
CORE was far different from its southern Christian counterpart. The Christian doctrine of 
southern Baptist preachers did not compel these men and women. They did not adhere to 
the traditional CORE discipline of nonviolence or the Rules of Action put in place in 
1942. “This ideology,” according to Inge Powell Bell, author of CORE and the Strategy 
of Nonviolence, “made little sense to the ghetto inhabitants whose way of life was riddled 
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with violence and who saw nonviolence merely another version of the humility and 
passivity demanded of the Negro throughout his long subordination in America.”
399
 In 
response to the question, “Are you a believer in nonviolence?”, a black female CORE 
student volunteer from Hunter College responded: 
Well, someone said yesterday, „I believe in nonviolence intellectually and 
theoretically, but if I got hit upside my head, I don‟t know what I do.‟ 
Now, that applies to me, too. In theory, I have to agree with it and it can 
be used as a weapon. It‟s a toss-up on how it‟s used. Basically I guess I am 
nonviolent, but I think if it came to a matter of self-defense, and the 
numbers were right, I think I wouldn‟t be terribly nonviolent.
400
 
 
   Within a year of the 1961 Freedom Rides, these members wanted to make 
standard practice the foot-stomping action used during the February 1962 Englewood 
school board sit-in or the all-night school sit-ins used in both San Francisco and 
Englewood. Los Angeles CORE followed suit, when its members locked arms and legs 
and forced the authorities to carry them to the squad cars. While not violent in nature, this 
new “tactical radicalization” trend, as August Meier and Elliott Rudwick noted, became 
for northern chapters a more militant approach to achieve change. James Farmer and 
national CORE complained that this change “violated CORE discipline and the principle 
of nonviolent direct action. …Under no conditions would we approve of such a tactic. 
We would approve of a sit-in—quiet, peaceful, and orderly, but not a noisy disruption of 
the proceedings.”
401
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The ideological and strategic image of CORE changed to reflect a more militant 
organization that, according to CORE member Marvin Rich, was “committed to 
eliminating discrimination, not to reconciling the discriminator.”
402
 While Farmer and 
older CORE members remained steadfast to the original principles of CORE, the era and 
its people had changed. As early as the spring of 1962, the new CORE that emerged had 
the goal of change now, not later. They no longer believed that nonviolent action would 
result in successful initiatives and campaigns. Rather, more frequent was the 
understanding, according to Wilfred Ussery, leader of San Francisco CORE, that “we 
don‟t talk about nonviolence anymore.”
403
 Ussery furthered declared, “The crucial point 
for the Negro is that on the one hand, with respect to violence, he is not starting anything. 
On the other hand, he may be ready to start something if he doesn‟t get his demands 
immediately. … I am trying to convey an appropriate sense of urgency… this country is 
on the brink of blowing up over the issue of second-class citizenship.”
404
   
There was a growing sentiment within CORE chapters that nonviolence was a 
futile strategy. Farmer and national CORE, though, remained committed to nonviolence 
as the proper approach to gaining CORE‟s goals in the movement. Farmer noted, “We are 
troubled by hate,” and “the angry young men of the present generation” who doubt “the 
nonviolent direct action ideals.” He stressed however that anyone or any chapter using 
other methods would “no longer be a part of CORE.”
405
 Even with Farmer‟s statement, 
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there was a strong understanding, according to Robert Curvin, chairman of Newark 
CORE, “that as CORE and other Civil Rights organizations achieved successes it was 
clear that direct action had not, and was not able to, solve the basic problems facing the 
masses of blacks.”
406
   
 The growing skepticism of CORE being an interracial group intensified with the 
increase in urban poor working class black members in CORE chapters. There existed an 
attitude, according to Gladys Harrington, New York CORE chairman, that the Civil 
Rights Movement and its organizations “should basically be run by Negroes.”
407
 
Members within Brooklyn CORE echoed Harrington‟s attitude when they noted, “Many 
Negroes simply will not allow their civil rights struggle to be led by whites.”
408
  
 This changing attitude towards whites as leaders in CORE caused a major divide 
in local chapters. Detroit CORE, overwhelmingly white, for instance, fractured into three 
factions in 1961. One faction argued that CORE should be an all-black organization, 
while the second faction insisted on the interracial dynamic of CORE, but with black 
leadership.
409
 The third faction criticized both factions as racist obstacles to CORE‟s 
ideology of a colorblind society and formally left Detroit CORE to form Metropolitan 
Detroit CORE. Detroit CORE members Ralph and Janice Rosenfeld recalled, “The issues 
that split the chapter were black leadership, and commitment to nonviolence.”
410
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  An organization that once thrived on unity within a brotherhood now harbored 
feelings of ambivalence and strong hostility toward whites in CORE. One CORE Detroit 
member declared, “We‟ve let whites set our values,” and this according to Fredricka 
Teer, a Baltimore CORE member, led to “strong anti-white feelings.”
411
 Whites 
represented, according to Lula Farmer, “a new deal idealism” that worked in the initial 
years when blacks tended to be nonpolitical.
412
 For twenty years, CORE had existed as a 
small-scale direct action organization. It emphasized strict nonviolence, integration in 
public accommodations, and was overwhelmingly white.
413
 Between 1961 and 1964, 
however, CORE developed into a mass direct action organization. While maintaining a 
nonviolent platform, the organization “shifted from nonviolent goodwill,” according to 
Bell, “to the organization of coercive pressure through massive direct action 
demonstrations.”
414
 By the end of this stage, the notion of blacks being nonpolitical was 
changing. In late 1964, the era of ghetto organization developed as CORE's third stage of 
existence. It was during this stage that the political voice of the black poor emerged. 
Black power, both politically and economically, became the central goal in campaigns 
and initiatives for CORE. Political and community organization replaced direct action, 
while the tactic of self-defense replaced nonviolence.
415
    
 The transition to this third stage changed the role of whites in CORE. Their 
position began to weaken in CORE as racial pride gained greater strength. It was 
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becoming increasingly difficult for blacks within CORE to accept white leadership and 
even membership in the organization. Lerone Bennett, Jr., author of The Negro Mood, 
argued that “for various reasons, most of them eminently realistic, oppressed people have 
insisted, with disturbing unanimity, that it is impossible to be both a member of the 
oppressor class and friend to the oppressed.”
416
  Blacks in CORE now defined their white 
counterparts as white liberals whose actions produced insignificant results. Increasingly, 
blacks within CORE, according to Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg perceived, the 
biracial “team” approach as a superficial type of communication. The changes this 
approach produced were “insignificant in comparison with the results of independent, 
aggressive action by militant Negro leaders who approached the white power structure 
with threats, not petitions.”
417
  
 Black Nationalist groups influenced this aggressive militant action. Such groups 
as the Black Muslims, with the charismatic rhetoric of Malcolm X, resonated with black 
CORE members. The ideas of Black Nationalism, pride and independence propelled 
these men and women to move in a separatist direction. Some CORE members found 
solace in the Nation‟s ideology. Ruth Turner of Cleveland CORE, a strong advocate for 
Black Nationalism, called it “The Black Ghetto—the Awakening Giant.”
418
 Black 
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Nationalism and Black Power, Curvin suggested, was “a label that was influencing 
people emotionally, in a sort of mass psychology, stampeding them.”
419
  
 In an editorial piece for the New York Amsterdam News entitled “What Do The 
Muslims Want,” Elijah Muhammad revealed the ideology that resonated with CORE 
members. Muhammad stated: 
  We want freedom; We want full and complete freedom. 
  We want justice. Equal justice under the law. We want justice applied  
  equally to all, regardless of creed or class or color. 
 
  We want equality of opportunity. We want equal membership in society  
  with the best in civilized society. 
   
  We want an immediate end to police brutality and mob attacks against the  
  so-called Negro throughout the United States. 
   
  We do not believe that after 400 years of free or nearly free labor, sweat  
  and blood, which has helped America become rich and powerful, that so  
  many thousands of black people should have to subsist on relief, charity or 
  live in poor houses. 
 
  We believe that the Federal government should intercede to see that black  
  men and women tried in white courts receive justice in accordance with  
  the laws of the land—or allow us to build a new nation for ourselves,  
  dedicated to justice, freedom, and liberty.  
 
  Since we cannot get along with them in peace and equality, after giving  
  them 400 years of our sweat and blood and receiving in return some of the 
  worst treatment human beings have ever experience, we believe our  
  contributions to this land and the suffering forced upon us by white  
  America, justifies our demand for complete separation in a state or  
  territory of our own. 
 
  As long as we are not allowed to establish a state or territory of our own,  
  we demand not only equal justice under the laws of the United States, but  
  equal employment opportunities… NOW!
420
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While the Nation of Islam and CORE shared certain goals, their approaches were 
drastically different. Muhammad and the Nation spoke of the empowerment of the black 
man and woman, which became the ultimate goal of complete freedom and 
independence. Gary T. Marx, author of Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the 
Black Community, claimed, “A vital element of all Negro protest is the quest for dignity 
… among the Black Muslims, unlike other groups, dignity is best pursued within the 
framework of an all-black society.”
421
 This mindset appealed to blacks within CORE. 
“Just because the Black Muslims,” one unidentified CORE convention delegate declared, 
“don‟t eat pork, that ain‟t going to stop us from getting together with them.”
422
    
 Important black leaders within CORE began to see the influential effect of Elijah 
Muhammad, Malcolm X, and the Nation of Islam. Robert Gore, CORE‟s assistant 
community relations director, witnessed this ideological shift firsthand at a debate 
between Bayard Rustin and Malcolm X in 1962: 
  I came away… with mixed feelings… Being a pacifist, a Negro, and one  
  who has been involved in the racial struggle lately I expected to be with  
  Bayard all the way and against Mr. X completely. My mixed feelings were 
  a result of the discovery that I was applauding more for Malcolm X than I  
  was Bayard Rustin…. There is no question in my mind but that Bayard  
  presented the saner attitude, but the amazing thing was how eloquently  
  Malcolm X stated the problems which Negroes have confronted for so  
  many years. … I must confess that it did my heart a world of good to sit  
  back and listen to Mr. X list the sins of the white man toward the black  
  man in America.
423
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Farmer was quick to state CORE‟s official stance on the Nation of Islam. “The 
Muslims,” he declared, “are all black and CORE is interracial. The Muslims are 
separatists and CORE is integrationist. The Muslims do not reject violence as a solution; 
CORE does.”
424
 Farmer furthered this position at a speaking engagement in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. “Theirs is a movement,” he stressed, “of despair. They represent the 
view that America will not and cannot implement its democratic ideals. CORE is a 
movement of hope that America can live up to its credo.”
425
  
 Coming increasingly under scrutiny was the ideology of CORE as this interracial 
group strived for a just and integrated society.  Even with CORE‟s official stance on the 
Nation of Islam, there was a level of respect for the organization and its leaders. A 
growing divide caused tension in CORE. Farmer, fully aware of this tension, emphasized 
at the 1962 national convention, “We no longer are a tight fellowship of a few dedicated 
advocates of a brilliant new method of social change; we are now a large family spawned 
by the union of the method-oriented pioneers and the righteously indignant ends-oriented 
militants. …Our problem is the constant internal tension between means and ends.”
426
 
CORE, with Farmer at the helm, was confronted with the ensuing battle between the 
“means-oriented idealists (pacifists), devoted to nonviolence,” and the “ends-oriented 
militants (the angry young men), willing to discard nonviolence as a tactic.” Initially, 
Farmer viewed this tension as positive for CORE. “Without the Young Turks the 
movement could never have grown to mass proportions, and without idealists it could not 
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have developed revolutionary dimensions. The anger of one without the disciplined 
idealism of the other could have produced only nihilism.”
427
 Farmer recognized the 
importance of this new segment in CORE, but stressed that the organization would “stay 
nonviolent” because “it cannot succeed if it does not remain nonviolent.”
428
 “I advocate 
keeping,” Farmer furthered declared, “that eye on the prize, or we risk as a minority the 
total loss of our identity and the loss of our movement itself in an avalanche of rusty 
words.”
429
 Lincoln Lynch, chairman of Long Island CORE, echoed this position. He 
indicated that CORE‟s strength was in its commitment to nonviolence and integration. 
“We realized,” Lynch, declared, “the chapter‟s strength lay in people of divergent 
backgrounds working together [and] nationalism was never an overt issue in the chapter, 
but a covert issue. It was never a question of someone getting up and saying we did not 
need whites.”
430
 
 The initial tension Farmer defined as valuable for CORE proved more detrimental 
as 1962 ended. The ideological fracturing of CORE went beyond this tension, and the 
fragmentation of the organization proved more complicated than Farmer had initially 
thought.  Fueling this tension, E.U. Essien-Udom, author of Black Nationalism: A Search 
for an Identity in America, noted, was that “A century after the Emancipation, nineteen 
million black Americans, robbed of their traditions and of a pride in their past, are still 
seeking acceptance by the white majority but are continuing to live in semi-bondage on 
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the fringes of American society.”
431
 This semi-bondage caused psychological problems 
because, as Killian and Grigg emphasized, “the Negro American can neither forget that 
he is black nor be proud of it. The question that presses …is whether Negroes in America 
will wait patiently while the slow, peaceful, democratic process of integration 
evolves.”
432
 “There is little evidence,” Killian and Grigg furthered declared, “that white 
society will be willing to give up its sense of dominance without a struggle. Nor is there 
much evidence that white Americans are willing to make sufficient sacrifices to speed up 
the process of integration and overtake the increasing alienation of the masses of Negro 
Americans.”
433
  
It was in this environment that CORE faced a threatening dichotomy. “We are in 
a time,” Paul Anthony, a member of Atlanta‟s Southern Regional Conference, noted, “of 
great promise and great danger. … Danger that Negroes will lose all faith in established 
institutions and will seek out other alternatives.”
434
 Those other alternatives, such as 
Black Nationalism, became more alluring in 1964. For blacks in the urban North, the idea 
of black power was intriguing.  As Stokely Carmichael declared, “the reason the Negro is 
in the position he‟s in today is not because he‟s not integrated, but because he doesn‟t 
have power. Integration is an insidious subterfuge for white supremacy.”
435
 These Black 
Nationalist ideas resonated with the new black CORE members. Militant northern CORE 
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members began to echo this sentiment. Rejecting the passivity of CORE‟s nonviolent 
integrated platform, one militant northern CORE member emphasized that, 
There is a begging aspect of it I don‟t like. When I am walking out in front of a 
store I am essentially saying to people that I‟m a Negro and Negroes are not 
treated well—will you please do something about it? I don‟t want to see myself 
quite like that—it‟s hard to find the words to use. I would rather see myself 
standing forth a man like any man and making certain I receive my due—nothing 
plaintive—no asking. When I am walking in front of a realtor‟s office, I still feel I 
am begging him. I would feel better if I could walk in and shove him out of the 
way and look at the listings—that, I would feel, would be being a man.
436
 
 
 Malcolm X, who broke away from the Nation of Islam in 1964 and formed the 
Organization for Afro-American Unity, still promoted Black Nationalism as a means of 
gaining political and psychological strength. He implored blacks to stop looking toward 
their white counterparts for the solution to their problems. He emphasized that blacks 
were not Americans but victims of Americanism and that Black Nationalism, not 
nonviolence was the correct “reaction to racism.”
437
 “If we react,” Malcolm declared, “to 
white racism with a violent reaction, to me that‟s not black racism. If you come to put a 
rope around my neck and I hang you for it, to me that‟s not racism. My reaction is the 
reaction of a human being reacting to defend himself and protect himself.”
438
 
 A combination of increased ghetto/community organization and Malcolm‟s Black 
Nationalism rhetoric furthered weakened white involvement and influence in CORE. 
Farmer even began to reevaluate the direction of CORE. “Must we renounce,” Farmer 
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declared, “ourselves and our community for the sake of integration?”
439
 Farmer 
suggested, “Perhaps we … were at fault for not knowing sooner that some form of 
nationalism, or group-ism or ethnocentrism-- there is a suitable name yet for this model I 
am trying to describe—can be incorporated into CORE‟s inner life without fatally 
compromising its ultimate ideals.”
440
 Farmer proposed a fragile alliance between the 
CORE of yesterday and the emerging CORE of 1964. 
 By 1965, this fragile alliance began to fracture. Mr. and Mrs. Robert Abromotitz, 
white members of New Haven CORE, recalled that by the spring of 1965 tensions 
between blacks and whites in the chapter were readily apparent. There was no longer the 
personal closeness or socializing between blacks and whites that had existed in 1963, 
when they joined the chapter.
441
 Specifically, in New Haven CORE, Mr. and Mrs. 
Abromotitz noticed that whites were subtly driven out of the chapter, while Walter 
Brooks, the black vice-chairman of New Haven CORE, advocated “blacks running 
things.”
442
 
 San Francisco CORE, according to Inge and Duran Bell, experienced the “edging 
out of whites” as early as 1964. “Black nationalism,” according to the Bells, “was one of 
the main things which tore CORE apart.” The San Francisco chapter had had several 
discussions about Black Nationalism in 1962 and 1963. By 1964, the Bells recalled a 
sense of self-confidence on the part of blacks in the chapter. It was this self-confidence 
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that enabled blacks, influenced by Black Nationalism and community organization, to 
drive whites out of the chapter. The trend of blacks leading in the urban ghettos left little 
room for whites within CORE. The emerging attitude was that black CORE members did 
not need whites to be successful with campaigns and initiatives.
443
  
 A revolutionary change took place in the social and political structure of CORE.  
Critical of whites and influenced by the Watts riot of 1965, to enhance self-defense, 
blacks in CORE envisioned organized power in black communities as the solution. 
Through organized black communities, CORE wanted to compel the American power 
structure to establish fundamental change among its politicians, labor leaders, and 
capitalists. CORE would organize and become the political voice, presence, and platform 
of the black poor. This new direction caused major debates within the organization. The 
house of CORE was now divided and the future of the organization was unknown. The 
direction, structure, and membership of CORE were under attack by new ideologies, 
strategies, and principles.
444
 The divisiveness within the organization created a dilemma 
over the next several years between men and women who once had considered each other 
comrades in the fight for equality. 
 The first divisive debate centered on the practicality of using direct action to fight 
institutional racism. All across the North and West, chapters argued, internally and 
externally, over integrated or community organized direct action. Louis Smith, a 
Philadelphia CORE member, indicated that the split existed between those who supported 
action through the “street people” and those who supported CORE‟s traditional direct 
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action platform.
445
 The lines being drawn created an escalated tension within the 
organization. Philadelphia CORE belittled the use of ghetto community organization as 
futile social work. Robert Curvin of Newark CORE noted that “some CORE members, 
who suggested that CORE could go it alone, without whites, were self-defeating.”
446
  In 
1966 Walter Carter, ex-chairman of Baltimore CORE, who doubted the efficacy of this 
new community approach, led a faction in a direct action housing campaign. Columbus 
CORE, in 1964, was heavily divided over this issue. Mike Lesser, national field 
secretary, found the chapter split between two agendas and leaders. Arthur Zebbs, former 
chairman of Columbus CORE, led the faction committed to integration of schools 
through direct action. Marlene Wilson, however, found support within the chapter for 
working in the poverty-stricken ghettos.
447
 Wilson‟s faction, with the support of Lesser, 
prevailed and began to organize the neighborhoods.  
 Harlem CORE experienced internal factionalism as well in 1963 and 1964. 
Following the Harlem riots of 1964, the tension between blacks and whites intensified.  
According to Doris Innis, there was the growing debate over who could relate to the man 
in the street. The Blyden Jackson faction consisted of white leftists who would have 
street-corner meetings to connect with the people. This faction believed, according to 
Mike Lesser a Harlem CORE member, that “leadership should be all-black in order to 
build a movement in Harlem.”
448
 The Clarence Funnye faction believed in integration 
and had a large white component. Roy Innis‟s faction discredited integration as valuable 
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and promoted a Black Nationalist platform within Harlem CORE. The political infighting 
pitted Harlem CORE members against each other, with Roy Innis„s black nationalist 
faction winning out. By 1964, according to Doris Innis, blacks lashing out at whites in the 
chapter would say “why don‟t you go home.”
449
  
 In Cincinnati, the division within the chapter manifested itself differently. While 
the argumentative point was the same, the two debating groups differed. In 1964, young 
white youths found themselves at odds with the middle-class black leadership in the 
chapter. These white youths condemned, according to Meier and Rudwick, the black 
leadership‟s “resistance to working in the slums …because it is something they have 
recently escaped from and because community organization work is fetish of the white 
kids who have alienated them.”
450
 This middle-class black leadership historically 
generated traditional CORE campaigns and initiatives. The white radical youths 
compelled Cincinnati CORE to reevaluate its campaigns and initiatives. By late 1964 and 
1965, the black leadership of Cincinnati CORE, combined community organization and 
direct action initiatives successfully.
451
    
 Increasingly, CORE chapters perceived that community organization was the 
solution to problems blacks faced in the United States. The idea of connecting with the 
urban black core was a constant topic of debate within CORE chapters in the North and 
West. Berkeley, Denver, Newark, Syracuse, Detroit, and New Haven CORE all strived to 
establish a connection with blacks in the urban core. Berkeley, through its job 
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demonstrations, tried to connect with the black community in Oakland.
452
 Denver 
established its Freedom House in the city‟s poorest areas to stimulate black growth in the 
chapter. Newark tried to establish a strong poor black contingent in its City Hall 
demonstration against police brutality. Syracuse‟s Niagara Mohawk initiative recruited 
grass-roots blacks from Rochester to help with the demonstration.
453
 Both Detroit and 
New Haven CORE found small numbers of poor blacks from the community joining the 
chapters.
454
 Overall, Berkeley, Denver, Newark, Syracuse, Detroit, and New Haven did 
not have overwhelming success penetrating the urban core of cities.
455
  By late 1964, 
according to James McCain, CORE‟s director of organization, “The Negro community, 
especially the lower economic segment, has been untouched by CORE.”
456
 Farmer even 
noted at the 1965 convention, “If we are honest we will admit that most [chapters] have 
failed” to penetrate into and organize the black community.
457
  
 This initial failure only invigorated these chapters‟ commitment to black 
community organization. This determination coupled with a growing disdain for 
integration resulted in a new directive for several northern and western CORE chapters. 
The initial rationale for community organization was to address major issues faced by 
blacks in the community. Now, the rationale for community organization, according to an 
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unidentified black CORE leader, was “to develop a base and get power to change 
things.”
458
 This new directive had the potential, which frightened traditionalist CORE 
members, of becoming a black power and separatist platform. This community 
organization directive became the “New Directions” of CORE and the movement. CORE 
traditionalists believed that this directive harmed the organization because of how CORE 
chapters defined black separatism and black power. CORE traditionalists feared that 
followers of these “New Directions” would not embrace the true meaning of black power. 
A CORE position paper on black power noted that black power had been “twisted by 
knaves to make a trap for fools,” to believe that black power meant violence and 
racism.
459
 Rather, CORE traditionalists argued,  
 It [black power] does not mean black separatism or the Black Muslims‟   
 approach. It means an honest recognition of the beauty of blackness and   
 negritude, and an understanding of African history; and awareness of   
 Negro culture and history within the American heritage, and a dedication   
 to help create a new society rather than welcome Negroes into first-class   
 citizenship in the old. It is further understood that Negro contributions will  
 be as fundamentally important as white ones in the new creation.
460
 
 
The CORE position paper further suggested, according to Inge Bell, that “black power 
was merely a slogan asserting the right of Negro Americans to do what all other groups in 
society had done.”
461
 The paper argued: 
It is singular that Black Americans, in the midst of their own revolution, have 
been made the subject of a new kind of ridicule and hatred emanating from our 
desire to do, at last, what the white community has always asked us to do—grab 
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our bootstraps, consolidate our political power and act in the framework of this 
democracy to change our own lives. This is Black Power—a concept as old as the 
first American immigrant who sought to share in the government of this land. As 
old as John Fitzgerald of Boston, Massachusetts, who built a base of political 
power that placed his grandson in the White House.
462
 
 
Farmer envisioned a black community embracing an uplifting black power that 
unified people. As he suggested in his weekly editorial The CORE Of It, “CORE is now 
deadly serious in its efforts to mount Freedom Democratic Movements throughout this 
country, movements which will represent black power addressed to black questions, 
mobilized outside the usual political alignments.” Farmer weaved black power and 
nationalism into a larger equality context that emphasized freedom and social change.
463
 
Farmer‟s definition of black power was cohesively in line with CORE‟s traditional 
principles of interracialism, nonviolence, and direct action.  
 Not everyone interpreted black power and separatism in the same way. Roy Innis 
was a prime example of a diverging interpretation. Innis, as New York CORE chairman, 
put in place a “black male caucus” that excluded white members from policy making in 
the chapter. CORE traditionalists feared these types of actions would become the norm 
under the “New Directions.” Innis‟s New York CORE chapter represented the type of 
black power and separatism that became skeptical of white participation. The white 
liberal came to be defined, according to Lerone Bennett, Jr. as, 
A man who finds himself defined as a white man, as an oppressor, in short, and 
retreats from that designation. But—and this is essential—he retreats only 
halfway, disavowing the title without giving up the privileges. The fundamental 
trait of the white liberal is his desire to differentiate himself psychologically from 
white Americans in the issue of race. He wants to think and he wants others to 
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think he is a man of brotherhood. The white liberal talks brotherhood; he writes 
about it, prays for it, and honors it. But: Between the idea and the reality; Between 
the motion and the act; Falls the shadow. …The white liberal is Andrew Johnson 
saying to Negroes in 1864, „I will be your Moses,‟ and taking, in 1865 the posture 
of Pharaoh. He is Abraham Lincoln biting his lip, as he put it, and keeping silent. 
The white liberal is the man who was not there in Montgomery and Little Rock 
and Birmingham; the white liberal is the man who is never there. The liberal, as 
Saul Alinsky, the brilliant white radical said, is the man who leaves the meeting 
when the fight begins. … This is the white liberal: a man of Shadows, a friend of 
freedom who pauses, calculates, hesitates, [and] as a result his reputation in the 
Negro community is at an all-time low.
464
   
 
Now the white man and woman, whether liberal or not, now according to David Cohen, a 
white Cleveland CORE member, “had the skin color of the enemy.”
465
 This perception of 
a white liberal pitted blacks against their white counterparts in CORE. With this attitude 
becoming the norm rather than the exception, where did that leave the “white CORE 
brothers and sisters?” Brooklyn and the Bronx CORE chapters, which were extremely 
influential amongst other CORE chapters, responded by redefining the role of whites in 
the organization to strictly supportive.
466
 Marlene Wilson of Columbus CORE echoed 
this move by restricting white participation to typing and research.
467
  
  The perception of white paternalism also contributed to whites losing influential 
positions and status in CORE.  White office holders, decision makers, and leaders 
became obsolete in many CORE chapters because, as one black CORE member declared, 
“Whatever whites did would be interpreted as paternalistic”
468
 Richard Haley of Harlem 
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CORE witnessed the same white paternalism during the early 1960‟s. Marvin Rich, 
CORE‟s communications director, was a charismatic and sophisticated leader who held a 
tremendous amount of decision-making power in CORE. While Haley respected Rich‟s 
acumen, other black CORE members came to despise Rich‟s decision-making authority. 
Black resentment of Rich, according to Meier and Rudwick, existed because of his white 
paternalistic nature.  Rich had the attitude, Meier and Rudwick noted, that “you are all 
nice people, but I am the decision maker. Because you are nice we will discuss, and I will 
not always insist that my decision be adopted, but by and large you will find that I am 
right.”
469
 The notion that Rich was “pulling the strings” became a point of contention for 
black CORE members.
470
 By the spring of 1965, Harlem CORE was overwhelmingly 
black with whites in less visible roles.  
 White leaders in Bergen County, New Jersey CORE confronted the same type of 
backlash from black CORE members. Blacks within the chapter believed that they could 
only identify effectively with “ghetto” people. “We felt whites,” according to Shirley 
Lacey, “had to play a new role. Whites felt they were working with us. We felt they 
should be working for us. We wanted the success to be ours …to win our own battles. If 
there were any mistakes, we should make them. We felt that whites should have no voice, 
…that they should run the mimeograph machines, …but should not work in the 
ghetto.”
471
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 By the 1966 national CORE convention in Baltimore, there was a strong change 
in tone towards whites. There was no longer a tolerance for whites. “People were no 
longer saying,” according to Rosenfeld, “that we have too many whites in office; instead 
they were saying, we have too many honkies around here.”
472
 Blacks perceived the role 
of whites in CORE as inhibiting them and the organization.  In the Detroit CORE 
chapter, “You are white and so you don‟t understand” became a staple in heated debates 
between whites and blacks that exacerbated the racial polarization.
473
 White CORE 
members were reduced in some, but not all, CORE chapters to being followers and 
supporters; a far cry from the leaders they began as in 1942.
474
 In Brooklyn CORE, 
according to Meier and Rudwick, as late as December of 1964, “five of the fifteen 
members of the chapter‟s executive board were white … and were limited to the 
essentially housekeeping posts of financial and recording secretary.”
475
 Even with 
diversity on the issue of white participation, the transitional trend was clear. Restricting 
white participation was becoming the standard, but more alarming was the demand in 
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some CORE chapters for the complete exclusion and removal of whites from the 
organization.
476
  
The limitation of white participation in CORE chapters was diverse and so too 
was the reaction of white CORE members to this limitation. While some agreed with this 
new position taken by black CORE members, others responded with great astonishment. 
Whites in Seattle CORE, Mrs. Freel, a Seattle CORE member recalled, in response to the 
limitation and exclusion of whites, declared, “after all I‟ve done for CORE, after how 
hard I worked in this chapter … after all that, you want to throw me in the trashcan.”
477
 
Selma Goode of Detroit CORE noted that whites firmly did not back down or out of 
leadership positions as early as 1961.  The predominantly white chapter in 1961 argued 
that “CORE doesn‟t mean anything if it was not both for blacks and whites. It is not a 
black white fight.” By 1965, the fractured Detroit chapter agreed that “whites should not 
dominate survey teams [in the black community],” but rather the white member should be 
quiet.
478
 White members could still participate and exert influence, but Detroit CORE 
emphasized that one of the chapter‟s goal was to develop black leadership.
479
  This new 
position prompted Selma Goode to accept the position of research chairman and gather 
information that black CORE members and leaders used to fight against institutional 
racism.
480
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White members within San Fernando Valley CORE took a masochist stance in 
self-limiting the role of whites in the organization. While in a “group therapy” session, a 
white member recalled, “We had lots of white masochists—I remember one who got up 
and said, „Every time I look in the mirror, I see that I‟m white and I feel guilty. I can 
never know what it is like to be black.‟ Much of the time at meetings was taken up with 
oral confessions.”
481
 A white female member of the Marin County, California, CORE 
echoed this same sentiment.  While attending a CORE conference in Los Angeles, she 
declared that, after spending three days in the ghetto, “beyond the [poverty] I found 
something else. Truth. There does not seem to be the need for glamour or falseness that is 
so obvious in the white world. This truth and honesty are everywhere, in the food, the 
music, in the talk, and in the faces of the people. …Through all the things I saw and felt 
during those three days I have some strong feelings regarding the white role in the Civil 
Rights Movement. My feeling is that the role of whites should be one of almost 
silence.”
482
 Syracuse CORE member Ronald Corwin believed a white person should not  
set strategies or make decisions on tactics for blacks. “When it comes,” Corwin recalled, 
“to the politics of wheeling and dealing in the ghetto, whites are a liability.”  Even with 
his talents to lead and organize, Corwin still recognized that he did not completely 
understand the desperation that blacks endured.  Whether social, economic, or racial, this 
disconnect for Corwin hindered CORE and the movement.
483
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The sentiments of betrayal, shock, masochism, and romanticism did not stop the 
inevitable flight of many white members from their respective CORE chapters. In 1967 
Selma Goode, research chairman for Detroit CORE, left the organization when the 
chapter chairman claimed that she “was the symbol of what was wrong … [she] was the 
white middle class bitch from the suburbs.”
484
 White men and women, like Selma Goode, 
grew tired of the snide remarks, the limited involvement, and the devaluing of their 
contributions to CORE.
485
  
 Black members from these CORE chapters did not fight the exodus of white 
members, and they welcomed the influx of new black members. CORE‟s membership in 
its Baltimore, Columbus, New York (Harlem), San Francisco, Berkley, Syracuse, Boston, 
Long Island, Washington, Detroit and New Haven chapters was either overwhelmingly or 
slightly more black by 1965. Black leadership, whether separatist in nature, became 
popular within these chapters in the mid-1960‟s. There were consequences of the white 
exodus and new directions of these chapters. Quite often, the organizational, financial, 
and manpower stability of the chapter collapsed when whites left these chapters.  
 It was no secret that national CORE and its chapters relied heavily on white 
financial support. Marvin Rich, one of CORE‟s lead fund-raisers, netted 95%--nearly a 
half a million dollars—of CORE‟s income from a list of primarily white donators.
486
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 There was internal factionalism within Detroit CORE. This resulted in the chapter 
having about 50-60 members by 1966—40% being white. This number would drop to 20 
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immediately following the Detroit riot. According to Ms. Goode, when the riot was over 
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“Little money,” according to James Peck, “came from blacks.”
487
 The physical exodus of 
white members meant depletion in funds for the chapters.  
This financial dilemma was further complicated by the instability in organization 
and manpower in these chapters. For instance, San Francisco CORE, which forced out 
much of its white membership and leadership by 1964, found a tapering off of initiative 
oriented activity.  Berkeley CORE, according to Charles Sellers, had a hard time 
maintaining the chapter because white members had done this. White members, because 
of their educational background, monopolized speeches, picketing, and negotiations. The 
chapter gradually shriveled away over the next couple of years.
488
 
 For the Bergen County, New Jersey, CORE chapter, the organization “died,” 
Shirley Lacey laughingly declared, “soon after the blacks took over.” For New Haven 
CORE, where whites staffed most of the jobs, organized work in greater numbers, and 
negotiated with city officials, “things,” according to Mr. and Mrs. Abromotitz, “stopped 
happening after whites left.”
489
  Losing the white contingent, financially and as 
contributing members, caused irrevocable damage to these CORE chapters. The malaise 
of CORE chapters like San Francisco, Berkeley, and Bergen County, New Jersey 
intensified the racial polarization that came to be consumed by Black Nationalism and 
separatism.
490
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 CORE chapters that had a slight white or slight black majority approached the 
divisive nature of racial polarization differently. For instance, both the Cleveland and 
Boston CORE chapters gave little relevance to the black and white issue. Cleveland 
CORE, 70% black in membership by 1964, discussed the tensions that existed between 
whites and blacks in the chapter. Ruth Turner, a committed nationalist member of the 
Cleveland chapter, made sure that the tension never escalated to a confrontation. Turner 
and the chapter committed themselves to getting things done, and thus set any combative 
relationships to the periphery.
491
 
 Chairman Lincoln Lynch of Long Island CORE emphasized that black leadership 
was always implicit but never explicit. “We tried,” Lynch recalled, “to push blacks with 
any degree of leadership into positions of leadership. It was a covert situation, never a 
overt, but we all recognized it.”
492
 Alan Gartner, chairman of Boston CORE, perceived 
the predominantly black chapter as having fewer black and white tensions than 
elsewhere. Several reasons contributed to blacks and whites working well together in the 
chapter, Gartner recalled: 
1. The successes on substantive issues, thus with something to do there is no 
time for in fighting. 
2. Boston had a greater history of interracial cooperation on these issues and in 
many ways it was a less segregated city. 
3. There were strong blacks committed to interracial structure 
4. Alan‟s own sensitivity, though he was careful to say this was limited by his 
whiteness. 
5. Finally, when there was a fight in the community, Boston CORE would be on 
the more militant ,or blacker, side.
493
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On the other hand, Washington CORE, which had a slight white majority by 
1964, was plagued with black and white tension. By late 1966, Ethebert Haskins recalled, 
overwhelming support surfaced for “not having white liberal leadership.” Mary Coleman, 
chairman of Washington CORE, believed that because of the hostility towards whites, 
their days in CORE were numbered. Black chairman Roena Rand gave validation to 
Coleman‟s belief when she stressed racial separatism within the chapter. Rand, along 
with Gladys Harrington, chairman of New York CORE, wanted blacks to run their own 
organization.
494
 
 St. Louis CORE echoed this racial polarization within its chapter. St. Louis 
CORE came to despise white leaders like Eugene Tenour and Charles Oldham. The 
intense factionalism in 1963 destroyed the once tight-knit chapter.  “We were sort of one 
big happy family,” according to St. Louis CORE member Wesley Hornsby. “We were 
almost a social club as much as an action group.” In the early days, Walter Hayes 
recalled, “There were no factions; it was a very closely knit group. We knew each other 
well, and perhaps we socialized too much….” By 1963, blacks and whites in St. Louis 
CORE were on opposite sides and white membership dwindled to twenty percent.
495
 
 Tension continued to escalate throughout 1964 and 1965 in northern and western 
chapters. A leading contributor to the tension was the disparity in education between 
white and black CORE members. Community organizing brought a new social class of 
blacks to several CORE chapters. Many of these new black members were young blue-
collar workers with far less education than their white CORE counterparts. A level of 
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distrust and hostility existed that escalated into an anti-white mentality. A New York 
Times survey of New York City blacks helped to explain this anti-white sentiment. 
Responding to the question: 
 “HOW DO YOU THINK MOST NEGROES FEEL ABOUT WHITES?”, 
sixty-three percent of New York City blacks said they did not hate whites, but they did 
not like them either.
496
 The pattern of race relations changed, for the worst, within CORE. 
As Gary T. Marx, author of Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black 
Community, explained: 
 Although the attitudes of white Americans toward Blacks may be becoming more 
favorable, the reverse is not necessarily true. While the differences are not large, 
as age decreases there is a tendency for anti-white sentiment to increase from 14 
to 27 percent. When the effect of education is held constant, this tendency 
becomes more pronounced. Thus, among people with only a grammar school 
education, 47 percent of those under 29 scored as anti-white in contrast to 23 
percent of those 60 and over. Among college educated, in the youngest group 20 
percent scored as anti-white while none of the college educated over 60 did.
497
 
 
From an educational perspective, blacks in CORE reflected the anti-white sentiment of 
the less educated black population or the twenty-nine-year-old with only a grammar 
school education.
498
 In most CORE chapters, whites were better educated than blacks. St. 
Louis CORE, with a membership of 12 whites and 13 blacks in 1951, reflected this 
disparity. Of the 12 whites, nine had a college degree, while only two of the 13 blacks 
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had a college degree.
499
 Wanda Penny, a black St. Louis CORE member, recognized this 
educational gap. “The whites,” Penny recalled, “were more articulate, and they guided 
the meetings, they seemed to know more about everything.”
500
  Fewer blacks went to 
college, and compounding the educational differences was the fact that many blacks were 
products of segregated schools, and thus far less educated than whites.
501
 This 
educational gap caused blacks, according to Gene Hughes Houghton of Berkeley CORE, 
“to take a back seat in negotiations on job projects.”
502
 “As we went into school 
projects,” Houghton recalled, “the tactics which worked best—making speeches before 
city councils and school boards—were involving skills that whites largely 
monopolized—so that left more black members feeling like they were on the 
sidelines.”
503
 This educational disparity contributed to the larger social and cultural 
disconnects. As Houghton explained, “Berkeley CORE had the most racism,” due largely 
to “the whites being middle class and the Negroes having lower status.”
504
 “There was a 
psychological undercurrent,” according to Meier and Rudwick,“ present in both whites 
and blacks that whites are better qualified or [ educated] to lead.”
505
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 Another source of tension facing CORE during this period was the debate over 
whether to employ nonviolence or self-defense violence. The long commitment, by 
CORE, to nonviolence had become an unattractive liability. The uncertainty of using 
nonviolence increased as city riots and physical intimidation escalated across the 
nation.
506
  Within CORE chapters as well as at the national level, the divisive debate over 
nonviolence versus self-defense violence intensified. A dichotomy existed that pitted an 
old CORE faction against a new CORE faction. The new CORE faction did not relate to 
nonviolence; it was a foreign philosophy that it just did not want to understand. Turning 
the other cheek and sustaining bodily injury was, according to Columbus CORE member 
Judy Sheerer, “a very alien motive operation since the whole lifestyle of the Negro 
community was so much more violence-oriented than that of the white middle class 
intellectuals.”
507
  Ollie Leeds of Brooklyn CORE echoed this sentiment when he 
emphasized, “nonviolence was very unpopular in the black community, except among the 
church people, and we never recruited from among them anyhow.”
508
 
 The old CORE faction, with its pacifist roots, was committed to nonviolence as a 
guiding principle and not just as a useable tactic in campaigns and initiatives. These men 
and women, according to CORE‟s Rules of Action, “met the anger of any individual or 
group with the spirit of good will and creative reconciliation: they submitted to assault 
and did not retaliate in kind either by act or word.”
509
 This commitment, by both black 
and white CORE members, to a disciplined order was unwavering. The steadfast 
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devotion was largely due to these members‟ commitment to the original goals and 
principals in CORE. Nonviolence paired well with the goal of reconciliation and the 
principle of integration in the early years of CORE. “In the old days,” Charles Oldham of 
St. Louis CORE recalled, “there was a great emphasis on reconciliation—trying to get the 
discriminating person to change and trying to think of him as a friend.”
510
  
 The new CORE ethos, though, believed integration and reconciliation had failed 
and thus nonviolence was futile and no longer useful. A shift in ideology took place in 
which, according to Marvin Rich, “traditional CORE philosophy became obscured.”
511
 
Early members like George Houser, James Peck, and Bayard Rustin did not accept this 
shift in ideology. Rustin was quick to denounce any use of violence in CORE.
512
  Even 
with Rustin‟s criticism, the fact remained that national CORE and its chapters began to 
redefine its meaning of nonviolence. There existed a vast gray area when defining 
nonviolence in CORE. On the one hand, according to Meier and Rudwick, nonviolence 
meant “the distinction between nonviolence as a way of life and nonviolence as a tactic 
on demonstrations; or the difference between violence as a weapon of self-defense 
against specific attacks, and the employment of violence as a strategy of offense.”
513
 
What became evident was growing support for self-defense violence. In the early summer 
of 1966, Boston CORE‟s statement on the issue reflected this sentiment. The statement 
indicated that while Boston CORE “would remain committed to nonviolence, it would 
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not criticize self defense by black people [because] Negroes had the unquestioned 
American right to defend their lives, their families, and their property.”
514
 Ronnie Moore, 
Assistant Director of Organization in CORE, echoed this mentality when he stated, “I am 
and have always been in favor of self-defense of one‟s home, but I have always held that 
direct action, which includes picketing, mass demonstrations, etc., must be nonviolent. 
For philosophical reasons must not only this exist, but also it must exist for practical 
reasons. I know the reality of nonviolence because I have worked in the South and I have 
inhaled tear gas. I have witnessed police brutality; I have ducked bullets therefore, I knew 
when it was wise to pick up guns and when it was wise to be nonviolent.”
515
 
 Nonviolence came to represent weakness for many blacks in CORE. “Many of the 
blacks in CORE,” Gene Hughes Houghton declared, “did not want to be in a position of 
[weakness]. They wanted to yell at the employers, not negotiate or beg. They didn‟t want 
to do anything cautious to make them look weak. It was not that the blacks were more 
militant in CORE; it was that they would counsel things like breaking a window faster”
516
  
This mindset contributed to the deterioration of nonviolence in CORE and its chapters.   
 Northern CORE chapters, according Richard Haley of Harlem CORE, began to 
view nonviolence as a tactic rather than a principled ideology.  In 1965 Lincoln Lynch, 
chairman of Long Island CORE who had, tired of the violence against blacks, declared 
that “the bigots will learn that we‟re going to stop turning the other cheek. Nonviolence is 
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coming to an end.”
517
 In February of that year, Lynch furthered stressed not only that 
CORE demonstrators needed to defend themselves against physical attack but also that 
CORE should “re-examine and redefine” its nonviolent position.
518
 Self-defense became 
a staple within many CORE chapters, while nonviolence loss its viability. Peck attributed 
this shift from nonviolence to self-defense violence to the decline in the popularity of 
nonviolence. “People wanted,” Peck declared, “something new. They wanted things to go 
faster. …Nonviolent direct action was no longer fashionable and perceived as not 
working.”
519
 Even with this perception, Farmer made it clear that CORE would remain a 
nonviolent organization devoted to racial integration and equality.  
  By 1966, the new CORE and its members had rejected all that had come before. 
“Integration was passé,” according Janice Rosenfeld; “people thought they would do 
things differently and thus really do something important and be successful. The attitude 
toward whites on the part of the blacks who were becoming active by 1965 had a strong 
element of contempt for what had gone before, a contempt for experience.”
520
 Norman 
Seay, an early CORE member, echoed this sentiment: 
There was little factionalism in the old days. We had a common problem to solve 
together, and it was more severe, coping with all the discrimination we found, as 
compared to now. So we banded together.  Today, Negroes have more freedom 
and more freedom means they have more experiences, and more different views, 
thus making for possibility of factions. Also, more experiences means a greater 
eagerness to assert leadership, and so clashes.
521
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These clashes triggered distrust and questioning of traditional directives and actions 
within CORE. William Bradley, San Francisco CORE chairman, noted that “Equality and 
integration are not the same thing. I never interpreted blacks and whites together to mean 
that blacks and whites do everything together.” For Bradley, according to Meier and 
Rudwick, “Integration [was] a dirty word.”
522
 The key tenets that gave early CORE its 
substance were no longer accepted. The 1966 CORE convention reflected this rejection 
of CORE‟s traditional integration and nonviolent principles. Replacing these old 
principles were Black Nationalism and separatism, retaliatory violence, and removing 
whites from the organization. The shift in ideology escalated further after the convention 
and firmly cemented the new direction of CORE.  
 By 1967 Floyd McKissick replaced Farmer as executive director, and unlike 
Farmer, McKissick embraced black power, which influenced his leadership.
523
 For 
McKissick the Civil Rights Movement was over and in its place was the “black 
revolution.” Under McKissick‟s leadership the new aim for CORE chapters was “black 
power for black people.”
524
 “I do not believe,” McKissick declared, “that nonviolent 
demonstrations are the answer to the problems of the black people. The nation does not 
respond to nonviolent demonstrations.”
525
 CORE, under the direction of its executive 
director, had embraced black power and discarded nonviolence as a viable option. 
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“Early CORE,” according to George Houser, “was color-blind.”
526
 While Houser 
recognized the white and black ratio within Chicago CORE, he never believed it to be an 
issue. Motivating factors may have differed, with whites tending to be more pacifists. 
Houser, though, firmly believed that little tension or hostility existed within CORE. The 
organization would remain disciplined by and devoted to the original purpose put in place 
in 1942. In 1945, CORE adapted a constitution that stipulated a firm purpose for the 
organization. CORE and its members believed the purpose of the organization shall be to 
federate local interracial groups working to abolish the color line through direct 
nonviolent action; and to give a voice nationally to their convictions on current issues. 
527
 
Over the next twenty years, CORE amended its constitution and purpose. With each 
amendment, CORE moved away from its traditional principles and toward its new 
identity. The first amending of that purpose was in 1956. CORE and its members agreed 
that the purpose of the organization shall be to federate local groups, preferably 
interracial, working to abolish the color line through direct, nonviolent action and to give 
voice nationally to their convictions on human relations.
528
 CORE made two more 
changes in its purpose between 1960 and 1966: 
 1960 purpose— CORE is a national membership organization with affiliated local 
 groups, preferably interracial, working to abolish discrimination based on skin 
 color, race, religion or national origin, and stressing direct nonviolent action. It 
 shall represent the groups nationally and give voice to their convictions and to 
 those of its national associate (contributing) members.
529
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 1966 purpose— The purpose for which this organization has been formed and for 
 which it exists is to abolish racial discrimination and all resulting inequalities 
 based upon skin color, class, race, religion, or national origin, stressing 
 nonviolent, direct-action methods, political and economic methods, and 
 community organization.
530
 
 
The changes were subtle, but the impact of these changes was monumental. The first 
purpose was clear and to the point. Complication free, that initial purpose implied that 
everyone was welcome who wanted to achieve the goal of abolishing the color line. By 
1966, CORE had added distinctive layers that convoluted the goal of erasing the color 
line. CORE opened Pandora‟s door to the new ethos that was not color-blind, but rather 
filled with hostility, animosity and frustration. “It was something that came about,” Gene 
Hughes Houghton recalled, “because of frustration and rage. It was based on a feeling 
that we weren‟t getting anywhere.”
531
  Frustration became a key component in the new 
direction of CORE. Black CORE members who embraced Black Nationalism, the 
removal of whites, and retaliatory violence were tired of the minor victories and 
successes. They no longer believed they could attain meaningful equality under the old 
traditional principles and ideas of CORE. Black power, separatism, the removal of 
whites, and retaliatory violence were all a part of a new era for CORE.  For blacks this 
era encompassed power, prosperity, and fundamental change.  Blacks within CORE 
willingly accepted this new day and season.  
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